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Abstract
Military construction (MILCON) represents 40% of the federal government’s $30
billion construction budget. The federal budget is fixed; therefore, any cost overages
likely affect project scope or requirements. This study investigated if MILCON
procurement costs more than private industry construction and if so, what causes the cost
premiums. A combination of in-depth literature review, expert interviews, a unique case
study, expert surveys, and geospatial statistical analysis answered the research question.
The case study evaluated two nearly identical projects to determine how internal factors,
in addition to public laws, affect MILCON cost premiums.
This study confirmed the existence of MILCON cost premiums. Additionally, 11
major cost premium themes emerged: overly restrictive statements of requirements,
failing to balance risk, stifling or not applying innovation, unique MILCON
requirements, parameterization of the execution process, selection of construction
specifications, schedule and submittal policies, perception of MILCON construction
agents, anti-terrorism/force protection requirements, Federal Acquisition Regulations,
and socioeconomic laws and policies. Additionally, in spite of the contract requirement
similarities, once complete, the studied projects differed by over a year of construction
time and $7 million. Research frequently cites federal laws and policies as the primary
cost premium driver; however, this research demonstrated internal construction policies,
which the military can control, also cause increased cost premiums.
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AN ANALYSIS OF COST PREMIUMS AND LOSSES ASSOCIATED WITH USAF
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON)

I. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the topic of study, provide limited
background information, set the research objectives, and present an overview of the
research methodology.

This chapter defines military construction (MILCON) and

provides a limited background into MILCON execution, procurement, and acquisition
methods. This limited background provides a baseline for the primary and secondary
research objectives.

Based on these objectives, this chapter summarizes the

methodologies applied and codifies the scope and limitations.

Finally, this chapter

outlines the remainder of the thesis. This chapter sets a uniform knowledge base for the
white paper and two scholarly articles.

Background
Military Construction
The MILCON program is a multi-billion dollar yearly acquisition and
capitalization endeavor. For fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD)
requested almost $12.5 billion for MILCON (112th Congress 2011). However, budget
constraints and scarce resources for the coming years have forced the DoD to take a hard
look at all expenditures, including construction. As part of this hard look, the United
States Air Force (USAF) decreased its proposed FY13 MILCON budget from $1.3
billion to $400 million, almost a 70% reduction (Schogol 2012). The final FY 2013
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MILCON budget authorized $6.5 billion of DoD MILCON with only $258 million for
the USAF (112th Congress 2013). The reduction in MILCON spending has resulted in a
desire to stretch each construction dollar as far as possible.
Title 10, United States (U.S.) Code, Section 2801, defines military construction as
“development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military
installation. MILCON includes construction projects for all types of buildings, roads,
airfield pavements, and utility systems costing $750,000 or more” (Department of the Air
Force 2010). MILCON projects are large enough to require capitalization into the real
property records. This capitalization process is similar to construction in the private
sector, where large construction projects are capitalized as company assets. In addition to
the explicit definition of MILCON projects, the U.S. government has also issued
directives and policies regarding the execution of MILCON projects. Department of
Defense Directive 4270.5 dictates that, with few exceptions, the “Department of the Air
Force shall use the services of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) for design and construction of the annual
military construction program” (Department of Defense 2005). If USACE and NAVFAC
do not object, the Air Force can also execute a limited number of projects through the Air
Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) (Department of the Air
Force 2010). In October of 2012, AFCEE and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support
Agency (AFCESA) consolidated under a single entity called the Air Force Civil Engineer
Center (AFCEC); this thesis will generally refer to AFCEC in lieu of AFCEE or
AFCESA. The selection, and policies, of design and construction agents may cause cost
premiums for Air Force MILCON projects.
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AFCEC sponsored this research effort to validate the existence of cost premiums
associated with the Air Force MILCON program, and if premiums exist, determine the
causes of these cost premiums. Additionally, AFCEC desired identification of possible
mitigation techniques that could be applied to reduce costs.

This research adds to

existing research, reports, and similar investigative efforts that have occurred or been
requested by varying agencies in recent years.
Military Construction Cost Premiums
Anecdotal evidence frequently supports the notion that cost premiums are
associated with MILCON procurement when compared to private sector construction.
Recently, researchers have worked to validate the existence of additional costs associated
with MILCON execution.

Pope (1990) investigated MILCON versus private

industry/commercial construction from a cost perspective. The goal of his research was
to discover key “successes” from private industry construction and incorporate the
lessons into the MILCON process. His research showed quantitatively that military
construction does cost more than private sector construction. His research effort pointed
to specific factors that increase cost: additional administrative requirements; more strict
military standards; contract clauses and procurement restrictions; and legislative
requirements, specifically the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) (Pope 1990). However, further
investigation is required because legislation and contract requirements have changed and
been adapted numerous times since Pope’s research.
In 2011, faced with austere budget conditions, the House Armed Services
Committee noted that an assessment of construction unit costs found a noticeable
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difference between MILCON costs and comparable facility construction in the
commercial sector (112th Congress 2011). The challenges specifically mentioned in this
report align with Pope’s (1990) research, including legislative and contract clauses. The
committee noted that the cost for MILCON appeared to be 25% to 40% more than
private-sector construction.

Based on this discovery, the committee directed the

Secretary of Defense to report on these cost premiums and develop courses of action to
reduce these costs (112th Congress 2011). Based on this guidance, AFCEC codified
some Air Force cost premiums and found a 37% cost premium for Air Force MILCON
(Hartford 2012). These recent studies demonstrate that the research conducted by Pope
(1990), and the additional research efforts he proposed, is still valid in 2012. There are
cost premiums associated with MILCON execution when compared to private sector
construction.
Military Construction Execution
Many research efforts have focused on varying aspects of MILCON execution.
These studies have concentrated on private industry best practices such as relational
contracting, schedule performance, and design-build procurement methods. All of these
research efforts have posed additional topics for investigation, including some
specifically focusing on variables affecting construction costs.
One of these industry best-practices, alliancing, was investigated from an Air
Force perspective. Recently, alliancing has become a performance enhancer and cost
reducer in private sector construction.

Alliancing involves forming an advanced

partnership where risk and reward are shared among the contract parties toward the
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common goal of increased performance; it can increase performance and reduce costs,
but federal acquisition regulations restrict some of the required aspects (Johnson et al.
2012). However, alliancing is simply an improvement on partnering, a policy adopted by
USACE; thus, some aspects of alliancing can be implemented into MILCON and should
pay dividends.

Additionally, Johnson et al.’s (2012) research demonstrated that

alliancing can reduce pricing fluctuations in design-build projects.
Unlike alliancing, the DoD and private industry have both adopted the method of
design-build.

To that end, multiple research efforts have focused on design-build

procurement. Rosner et al. (2009) analyzed the performance of 835 MILCON projects,
including 278 design-build projects, to see if execution method affected schedule,
performance, and cost growth. The analysis showed that design-build resulted in better
performance for complicated construction; additionally, their research found that the
facility type and cost have more influence on schedule than method of execution method
(Rosner et al. 2009). Gannon et al. (2012) analyzed design-build procurement in terms of
scheduling shortfalls and found that restrictions in USACE design-build methodology
caused schedule and cost growth. Additionally, his research resulted in the concept of a
construction “cone of uncertainty” showing variability in schedule based on percentage
of the design completed (Figure 1). Other industries, such as computer science, have
applied this cone of uncertainty to cost (Little 2006).
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Figure 1: Schedule cone of uncertainty (Gannon et al. 2012)
These research efforts, and the frequent use of design-build in military and private
industry construction, pose additional questions relating to MILCON cost premiums.
The concept of Gannon et al.’s (2012) cone of uncertainty may also be applicable to
construction cost in addition to schedule. Between method of execution, design agent,
and contractual partnering/alliancing, it becomes apparent that MILCON procurement is
a complicated process involving many variables that could contribute to cost premiums.

Research Objectives
The overall research objective is to answer the question: do MILCON costs
exceed private industry construction costs, thereby reducing the cost performance and
effectiveness of USAF construction, and if so, what causes the MILCON cost premiums?
This research objective was met by integrating research questions posed by the literature
and direction from AFCEC to meet the following objectives:
1. Validate the existence of cost premiums associated with MILCON compared to
private-sector construction.
2. Determine the variables that cause/affect MILCON cost premiums through the
analysis of internal processes.
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3. Analyze a limited number of variables to determine the effect on cost
premiums. Additionally, examine interactions between variables such as
acquisition and execution method affecting scheduling.
4. Create mitigation strategies for the analyzed variables for the USAF use to
reduce MILCON cost premiums.
These research objectives revolve around meeting the Air Force’s goal of reducing the
cost of military construction procurement while also increasing performance. Also, an
additional objective of the research is to investigate MILCON cost premiums from both
the government and construction contractor points of view.

A more accurate and

unbiased determination of variables affecting cost should be discovered by analyzing
both sides of the procurement process.

Research Approach
In order to meet the research objectives posed above, four phases of analysis
occurred. The research objectives were met through the combination of two scholarly
articles and a white paper with their supporting appendices. The three articles are each
supported by one or more research phases. While each phase of the research was critical
to answering the overarching problem, each article had a different purpose or audience.
Figure 2 illustrates the four phases, the inputs required, and how each phase linked to the
three articles.
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Figure 2: Research Approach, Inputs, and Outputs

Phase 1 – Validate Cost Premiums
The first phase answered the first research objective related to validating
MILCON cost premiums. This analysis involved a literature review of existing research
and reports relating to MILCON and private industry construction costs. According to
Krathwohl (1998), a literature review has four functions: show which facets are
important, show the depth of previous research, relate the problem to previous
explanations, and determine methods and designs to use and avoid. For this research
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effort, the literature review helped scope the investigation while also meeting the phase 1
requirement to validate the existence of MILCON cost premiums.

Past research

demonstrated that there are substantial cost premiums. This research phase supported the
white paper for AFCEC as well as the journal article. Additionally, the consolidation of
MILCON cost and execution related research provides stepping stones for AFCEC to
utilize for future research.
Phase 2 – Determine Factors Causing Cost Premiums
The second phase of this investigation into military cost premiums determined the
factors that cause cost premiums. An analysis of factors causing cost premiums based on
internal MILCON processes was developed based on expert opinion and a case study.
This section provides background information on causal analysis and case studies as well
as a brief overview of the application of these methodologies.
Causal Relationships
Developing a causal relationship is the best way to develop mitigation
methodologies for MILCON cost premiums. To show a causal relationship, the entire
causal chain must be analyzed, not just the last step (Krathwohl 1998). For example, the
requirement to buy an American-made bolt may add to the cost of construction.
However, the entire causal chain would show that although the bolt did increase the cost
of construction, the implementation of a law set a policy that required the contractor to
procure the specific bolt; the cause of the additional cost is actually the implementation of
a law. A key element of causal relationships is they “are always inferred, never proven”
(Krathwohl 1998, p. 131). This statement means that causal relationships developed by
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research are not necessarily proven but rather not disproven. The framework chosen for
analysis of MILCON procurement is designed to create a theory while documenting and
validating some of the causes of MILCON cost premiums.
Case Studies
The concept of utilizing case studies to develop theory has existed since the late
1960s and continues through today (Eisenhardt 1989). Eisenhardt (1989) described how
to build theories from case studies. Her synthesis of previous work related to case studies
developed a singular roadmap directing the use of case studies for theory development.
Her eight-step process includes defining the research question, selecting case(s) to be
studied, creating data gathering protocols, collecting the data, analyzing the data, shaping
the hypothesis, comparing with similar and conflicting literature, and reaching closure.
For this investigation, comparison to existing literature helps limit threats to internal
validity. The use of case studies in analysis typically “combines data collection methods
such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534).
The qualitative and quantitative data provided by case studies require the use of multiple
methodologies during analysis.

The qualitative aspects of the case study serve to

describe the aspects of MILCON procurement that cost more than private industry or
between construction agents, whereas the quantitative analysis seeks to describe the cost
and schedule differences. According to Ellram (1996), a case study is an appropriate
methodology to answer these questions.
Early in the research effort, the number of cases requiring study must be set.
Analysis can be completed using multiple case studies or a single case study. A single
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case study can be analyzed because “each case study is in and of itself a self-contained
experiment, with unique context that is part of the experiment” (Ellram 1996, p. 100). A
single case is appropriate when it “represents a critical case to test a well-formulated
theory, an extreme or unique case, or a case which reveals a previously inaccessible
phenomenon” (Ellram 1996, p. 100). In the case of this research effort, a single case
study is utilized because the DoD has never before constructed two of the same buildings
in the same location at the same time via different execution methods, an inaccessible
phenomenon. When utilizing a single case study, it is imperative to minimize threats to
validity to allow for generalization of the results. This can be accomplished by utilizing
multiple data sources within the case study, such as focus groups, meetings, after-action
reports, and memos (Ellram 1996). The use of quantitative documentation, standards,
and written and verbal qualitative information helps limit the threat to validity posed
through the use of a single case study.
Case study analysis is not without its weaknesses. First, the use of case studies
can yield theory and causes that are overly complex (Eisenhardt 1989). The volume of
data available based on case studies and the researcher’s goal to use all of the data
available can cause this weakness. To limit this weakness, the research should focus on
applicable, simple, data while keeping in mind the need for internal and external validity.
Second, the results of case studies can be so specific or narrow that the results cannot be
generalized (Eisenhardt 1989). To limit this weakness, the researcher must ensure theory
developed from a case study has external validity. A theory requires external validity in
order to be generalized to the entire population (Krathwohl 1998). The research was
designed to explain a theory and then validate the explanation with industry experts; this
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explanatory case study with validation design helps improve the external validity (Yin
2009).

While the case study alone cannot limit all threats to internal and external

validity, validating the results with additional data, such as interview and survey data, can
lend credibility to, and improve, the validity of the results.
Likert-style Survey
Surveys describe or quantify “the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of a population”
(Patten 2009). The survey used in this study was developed to determine the level of
influence different factors have on MILCON cost premiums based on expert opinion, or
beliefs. The influence of different cost factors could not be quantitatively calculated due
to the lack of similar, specific, data between private industry and MILCON projects.
Additionally, the survey provided validity to the case study results and thereby allowed a
limited generalization of the results. The survey consisted of two overarching questions.
Both questions ask the respondents to rate the level of influence factors have on the cost
of MILCON projects; however, the first question asks for a comparison between
MILCON and private industry construction while the second question requires a
comparison between the case study projects. Each of these two overarching questions
had a series of cost premium factors listed underneath that required a Likert-style
response.
All respondents rated how each factor influences cost premiums; therefore, the
standard Likert scale was not appropriate. The standard five-point Likert scale breaks
down as Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neutral (3), Agree (4), and Strongly Agree
(5); however, this survey used: Not at All (1), To a Limited Extent (2), To a Moderate
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Extent (3), To a Large Extent (4), and To a Very Large Extent (5) (Carifio and Perla
2007). In this case, no negative responses were required because respondents were told
to assume that MILCON cost premiums exist based on previous literature; therefore, no
factors could lower the cost of MILCON compared to private industry. One of the
limitations of the scale, as written, is that it does not associate a percentage or dollar
figure to each rating. This limitation is partially mitigated by ensuring respondents all
qualify as experts in the career field and have enough breadth of knowledge to understand
the size and scope of MILCON projects.
Methodology Application
In the case of this specific research, two projects constructed via the same
statement of requirements at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), Alaska, were
compared to search for the root causes of differences in cost and performance. By
focusing on the differences between the projects and cost premiums rather than the base
cost, the results drawn from these Alaska projects can be applied regardless of location.
Contract requirement differences and after-action reports were analyzed to determine
factors that could cause cost premiums. Additionally, semi-structured interviews with
contractors specializing in MILCON and private industry construction projects allowed
for the determination of additional factors shown to cause cost premiums.
Industry experts validated all of the determined factors through the use of a
Likert-style survey. In total 32, or 75%, of the survey questions relate to requirement
differences noted during the case study analysis. To limit the survey length, factors
quantitatively known to cause cost premiums, such as Davis-Bacon Act wage rates, were
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omitted from the survey. However, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) drive many
of these quantitative factors, so the factors were included in a general form.

The

combination of these two research streams allowed for the creation of a comprehensive
list of factors that cause MILCON cost premiums.
Phase 3 – Cost Premium Factor Analysis
The third phase focused on an in-depth analysis of one factor, Davis-Bacon Act
(DBA) wage rates, shown to cause cost premiums and general analysis of other
influential factors. The further investigation of variables was based on expert opinion
obtained via a survey on the influence of each variable as well as the ability of the USAF
to affect the factor. Additionally, limiting the quantitative in-depth analysis to a single
factor occurred due to data availability and expert insistence that these wage rates
represent a large cost premium. This phase utilized the results of expert interviews,
geospatial analysis, and statistical inquiry. Phase 3 allowed for a detailed understanding
of the root causes of some of the cost premium factors.
Quantitative Geospatial Analysis
Geospatial analysis is a unique method of quantitative analysis providing for both
statistical analysis based on geography as well as visual representation of data and results.
Specifically, geospatial analysis is the “formal quantitative study of phenomena that
manifest themselves in space” (Anselin 1989).

Geospatial analysis is grounded in

statistics and mathematics while adding elements of space. Geospatial analysis of data
must meet all the requirements of the performed statistical tests being performed and
have valid and accurate geospatial parameters.
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Another key attribute of geospatial

analysis is its ability to create a single time-based sample out of a series of geospatial data
points (Anselin 1989). This ability means geospatial analysis of a set of data across an
area can be considered a single point in time comprised of hundreds or thousands of
geospatially attributed points. However, one of the main flaws to geospatial analysis is
the existence of geospatial errors. Geospatial errors exist when the location data of a
point is not accurate enough for the level of analysis or differs from the point’s true
location (Anselin 1989). However, in this research, the analysis of wage rates occurs
mainly on a national level and at its smallest point across an entire Air Force base. Any
location geospatial error is negligible due to the large area covered.
DBA and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) wage rates are both geospatially
related. The wage rates are representative of a specific location on earth. Geospatial
analysis of these wage rates allowed for the determination of differences across space.
Additionally, through the use of surface generation, a limited amount of data, such as
DBA wage rates at USAF bases, could be extrapolated to present a visual of wage rate
trends across the country. Geospatial analysis allowed for the examination of wage rates
across space at a point in time.
Statistical Analysis
Research performed during phase 3 required the use of inferential and descriptive
statistics. Descriptive statistics, such as the mean, histogram, and standard deviation
helped present the survey results. Non-parametric statistics provided ranks for the level
of influence of each surveyed cost premium factor based on each of the three
demographics. The three demographics are USACE personnel, USAF civil engineers
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and contracting officers, and contractors. Finally, inferential statistics described the
statistical significance of results based on a large quantity of data. For the analysis of
DBA wage rates, inferential statistics based on a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) and matched pairs t-test provided confidence intervals and p-values
representative of the statistical significance of the results.

These quantitative

methodologies were critical to conclusions based on the third phase of this research
approach.
Phase 4 – Develop Mitigation Strategies
The fourth, and final, phase developed mitigation strategies for the factors shown
to cause cost premiums. The development of these mitigation strategies answered the
final research objective by showing where cost mitigation efforts could be applied. The
recommended mitigation strategies were synthesized from existing literature, expert
interviews, or a combination of both. Additionally, mitigation strategies were developed
based on the linkage between influential cost premium factors and the case study contract
requirement differences. This research phase provided Air Force Civil Engineers and
AFCEC with documented evidence that can be used to adapt MILCON procurement rules
and execution.

Scope and Limitations
This research effort focused on USAF MILCON procurement. Although the
findings may apply to other branches of the military, the scope of the research was USAF
MILCON primarily executed through USACE or AFCEC.

Additionally, all cost

premium causes presented are only directly applicable to non-contingency MILCON
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procurement. Furthermore, the quantitative Davis-Bacon Act wage rate research applies
only to the carpenter and electrician trades at USAF bases.
As with all research, there were limitations to this study of MILCON cost
premiums. The lack of quantitative data was the largest limitation. Since data related to
the same facilities constructed on and off base were not available, it was not possible to
do an exact comparison and factor analysis. Additionally, contractors were not able to
provide an equivalent estimate of costs for constructing a MILCON facility off base.
Finally, the USAF does not track any loss in scope during pre-final bid negotiations in
any database. This means that if a bid comes back too high the USAF does not document
changes implemented to ensure the bid meets the programmed amount. Results were
determined from qualitative source data and expert opinion due to the lack of quantitative
data.
The use of a single case study makes the result difficult to generalize to all
MILCON projects. However, the case study presented a unique opportunity to analyze
internal factors that affect cost between the standard process and a more innovative
approach. In this case, the unique dataset and validation with industry experts through
surveys and interviews help overcome limitations to generalizability.

For expert

validation, the small sample surveyed, and limited population of experts with general
MILCON knowledge and experience with the specific case study, limited the statistical
significance. However, even with the limitations mentioned above, this research presents
viable causes of cost premiums as well as possible mitigation strategies. In addition to
the general limitations mentioned in this section, each article contains a description of the
applicable limitations.
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Organizational Impact
Military construction cost premiums affect the ability of the military to meet its
war fighting mission by expending limited resources in an inefficient manner. These cost
premiums have limited construction performance and become noticeable line items in
austere budgets. Due to these premiums, leaders have been tasked to find ways to
mitigate excess costs. Additionally, based on Congressional requirements, the Air Force
is required to do a MILCON cost premium analysis. Through this research, the Air Force
should be able to reduce its MILCON spending while gaining construction performance.
Furthermore, determination and mitigation of variables causing cost premiums should
more closely align MILCON procurement with private industry practices. Increasing the
similarities will enable construction contractors to more efficiently utilize their resources
on both government and private construction contracts.
Determining the cost premiums of MILCON procurement is a key step in
reducing military spending. The reduction of wasteful spending in MILCON projects
should be value-added for the military unit requiring a facility as well as the contractor
executing the project. While people generally scoff at the concept of “doing more with
less,” the determination and mitigation of MILCON cost premiums should allow the Air
Force to do just that. Increasing the efficiency of military construction will result in
increased mission capabilities and reduced taxpayers bills.

Overview
This chapter provided the framework for the study by describing the impacts of
cost on federal procurement, the need and desire for the research effort, the research
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objectives, the research approach, and the organizational impacts. This thesis follows a
modified scholarly article format and presents three separate articles, a white paper and
two scholarly papers, in chapters two through four. Although each article can be read as
a standalone, they flow from one to another with Chapter II providing the most
background information and results to Chapter IV providing in-depth analysis of a single
factor.

Specifically, Chapter II contains the MILCON cost premium white paper

developed for AFCEC. In addition to cost premium factors and mitigation strategies for
USAF MILCON procurement, the white paper provides extensive literature review. The
detailed look into the many causes for MILCON cost premiums provided the basis for the
next chapter’s journal article. Chapter III contains the journal article submitted to the
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. The article synthesizes expert
interviews, the case study, and survey results to present general themes shown to cause
MILCON, and thus public-sector, cost premiums. Chapter IV presents the journal article
submitted to the Lean Construction Journal. The article quantifies cost premiums based
on DBA wage rates through a comparison with local area wage rates.

Chapter V

provides overarching conclusions and serves to provide a simplified answer to the
MILCON cost premium research question. Additionally, Chapter V contains suggestions
for future research.

Finally, appendices A through D support the three articles by

providing further details, such as additional background information, detailed
methodologies, and full results.

19

II. White Paper: Report for AFCEC on MILCON Cost Premium Research, Causes
and Mitigation Strategies
This chapter contains the white paper developed for the Air Force Civil Engineer
Center (AFCEC) use. The goal of the white paper was to provide an extensive literature
review of previous research relating to military construction (MILCON) and methods of
executing MILCON. The literature review presented in this white paper also provides
detailed background for Chapters III and IV. Additionally, the white paper includes
analysis of factors causing or influencing cost premiums from the United States Air Force
(USAF) perspective. Also, this white paper includes expert suggestions directly relating
to the mitigation of cost premiums during USAF execution of MILCON. Finally, this
white paper suggests future research avenues related to MILCON cost premiums.
Appendix A and Appendix B contain additional supporting information for this white
paper.
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Report on MILCON Cost Premium Research, Causes, and
Suggested Mitigation Strategies
Developed for the Air Force Civil Engineer Center

Introduction
The United States Air Force’s (USAF) military construction (MILCON) budget,
with the exception of the deliberate pause in fiscal year 2013, is worth billions of dollars
yearly. However, anecdotal and limited quantitative evidence has shown that MILCON
procurements costs hundreds of millions of dollars per year more than equivalent
construction would cost in the private sector. The Air Force Center for Engineering and
the Environment (AFCEE), which was recently combined with the Air Force Civil
Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) to form the Air Force Civil Engineer Center
(AFCEC), sponsored research to determine the causes of MILCON cost premiums. This
white paper is one element of the MILCON cost premium research. The sponsored
research resulted in two other documents, a geospatial and statistical analysis presented in
a scholarly article regarding the effects of Davis-Bacon Act wage rates and a journal
article presenting the analysis of a case study and survey regarding USAF MILCON
generalized to public-sector construction.

This white paper provides USAF civil

engineers information regarding MILCON cost premiums from an Air Force perspective.
Additionally, the specific cost premiums have been categorized according to how much
control different levels of the USAF or DoD engineer community have over each cost
premium.

By providing a thorough background and a simple list of findings and
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suggestions, this paper sets the foundation for change in the MILCON procurement
process as well as suggested improvements to allow for future, more in-depth, research.

Literature Review
This literature review establishes a foundation of knowledge related to military
construction based on published literature and standards. The purpose is to understand
the characteristics of MILCON procurement, applicable rules and regulations, and
research as it relates to MILCON procurement and costs. This literature review begins
by defining key terms and standards that apply to MILCON level construction.

A

discussion of construction execution methods and acquisition processes follows the
MILCON background. Although this literature review references previous, published,
research efforts, the following section focuses specifically on previous research and
investigations directly related to MILCON cost premiums.

All components of this

literature review combine to form a comprehensive and cohesive picture of MILCON and
previous research.
Military Construction Standards
Military construction, known as MILCON, is a specific type of construction
executed by military entities.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 2801, defines

military construction as “any construction, development, conversion, or extension of any
kind carried out with respect to a military installation. MILCON includes construction
projects for all types of buildings, roads, airfield pavements, and utility systems costing
$750,000 or more” (Department of the Air Force 2010, p. 25). The second sentence of
the definition is the unique attribute of MILCON type construction; specifically,
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MILCON projects cost $750,000 or more. Military construction with costs below this
threshold is called unspecified minor military construction and is governed by different
rules and regulations (Department of the Air Force 2003). The difference between
MILCON and minor military construction starts with the funding stream, military
construction authority as opposed to operations and maintenance funds, and continues
into execution agents, authorities, and limitations on the type of construction authorized
(Department of the Air Force 2003). However, this research endeavor focuses solely on
large MILCON projects; therefore, the background information presented is primarily
applicable to MILCON procurement rather than unspecified minor military construction.
While officially codified in public law, Air Force engineers utilize guidance provided in
Air Force Instructions (AFI). The applicable AFIs break MILCON procurement into
planning and programming (AFI 32-1021) and then design and construction (AFI 321023).
MILCON Planning and Programming
The first phase of a MILCON project, planning and programming, occurs at least
3 to 5 years before project execution.

AFI 32-1021 dedicates an entire chapter to

MILCON project planning because it sets the foundation for a MILCON level project.
The AFI dictates that installations must “identify future facility needs 3 – 5 years in the
future and determine which needs cannot be met with existing facilities” (Department of
the Air Force 2010, p. 7). Once installation leaders identify and approve the needs,
further planning actions focus on a certificate of compliance ensuring the project, as
planned, meets environmental, seismic, and explosive arc and airfield clearance
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requirements in addition to other requirements based on additional AFIs and executive
orders (Department of the Air Force 2010). While this planning phase occurs long before
project approval or execution, it is a critical component of MILCON procurement; failure
to properly plan ensures project failure.
Once engineers complete a certificate of compliance, the project can enter the
programming phase. AFI 32-1012 defines programming as “the process of developing
and obtaining approval and funding for MILCON projects” (Department of the Air Force
2010, p. 25). It is during this phase of MILCON procurement that the project is further
developed and codified by engineers and the end-user. In order for approval to be
granted by the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress, the
project must be developed, justified, and include a cost estimate (Department of the Air
Force 2010). Additionally, in an attempt to control excess costs, all MILCON projects
over $2 million require the completion of a detailed economic analysis (Department of
the Air Force 2010). Engineers and comptrollers work together to complete economic
analyses on MILCON projects. Once the project programming is completed, the project
documentation is sent to Headquarters USAF (HQ USAF) where it competes with other
MILCON requirements throughout the Air Force. HQ USAF sends the finalized and
prioritized list of MILCON projects to the OSD for entry into the 6-year Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a portion of the president’s budget that is
submitted to Congress. Finally, Congress receives the list of MILCON projects requested
and decides whether to provide authorization and appropriation for each project
(Department of the Air Force 2010). Once authorization and appropriation are received
from Congress, the MILCON project can enter the design and construction phase.
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MILCON Design and Construction
AFI 32-1023 contains the governing documentation for the design and
construction of MILCON projects. The AFI sets goals, rules, and restrictions for the
design of Air Force facilities. Specifically, it mentions that facilities should “enable
mission execution and enhance occupant safety and quality of life by providing
sustainable facilities” (Department of the Air Force 2010, p. 10). It requires functional
flexible designs developed with accessibility and cost management in mind (Department
of the Air Force 2010). The 2010 version of the AFI now specifies that design decisions
should be based on the life-cycle cost of a facility; however, this requirement is not in the
programming AFI which provides guidance for MILCON project programming and
estimating (Department of the Air Force 2010). This lack of consistent guidance means
that although the design should be cost effective based on the life-cycle costs,
Congressional authority and appropriations have already fixed the project cost. The AFI
continues by specifying that designs must meet Unified Facility Criteria (UFC);
commercial standards, such as National Electric Code or National Fire Protection Code;
Engineering Technical Letters (ETL); and the Whole Building Design Guide
(Department of the Air Force 2010). Additionally, the AFI specifies the use of “the
United States Green Building Council’s (USGBC) LEED Green Building Rating System
as a tool to incorporate sustainable design principles and subsequently to measure the
sustainability achieved” (Department of the Air Force 2010, p. 17). The remaining
portion of the AFI’s chapter is dedicated to requirements that may not apply to all
projects, such as utility metering, environmental regulations, and design management
(Department of the Air Force 2010). The AFI attempts to control cost and scope by
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mandating, post Congressional approval, that project scope remain fixed, and that costs
can only increase by 25% without reprogramming and approval (Department of the Air
Force 2010). This mandate fixes the scope at least 3 to 5 years before project design.
While costs can change; additional funding is not authorized by Congress and comes at
the expense of other MILCON projects. MILCON budgets are fixed on a yearly basis;
therefore, overages from one project are removed from another project unless Congress
authorizes additional funding. Once the design is complete, the MILCON project is
transferred to the construction phase.
AFI 32-1023 also focuses on construction management, specifically the roles and
responsibilities of the construction management team and the phases of construction.
The construction manager (CM) is the individual or team responsible for monitoring
construction on a day-to-day basis.

AFI 32-1023 dictates 22 tasks that are the

responsibility of the CM. In general, the CM monitors and reports on construction
progress, oversees the construction agent (CA) including changes and scheduling,
completes documentation for all changes and funding requests, and is responsible for
ensuring the project meets its requirements (Department of the Air Force 2010). The
unique role of the Air Force CM is to oversee another military entity executing the
contract (AFCEC, USACE, or NAVFAC) as well as the contractor doing the work. This
layer of oversight ensures construction projects, regardless of method or agent of
execution, meet Air Force needs. With the roles of the CM defined, the AFI continues by
specifying the phases of construction.

Per the AFI, these phases include: the

construction management plan dictating roles, responsibilities, procedures; a red zone
meeting held at 80 percent of construction completion; construction acceptance
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procedures; and post-occupancy inspections to ensure proper construction completion,
and that errors are remedied within the warranty period (Department of the Air Force
2010).

Additionally, the AFI specifies the ability to occupy the facility during

construction and joint occupancy, as well as noting that the CM and CA share
responsibility for ensuring the quality of construction (Department of the Air Force
2010). The construction phase of MILCON procurement is one of the shortest in the long
MILCON process but is also the most visible, and the phase that creates an enduring
facility.
MILCON Roles and Responsibilities for the Air Force
Although the MILCON procurement is a DoD-wide enterprise, Air Force
application of MILCON procurement differs from the implementation by other branches.
These differences are most noticeable in the oversight and execution of the construction
phase. This section clarifies the roles and responsibilities of key players based on AFI
and DoD guidance. Table 1 presents a simplified list of agencies and entities with unique
responsibilities in the Air Force MILCON process. Additionally, Table 1 specifies the
branch of the entity as well as whether it is local to the base or a field operating agency
(FOA) functioning out of a dislocated location.
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Table 1: MILCON Agency/Entity Roles and Responsibilities
Name
Design Agent (DA)/
Construction Agent
(CA)

Branch
Army, Navy,
or Air Force
(FOA likely)

Design Manager (DM)
/ Construction
Manager (CM)

Air Force
(local)

Air Force Center for
Engineering and the
Environment
(AFCEE/AFCECWest)
Air Force Civil
Engineer Support
Agency
(AFCESA/AFCECEast)

Air Force
(FOA)

MILCON Role/Responsibility
The DoD component responsible for the
technical execution of the construction or
design and performs the duties of the
contracting officer.
Air Force organization designated to manage
construction and interface with the DA/CA.
Responsible for local construction oversight and
ensuring project meets USAF needs.
Air Force MILCON program manager and
possible DA/CA or DM/CM. Creates planning
guidance and provides technical planning
assistance for Air Force engineers.

Air Force
(FOA)

Develops, coordinates, and interprets UFCs and
ETLs to ensure compliance with all policies.
Responsible for the ETL system. Responsible
for facility energy conservation, metering, and
renewable energy via Air Force Facility Energy
Center.
Note: All roles/responsibilities adapted from AFI 32-1023 (Department of the Air Force
2010)

DoD Directive 4270.5 dictates the specific agencies authorized to act as the DA,
CA, or DA/CA. Additionally, the directive states that, with few exceptions, the “Air
Force shall use the services of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) for design and construction of the annual
military construction program” (Department of Defense 2005, p. 3).

However, the

directive allows AFCEC to execute a limited number of projects if the Air Force and
NAVFAC/USACE agree it is the “most efficient, expeditious, and cost-effective way” to
complete a project (Department of Defense 2005, p. 3). Having USACE and NAVFAC
execute projects with additional oversight provided by Air Force construction and design
managers creates unique relationships.

Compared to Navy and Army MILCON
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procurement, the Air Force provides an additional layer of oversight over both the
contractor as well as the DA/CA.

These roles and responsibilities are critical to

successful MILCON procurement.
Construction Specification Standards
Construction specifications define facility requirements. Generally, three forms
of specifications are used: method-based specifications (MBS), end-result specifications
(ERS), and performance-related specifications (PRS) (Dhakal et al. 2009). The MBS is
the classical form of specification where the design and construction agent prescribes
construction procedures for the contractor to follow. With ERS, the contractor is fully
responsible for the construction procedures and quality control, but the construction agent
accepts or rejects the final results based on an explicit quality assurance plan. Finally, the
PRS grew from statistically based quality assurance specifications and are specifications
that relate quality characteristics and/or life-cycle costs to expected performance of the
work completed (Dhakal et al. 2009). Studies by the Federal Highway Administration
and analysis of paving contracts in New Brunswick provide further evidence that moving
from MBS to ERS does not result in performance degradation (Dhakal et al. 2009).
MILCON projects can utilize any of these construction specification standards but
frequently use MBS.
Project Management
Prior to the detailed discussion of MILCON execution and acquisition, it is
important to understand that all methods have benefits and disadvantages. The best
approach attempts to balance advantages and disadvantages so that no party is wronged.
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The project management “iron triangle” (Figure 3) shows the facets of a project that must
be balanced: scope/performance, schedule, and cost. In general, project managers are
able to optimize two of the three elements through the selection of acquisition and
execution method (Chan et al. 2004). Based on the needs of the user, the critical facets
can vary. Additionally, all cost premium factors will apply to at least one of the facets of
the project management iron triangle. This means that project managers will be able to
understand the additional costs and sacrifices being made by each factor causing
MILCON cost premiums. The combination of a basic understanding of the project
management iron triangle, as well as the in-depth knowledge of where each cost premium
lies, allows project managers to better manage MILCON procurement.

Figure 3: Construction iron triangle
MILCON Execution
This section focuses on the methods of execution and acquisition utilized for
MILCON procurement. In private industry, many execution and acquisition methods are
available including design-bid-build, design-build, multi-prime, construction manager at
risk, construction manager, engineer-procure-construct, and private-public-partnerships
(Kelleher and Walters 2009). However, policies restrict MILCON execution to specific
methods of execution, generally the traditional design-bid-build (DBB) or the design-
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build (DB) method (AFCEE 2008). This section will briefly describe each applicable
execution method followed by a discussion of current research into MILCON execution.
Further information is available in AFCEE’s (AFCEC’s) United States Air Force Project
Manager’s Guide for Design and Construction.
Design-Bid-Build
The traditional method of construction execution is the DBB process. In this
case, the Air Force issues a request for a design to an architect-engineer (A-E) firm
(AFCEE 2008). The Air Force works with the design agent to fully define the project
scope and cost (AFCEE 2008), which is used to update the programming documentation
that goes to Congress if completed prior to Congressional approval. The A-E firm
completes the design of the entire facility including “drawings, specifications, design
analysis, and cost estimate” (AFCEE 2008, p. C-1).

These construction documents

become the property of the Air Force at contract completion. Once Congress authorizes
the MILCON project, the designs are given to a separate contractor for construction. The
advantage to this method is that the design features are known so the bids should be very
accurate (Kelleher and Walters 2009). Additionally, the DBB method has been tested in
court; consequently, dispute resolution is generally predictable (Kelleher and Walters
2009).

However, the DBB process does not take into account contractor and

subcontractor input and may not reflect correct material pricing at the time of project
execution; these issues can end up delaying a project or requiring additional funding
(AFCEE 2008). The design-bid-build process has been utilized since the start of federal
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construction procurement, but over time construction execution has shifted towards a
design-build relationship.
Design-Build
The design-build execution method is based around the “master builder” concept
where a single contractor designs and constructs the project (Kelleher and Walters 2009).
While the Air Force lists six variations of the DB method, they all revolve around a
single contractor taking the project from start to finish, thereby improving execution
speed and reducing overall project costs (AFCEE 2008). Even though the advantages
appeared immediately, policy restricted the Air Force from utilizing the DB method until
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Rosner et al. 2009). The traditional DB method is the
two-step or one-step method where a contract is awarded based on a set of specifications
and/or preliminary design and the contractor then designs and executes construction in
one fluid motion (AFCEE 2008). The difference between the one-step and two-step
method is that in the two-step DB process contractors are short listed based on
qualifications; shortening the list of prospective bidders increases competition among the
technically capable construction firms (Molenaar et al. 1999). The design-build+ method
is a form of DB which brings the contractor into the planning phase early to help with all
phases of execution; these contracts normally involve the award of a contract to a
construction team that executes a series of construction projects (AFCEE 2008). Another
variant is the design-build (turnkey) method. For this method, a fixed price is established
along with minimum requirements and contractors bid with the expectation of building
multiple versions of the same facility for a set cost (AFCEE 2008). All of these design-
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build methods shift risk from the government onto the contractor but allow for potential
cost and time savings; the private sector uses design-build extensively and has become
the preferred method for Air Force MILCON execution.
Previous researchers have determined factors that can influence or help determine
the success of a DB project. Chan et al. (2004) performed a meta-analysis of previous
literature and determined the criteria used to determine DB project success.

Their

research found that four objective criteria and five subjective criteria characterize
success. The objective criteria are time, cost, quality, and safety. The subjective criteria
are: meeting specifications/employer’s requirements; conformance to expectation of
project team members; functionality; aesthetics; and reduction in dispute (Chan et al.
2004). Lam et al. (2008) applied those criteria to develop a mathematical model to
predict DB success. Their investigation also identified success factors and determined
causal relationships between the critical success factors and success indicators. Lam et
al.’s (2008) research utilized time, cost, quality, and functionality as the success
indicators. The model determined that the critical success factors for DB success include
“the project nature, the effectiveness of project management action, and the application of
innovative management approaches” (Lam et al. 2008, p. 336). For project nature, Lam
et al. (2008) determined that successful DB projects provide room for contractor input,
are decently complex, allow the contractor to propose and implement alternative
solutions, and allow the contractor to design structures to suit their construction methods.
Effective project management for DB requires proper contract documentation and
controls to allow contractor flexibility while ensuring all requirements are met. Finally,
the adoption of innovative management approaches includes using value management
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and patterning (Lam et al. 2008). Value management involves removing project elements
that do not increase value.

Partnering involves establishing relationships between

contractors and construction agents where all parties work towards common goals
together rather than at each other’s expense (Lam et al. 2008). Research demonstrated
that these three elements are critical elements of DB project success.
Other Execution Methods
Air Force MILCON execution is generally a tightly controlled process; however,
waivers can be obtained to utilize a variety of execution methods when cost or time
savings are evident. For example, construction can be executed using the U.S. General
Services Administration (GSA) schedule catalog by procuring turnkey facilities with
installation (GSA 2012). Another alternative execution method is the procurement of
MILCON facilities through an Enhanced Use Lease (EUL). The EUL allows the Air
Force to trade property for construction services (Bates 2011).

These alternative

execution methods are only a sample of the possibilities; however, these methods are
used infrequently due to the extra effort required for execution.
MILCON Acquisition Methods
The acquisition method, or construction contract type, for MILCON is the means
used to fund and contract MILCON execution. The construction contract types utilized
for Air Force construction procurement include the following (AFCEE 2008).
•

Indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) – multi-period contracts for an
unknown number of construction requirements

•

Firm fixed price – a lump sum contract
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•

Fixed price with economic price adjustment – a lump sum that can be adjusted
for economic contingencies

•

Fixed price with incentive firm – a fixed price contract that allows for
adjustment of profit and final contract price

•

Fixed price with award fees – a fixed price contract with an award based on
Government evaluation

•

Cost plus incentive fee – a cost reimbursement contract with an adjustable
incentive fee

•

Cost plus award fee – a cost reimbursement contract with an award based on
Government evaluation

•

Cost plus fixed fee – a cost reimbursement contract that pays cost plus a fee
that is fixed at the inception of the contract

Although additional procurement methods exist, they are rarely utilized in MILCON and
therefore not discussed here. In addition to the information provided in the USAF Project
Manager’s Guide for Design and Construction, the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) part 16 governs all of these acquisition methods. Furthermore, the pricing for cost
plus can be based on established pricing, actual price paid, or catalog prices; these details
are solidified during contract award or advertisement and vary from project to project
(AFCEE 2008). In general, most MILCON projects strive for a firm fixed price where
the costs are known up front.

However, the use of firm fixed prices requires the

contractor to commit to a set price early in the design process (Molenaar et al. 1999).
Both firm fixed and cost plus, including their variants, can be utilized with any execution
method. The execution and procurement method options require design and construction
agents to select the execution and acquisition method.
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Research in MILCON Acquisition/Execution
The multitude of acquisition and execution methods has led to a series of research
endeavors attempting to determine how execution and acquisition methods affect
MILCON performance.

This section focuses on research into execution methods

followed by research into acquisition and procurement method.
Design-Bid-Build and Design-Build Research
The performance of MILCON projects based on execution method has been
investigated in terms of cost, performance, and schedule. Molenaar, Songer, and Barash
(1999) investigated design-build evolution and performance in the public-sector. They
focused on performance differences in DB projects based on the one-step, two-step, or
qualifications-based method of execution. The qualifications-based method utilizes a
lower level of design, allows prequalification of bidders, and the award is competitively
negotiated rather than the lump sum utilized for the one- or two-step process. The results
of the 104 public-sector projects they studied show that the two-step process, which
limits the number of bidders, has the best schedule and budget performance. However,
the research shows that qualification-based execution results in significantly lower
administrative burdens by transferring the responsibility onto the contractor (Molenaar et
al. 1999). Overall, their results suggest that the Air Force should utilize the two-step DB
execution method in order to maximize cost and schedule performance.
Rosner, Thal, and West (2009) narrowed design-build research to Air Force
MILCON projects by analyzing 835 projects against six performance metrics based on
execution method. They analyzed 278 design-build and 557 design-bid-build projects;
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the disparity in the number of projects analyzed by execution method was based on the
fact that DB was not heavily utilized at the beginning of the study period (1996-2006)
(Rosner et al. 2009). The six metrics the projects were measured against were unit cost,
cost growth, schedule growth, modifications per million dollars, current working
estimate/programmed amount ratio, and total project time; additionally, they performed
the analysis based on facility type. Their research concluded that DB outperformed DBB
in two metrics, cost growth and the number of modifications, while DBB outperformed
DB for project time (Rosner et al. 2009). However, the project time performance was to
be expected because DBB projects sometimes have “off-the-shelf” designs available and
thus design time is not included. A 2009 study of U.S. Navy dorm construction found
similar results; DB resulted in reduced cost and schedule growth (Hale et al. 2009). The
Navy study found that the reductions in cost and schedule growth, as well as overall
construction schedule, were statistically significant (Hale et al. 2009).

Finally, the

Rosner et al. (2009) research effort revealed that the DB method was best suited for
“seven out of nine facility types: airfield pavements, operations, corrosion control,
administration, dormitories, fitness centers, and child development centers,” while
storage and operations facilities did not favor one method over the other. Overall, the
authors advocate the utilization of DB for the majority of Air Force MILCON
procurement.
Gannon, Feng, and Sitzabee (2012) completed additional research into schedule
performance for design-build projects. Their research was based on a quantitative and
qualitative analysis of three MILCON projects executed by USACE and overseen by the
88th Civil Engineer Directorate at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The research question
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considered was: “do initial schedules specified in federal design-build facility
procurements provide reliable forecasting for project control” (Gannon et al. 2012).
Furthermore, this question was refined by setting the goal of understanding the
scheduling process and analyzing how changes affect schedule uncertainty. The results
of the study show that modifying the project results in cost and schedule growth;
specifically, the later the change occurs, the stronger the negative effect on schedule and
cost.

Additionally, Gannon et al. (2012) observed that USACE required the initial

schedule in the first 2 months of a DB project although it takes 8-11 months to reach the
100% design milestone (Gannon et al. 2012). Based on case studies and observations
related to construction scheduling Gannon et al. (2012) developed the cone of uncertainty
(Figure 1) to demonstrate the variability in schedule based on design percentage
completed.

The recommendation from their study is that MILCON design-build

procedures should align more closely to private industry policies and allow for flexible
scheduling until the design is solidified (Gannon et al. 2012). While the DB method is
known to outperform DBB, their research shows that policies must be adapted to gain all
the performance improvements available.

Figure 4: Schedule cone of uncertainty (Gannon et al. 2012)
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Acquisition/Procurement Method Research
Regardless of the execution method chosen, there are a variety of acquisition
methods available. Research has shown that 88% of public-sector projects use lump-sum
fixed price contracts (Molenaar et al. 1999). Due to the heavy utilization of fixed price
contracts, and restrictions on cost growth for MILCON projects, little research has
investigated alternative acquisition methods.

However, options exist for the

procurement, or award, of fixed price contracts. El Wardani, Messner, and Horman
(2006) compared these procurement methods for design-build projects. They compared
four methods (sole source, qualifications-based, best value, and low bid) against three
performance metrics (cost, time, and quality). These four procurement methods can be
utilized to select contractors for almost any acquisition method. Sole source selection is
the selection of a single contractor based on performance and qualifications at the
expense of price competition (El Wardani et al. 2006). The Air Force is unable to use
sole source selection for most construction due to FAR restrictions. Qualifications-based
selection is the selection of a contractor based on a request for qualifications; once
selected, the DB contract is directly negotiated with the most qualified contractor (El
Wardani et al. 2006). The best value selection, supported by the Air Force as of 2010 and
the most flexible selection method, allows the selection of a contractor based on
evaluations of the design and cost. Finally, low-bid selection chooses a contractor based
solely on cost. The study results show that low-bid has the lowest initial cost but the
highest cost growth and very high schedule growth, 9.82% and 5.64%, respectively (El
Wardani et al. 2006). These results align with guidance from AFCEC that dissuades the
use of low-bid selection for MILCON procurement (AFCEE 2008). Additionally, El
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Wardani et al. (2006) found that qualifications-based selection results in excellent
performance for cost growth and speed of construction, especially for low-complexity
projects. However, the best value method results in top performance in terms of schedule
growth at the expense of initial cost. Their study did not investigate if the higher cost of
best value is related to design enhancements not offered by the other procurement
methods. Overall, El Wardani et al. (2006) conclude that no one procurement method
outperforms any other method in all performance metrics; therefore, the procurement
method must be selected based on the most critical metric for each project.
Recently, Sullivan (2011) performed further investigation into best value
procurement for construction versus other methodologies including Lean, Six Sigma, and
Total Quality Management (TQM). He investigated these management methodologies
for use in construction because, in his opinion, construction has been “slow to adapt”
with many projects over budget and behind schedule. The results of his research show
that best-value allows owners to select the best-fit contractor based on past performance,
assessing and limiting risk, interviews, and prioritization of cost and performance
(Sullivan 2011).

Additionally, Hammad et al.’s (2010) research of public building

projects found that selecting based solely on low-bid could result in underbidding and
excessive change requests. Furthermore, Sullivan (2011) found that best value benefits
both the owner and contractor while many of the other efficiency tools benefit one party
significantly more than the other.

His findings also show that some management

methodologies are ill suited to construction, including TQM which primarily improves
vendor to supplier relationships. Overall, Sullivan’s (2011) research effort supports the
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utilization of tried and true construction procurement methods such as best value over
newer management programs.
MILCON Cost Premiums
Large construction projects are inherently complicated endeavors; for the Air
Force, strict planning, programming, and executing guidance, as well as the variety of
execution and acquisition avenues available, increases these intricacies.

MILCON

projects throughout the DoD are a multi-billion dollar line item on Congressional budgets
each year, making them prime targets for cost saving measures (112th Congress 2011).
The costs, limited quantity, and complicated nature of MILCON projects result in a
variety of research comparing MILCON costs to private industry costs.
MILCON Cost Investigations
The cost of MILCON projects has been investigated multiple times over the past
two decades.

Pope (1990) investigated MILCON procurement compared to private

industry from a cost perspective. The stated goal was to discover “successes” from
private industry and integrate these successes into the MILCON process in order to
realize cost savings.

His research investigated four specific questions: is there a

difference in administrative effort between MILCON and private industry, do MILCON
standards differ from national and local standards, are contractors restricted or
constrained when working on MILCON projects compared to private industry, and does
the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) cause MILCON wage rate differences compared to private
industry.

Additionally, if differences were found in any of the areas, Pope (1990)

investigated whether those differences impacted construction cost. Pope’s (1990, p. 7)
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research also attempted to determine if privatization, or the “transfer of government
services, assets and/or enterprises to private-sector owners . . . when those owners and
suppliers have the capability of providing better services at lower costs,” allowed for
more efficient MILCON execution.

However, in the 22 years since his research,

privatization has not been heavily used or considered for MILCON projects.
In the background of his research, Pope (1990) discusses that a consensus could
not be obtained as to whether federal facilities cost significantly more than their private
industry counterparts.

One study found the cost ratio between federal and private

construction was 151 to 100 while another found private costs to be 64.5% of federal
costs with a final studying finding no significant difference (Pope 1990). However, the
study showing differences found “no hard evidence of cost differences arising from
intangible factors such as labor standards, specification restrictions, extra federal
documentation, or restrictive procurement policies” (Pope 1990, p. 38). Industry experts
disputed this point and presented other reports faulting procurement methods and
administration for cost increases (Pope 1990). These conflicting reports precipitated the
need for Pope’s (1990) study specifically comparing MILCON projects to private
industry construction.
Pope (1990) conducted interviews with government engineers, managers, and
contracting officers and then interviewed contractors with government and private
industry experience. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with the goal of
answering each of the four investigative questions.

Pope (1990) found that the

government believed that administrative requirements did not increase costs while the
contractors disagreed, stating that administrative requirements did cause increased costs.
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For the remaining investigative questions, both government employees and contractors
believed construction standards, contract clauses, and the Davis-Bacon Act caused cost
increases above private industry costs. Additionally, Pope (1990) validated through
quantitative comparison that the prevailing wage rate set by the Davis-Bacon Act was
more expensive than wage rates paid in the local area. His research showed that in 1990,
MILCON procurement was more expensive than private industry construction; however,
in 22 years, there have been many regulatory changes affecting MILCON procurement
including tweaks to the Davis-Bacon Act.
Beach (2008) analyzed MILCON cost and schedule performance based on the
major command (MAJCOM) and the construction agent executing the project. He sought
to investigate the ability of MAJCOMs to accomplish projects with regards to schedule
and cost contrasted against other MAJCOMs; additionally, he investigated how well the
CAs accomplished projects compared to each other.
USACE, NAVFAC, and AFCEE.

The CAs investigated include

Beach (2008) analyzed 1,322 completed USAF

MILCON projects utilizing the earned value analysis metrics of cost performance index,
schedule performance index, and the cost-schedule index. The study did not take into
account any reduction in project scope or facility performance losses due to the data
provided and use of regression analysis. These types of losses are not documented
quantitatively and consistently across the Air Force. Overall, his research found that the
Air Force MILCON program “consistently delivers projects that are under budget” but
frequently over schedule (Beach 2008, p. 81).

This finding validates the idea that

MILCON projects are designed and executed to their programmed amount at the expense
of schedule and requested capabilities. Another interesting result of Beach’s (2008)
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study is that the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) MAJCOM and Alaska district (POA) of the
USACE have the best cost and schedule performance in comparison to other MAJCOMs
and districts. Additionally, no major variation appeared in cost or schedule performance
based on the type of facility constructed (Beach 2008). His quantitative research effort
analyzed the internal performance of MILCON projects based on the costs and schedules
set by the MAJCOM and CA; however, the research was accomplished without regard to
how long construction should take or appropriate construction costs.
In 2011, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) noted that the
Department of Defense was unable to “provide competitive construction costs with
comparable type facilities in the commercial sector” (112th Congress 2011, p. 291). The
committee noted that MILCON unit costs are typically 25% to 40% more than privatesector costs (112th Congress 2011). The HASC highlighted key challenges it believes
contribute to the cost increases including federal contracting requirements, such as DavisBacon wages and federal sub-contracting and small-business goals; additional design
requirements, such as anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) measures; energy
efficiency objectives; and a robust construction management capacity providing
construction oversight. Although Congress sets many of these requirements in Public
Law, the committee found the markups to be “excessive and limit the purchasing ability
of the” DoD (112th Congress 2011, p. 292). The report requires the Secretary of Defense
to report on these cost premiums; this requirement required input from the Air Force via
AFCEC. In early 2012, the AFCEC construction management section determined USAF
MILCON unit costs are up to 37% higher than private industry construction (Hartford
2012).

Table 2 breaks down AFCEC’s probable causes of USAF MILCON cost
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premiums and the cost increases associated with each.

The fact that there are no

equivalent data sets for a private industry project and a MILCON project limits the
AFCEC study. Therefore, the study compared historical unit costs from USAF MILCON
to available private industry historical unit costs (Hartford 2012). The HASC report and
AFCEC study form the basis for continued research into the causes of MILCON cost
premiums.
Table 2: AFCEC Study Cost Premium Summary (Hartford 2012)
Cost Premium
Product: Type of Construction and Restrictive Specifications
Product: Energy and Sustainability Requirements
Product: AT/FP Requirements
Product: Facility Service Life
Process: Base Security Requirements
Process: Project Planning and Definition Issues
Process: Contract Administrative Burdens
Process: Contracting Requirements – Socioeconomic Clauses
Process: Contracting Requirements – Business Protection Clauses
Process: Contracting Requirements – Labor Clauses
Process: Contracting Requirements – Bonding (Miller Act)
Process: Contracting Requirements – Insurance
Process: Contracting Requirements – Quality Control

% Increase
10%
2%
2%
Inconclusive
5%
3%
5%
3%
1%
6%
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive

Research supports the notion that MILCON costs more than equivalent private
sector construction.

Additionally, interviews with industry experts confirm that, in

general, MILCON costs more than equivalent private industry construction. Table 3
provides a summary of the causes of MILCON cost premiums according to previous
research. Most of the previous research has focused on, and faulted, policies or laws
outside of the DoD or USAF’s span of control. Analysis of the previous research
validated the existence of MILCON cost premiums. This research adds to the body of
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knowledge relating to the causes of MILCON cost premiums by primarily examining
internal causes.
Table 3: Causes of MILCON Cost Premiums According to Previous Research

Factor Influencing Cost Premiums
Additional administrative requirements
Strict military standards
Contract and procurement restrictions
Davis-Bacon Act wage rates
Socioeconomic clauses/requirements
Construction type and restrictive
specifications
Energy and sustainability requirements
Anti-terrorism/force protection
requirements
Base security requirements
Project planning and definition issues
Government quality-assurance capacity

Type
(Internal/
External)
Both
Internal
External
External
External

Previous studies
112th
Pope
Congress
Hartford
(1990)
(2011)
(2012)












Internal
External





Both





Both
Internal
Both





Specific MILCON Cost Investigations
In addition to research into the general costs of MILCON procurement, other
studies have focused solely on singular, key, elements of MILCON execution.
Researchers have suggested that the MILCON cost increases over private industry start
with planning and programming. Conference proceedings cited by Pope (1990, p. 41)
state “the MILCON design and construction agent is forced . . . to manage cost to the
Congressionally authorized and appropriated programmed amount”.

Managing

MILCON projects to this programmed amount pushes the programmer to increase the
estimate in order to ensure project success regardless of the number of years until
construction or changes in material costs or economic conditions. Additionally, once the
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programmed amount is fixed, the “designer is urged to ‘design to budget’ since there is
no motivation to return excess funds” (Pope 1990, p. 42).

This demonstrates how

MILCON cost additions can begin in the early phases; however, cost premiums can
continue into the design and execution of construction.
Nielsen (2007) investigated how change orders during construction of MILCON
projects affect overall performance. He specifically investigated 31 MILCON projects
and the data loaded into the Air Force civil engineer’s database, ACES. The results of his
research show errors in pre-construction activities, such as unforeseen site or
environmental conditions, user changes, and design errors, are the most common causes
of MILCON change orders. Nielsen’s (2007) quantitative analysis determined most
change orders were due to design deficiencies and user change requests with the fewest
caused by value engineering proposals, exercised options, and unforeseen environmental
site conditions. Additionally, Nielsen (2007) found that USACE and NAVFAC had
lower change order costs than AFCEC; however, he points out that the results are
questionable due to inaccurate and incomplete data used for analysis. Gannon et al.
(2012) researched how the types and scope of change orders affected MILCON
scheduling. Their research showed changes resulted from Air Force/USACE driven
contract modifications, definition and sequencing corrections, weather delays, hidden
rework, and process learning. The research shows that executing change orders late in
construction execution causes inaccurate tracking of both schedule and costs in the time
leading up to award of the modification as well as immediately afterward (Gannon et al.
2012). The results of both Gannon et al. (2012) and Nielsen’s (2007) studies suggest
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MILCON project managers should ensure pre-construction activities, especially design
reviews, are well executed to limit change orders and, therefore, limit cost overruns.

Data Gathering and Analysis
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies were utilized to
determine the factors causing MILCON cost premiums. Data inputs included the use of
an extensive literature review, a single MILCON project case study, government and
contractor expert interviews, a Likert-style survey, and geospatial and statistical analysis.
The synergy of these data sources allowed the determination of MILCON cost premium
causes and the development of this white paper. This white paper does not, in general,
present specific quantitative values for each MILCON cost premium.
Case Study
The case study was based on two weather shelters constructed at the same time,
with the same basic requirements, by two different construction agents at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), Alaska. USACE constructed one weather shelter while
the 673d Civil Engineer Group (CEG) with AFCEC constructed the other one. In the
end, the CEG weather shelter cost 27% less (~$7M) and took less than half the time to
construct while meeting or exceeding all requirements. To determine the causes of the
cost and schedule differences, an analysis of contract documents, after action reports
(AAR), and interview data occurred.
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Interviews and Survey
Semi-structured expert interviews were conducted with government personnel
from contracting, civil engineering, and USACE who were familiar with MILCON and
the case study projects. Additionally, further interviews were conducted with contractors
experienced in MILCON and private-sector construction. The interviews utilized openended questions to allow the respondents to mention causes of MILCON cost premiums
or mitigation methods without guiding the discussion. Finally, a 43-question Likert-style
survey was developed based on discoveries made during the interviews and case study.
A limited number of government and contractor experts rated the level of influence each
factor has on MILCON cost premiums as: not at all, to a limited extent, to a moderate
extent, to a large extent, or to a very large extent. The respondents represented three
demographics: USAF personnel, including civil engineers and contracting officers;
USACE personnel; and contractors. The results of the survey also linked back to specific
contract requirement differences noted during the case study.
Geospatial and Statistical Analysis
Analysis of DBA wage rates required the use of geospatial and statistical analysis.
The comparison of DBA wage rates at USAF installations with Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) average wages outside of the base quantified the hourly differences
between MILCON and civilian wages. Inferential statistics were used to describe the
differences and validate the statistical significance. Descriptive statistics were applied to
analyze the case study’s cost and schedule differences. Responses to the Likert-style
survey were analyzed using descriptive statistics including non-parametric ranking and
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distribution analysis. The combination of statistical and geospatial methods allowed
some MILCON cost premiums to be quantified.
Limitations
As with all research, there are limitations to this study of MILCON cost
premiums. The lack of quantitative data is the largest limitation. Since data related to the
same facilities constructed on and off base is not available, it is not possible to do an
exact comparison and factor analysis. Additionally, contractors are not able to provide an
equivalent estimate of costs for constructing a MILCON facility off base. Finally, the
USAF does not track any reduction in scope during pre-final bid negotiations in any
database. This means that if a bid comes back too high, the USAF does not document
changes implemented to ensure the bid meets the programmed amount. Results were
determined from qualitative source data and expert opinion due to the lack of quantitative
data.
The use of a single case study makes the result difficult to generalize to all
MILCON projects. However, the case study presented a unique opportunity to analyze
internal factors that affect cost between the standard process and a more innovative
approach. In this case, the unique dataset and validation with industry experts through
surveys and interviews help overcome limitations to generalizability.

For expert

validation, the small sample surveyed, and limited population of experts with general
MILCON knowledge and experience with the specific case study, limited the statistical
significance. However, even with the limitations mentioned above, this white paper
presents viable, researched, causes of cost premium as well as possible mitigation
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strategies. All cost premium causes presented are only directly applicable to noncontingency MILCON procurement.
This white paper does not contain detailed information regarding the data or
methodologies applied.

Detailed information is available in the full MILCON cost

premium research thesis published in March of 2013. The full thesis is available at
www.DTIC.mil and is titled An Analysis of Cost Premiums and Losses Associated with
USAF Military Construction by Daniel Blomberg. The full thesis contains the survey
distributed, the raw case study contract requirement differences, and statistical and
geospatial analysis information.

Cost Premium Causes & Mitigation Strategies
This section contains the major factors shown to cause MILCON cost premiums
from a USAF perspective. While the survey contained 43 possible factors based on
expert interviews and case study analysis, this section highlights the main cost premium
causes and categorizes them into general themes. Additionally, the cost premiums are
broken into sections by the ability of the USAF to affect change. The USAF controllable
cost premiums include factors that cause additional costs but can be mitigated internally
by the USAF.

The DoD controllable cost premiums contains factors that can be

mitigated by working with other DoD entities such as USACE and NAVFAC. Finally,
the outside DoD control cost premiums contain factors that cannot be directly changed by
the USAF or DoD but cause additional costs. By breaking down cost premium causes
into these categories, USAF engineers can focus their efforts on areas where change can
be implemented.
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USAF Controllable Cost Premiums
This section contains cost premiums that can be controlled, mitigated, or affected
by the USAF. Each cost premium contains a description, limited analysis, and suggested
mitigation strategies.
Development of Overly Restrictive Requirements
Description: The USAF develops requirements for execution by a, possibly
separate, design and construction agent. These requirements are sometimes above what
is required or are not adapted to the facility environment. This cost premium is also
directly related to “stifling or not applying innovation” in this section and “selection of
construction specifications” in the DoD controllable cost premiums section.
Analysis: Survey and interview results indicated that most USAF engineers and
contractors fault the construction agent for overly-prescriptive requirements. However,
further investigation showed that the USAF is partially at fault for the overly specific
requirements. Research found that the USAF required explicit materials in specific
facilities based on commander discretion, squadron heritage, or a “that’s what we’ve
always done” mentality. Specifying these requirements adds additional costs to the initial
construction as well as the life-cycle because it limits facility use. While it appears that
architectural standards do not add a significant cost, engineers must ensure that the
standards are not based on the wants of a single person but rather a methodical, life-cycle
cost conscious, process. An example of this was the use of a low slope metal roof on the
CEG weather shelter rather than the architecturally recommended built-up roof. The
built-up roof increased costs and limited construction methodology without any
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advantage except for meeting the architectural standards. Project managers must ensure
the architectural standards do not limit construction practices unnecessarily.
Additionally, analysis found that AFIs specify square footages for specific functions.
While this is useful by not allowing functions to expand too much, engineers in coldweather climates mentioned that the square footage requirements sometimes do not allow
enough space for all required functions and the appropriate amount of insulation. In this
case, the stringent requirement is hurting the life-cycle cost of the facility by increasing
energy usage. Furthermore, the square footage and programming requirements have not
been fully adapted to open floor plan technology or architecture.
Mitigation: AFIs should either specify internal square footage rather than overall
footprint or be updated to allow for square footage deviations based on environmental
conditions. Additionally, facility requirements for new bed-downs should be specified at
an overall level, as broadly as reasonable, and restricted from local commander deviation.
Finally, the USAF must not over-prescribe requirements to the design/construction agent
for design-build projects.

The USAF should specify end-results and the functions

required rather than material and methods.

Local base engineers should ensure

architectural standards are not adding an unreasonable cost to facility acquisition.
Selection of Acquisition Method Including a Failure to Balance Risk
Description: Inappropriate selection of the acquisition method does not motivate
the contractor to reduce costs or apply innovative techniques. Also, the USAF does not
gain cost savings through the selection of the execution or acquisition method because
the balance of risk does not appear to vary based on the methods selected.
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Analysis of acquisition method: The literature review contained extensive
background information regarding the acquisition methods available to USAF personnel.
However, most MILCON projects are programmed and executed as firm fixed price
contracts. This has two main issues; first, contractors may be designing and constructing
to the programmed amount rather than to meet the actual requirements (Pope 1990).
Second, there is little incentive for construction agents, USAF engineers, or contractors to
innovate or reduce costs since none of these stakeholders can use the savings. If USAF
personnel implemented firm fixed price with incentives, they could incentivize the
contractor to reduce life-cycle costs rather than initial costs, thereby giving the
government long-term savings while not affecting the contractor’s expected bottom line.
The selection of acquisition method can help balance risk and motivate innovation.
Additionally, DB cost savings are not as evident in MILCON procurement as private
industry construction because all parties do not share the savings.

While the FAR

currently disallows the outright sharing of savings, engineers can use savings from DB to
award bid options, thereby increasing MILCON performance while not negatively
affecting the contractor. The CEG weather shelter demonstrated how cost savings could
be used to fund bid options and resulted in an improved facility.
Analysis of failure to balance risk: In private sector construction, risk shifts based
on the execution and acquisition method (Kelleher and Walters 2009). Shifting from
design-bid-build to design-build shifts risk from the construction agent to the contractor.
However, in MILCON procurement, sometimes the risk shifts so far toward the
contractor that it causes cost premiums. To avoid litigation, construction agents choose
to specify every requirement possible even in DB execution. To combat the additional
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risk, contractors are forced to raise their prices. This imbalance of risk directly affects
construction costs.

A method that helps mitigate risk involves partnering with the

contractor. AARs for the CEG project lauded a partnership-oriented process as a large
success in the CEG project that reduced cost while allowing for a more aggressive
schedule. Additionally, research by Johnson et al. (2012) codified how the USAF can
partner with contractors within the confines of the FAR.
Mitigation: The USAF should create simple guidelines to help engineers and
contracting personnel select the correct acquisition method based on desired results.
Additionally, the USAF should volunteer to test a variety of acquisition methods that
reward reducing costs by sharing the savings. Requesting this as a pilot study would
provide the evidence required to adapt the FAR to allow for sharing of profit savings,
thereby motivating the government and contractors to work together.

Furthermore,

USAF engineers need to be aware that risk can be shifted based on the execution and
acquisition method. If the contract is not modified to reflect this shift in risk, then the
selection was made in name only and no cost savings will be obtained. USAF engineers
should also work to partner with the contractor to balance risk and allow each party to
help the other succeed.
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation
Description: MILCON construction agents write and regulate, sometimes
unknowingly, innovation out of many construction projects, thereby requiring the use of
older, more expensive, techniques and materials.
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Analysis: The weather shelter AARs and interviews with contractors revealed a
common theme that MILCON construction agents write requirements and contracts that
directly limit innovation. Two of the four factors rated as having a large influence on
MILCON cost premiums fell directly into this innovation cost premium category.
Additionally, outside research found that one of the three critical success indicators for
design-build projects is the “adoption of innovative management approaches” (Lam et al.
2008). The CEG weather shelter project demonstrated how result-based RFPs allow for
problem solving via innovative solutions. Generally speaking, the prescriptive nature of
the USACE weather shelter RFP limited the design and construction methods. However,
USACE stated that feedback from USAF representatives limited the design. Examples of
innovative features in the CEG weather shelter include simple things, such as sealed
concrete flooring rather than vinyl, to more complicated changes, such as using electrical
disconnects rather than installing all hazard-rated electrical infrastructure. These changes
saved money up-front in construction and reduced maintenance costs and did not affect
the overall requirement for the facility.

Construction agents must work with their

contractors rather than simply dismissing ideas that do not align to “the way it has always
been done.” Contractors have private industry experience and, therefore, are more likely
to be aware of new construction techniques or suggest design changes that can improve
facility functionality and maintainability or reduce costs.
Mitigation: For DB MILCON projects, ensure RFPs are written in a results-based
format that does not unnecessarily limit construction or design techniques. Ensure USAF
engineers work with the construction agent, end-users, and stakeholders to educate all
individuals on requirements versus wants.
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Work to change the “culture of no” by

partnering with contractors for solutions and listening to the suggestions. Implement
specification changes per “selection of construction specifications” coming up in the
DoD controllable cost premiums section.
Cost as a Schedule Metric
Description: The value of the construction sets the allowed construction time.
Analysis: Ribbon Cutter and/or Dirt Kicker metrics set the allowed construction
time for USAF MILCON procurement based on the value of the construction project
(673d Civil Engineer Group 2010). For example, these metrics would have allowed 820
days for the weather shelter project since it was over $20 million. The CEG finished 15
bays, two buildings, in just under 12 months while the USACE finished their seven bays
in 27 months, including a delay for contaminated soil. These metrics add substantial
costs in terms of dollars expended paying the contractor, time without the constructed
facility’s functionality, and administrative overhead supporting long duration projects.
Additionally, these metrics reduce the ability for the government to negotiate. In the
private sector, owners can negotiate by granting more time for lower costs; for USAF
MILCON, the contractors know the amount of time allowed and can bid accordingly.
For DB execution, the contractor should be specifying the timeframe required; the USAF
can then validate the timeframe based on the facility itself rather than a set metric. For
example, a large weather shelter can take less time to construct than a specialized data
center regardless of the cost of each facility.
Mitigation: Continue to adapt the schedule metrics. The metrics can be adapted
based on facility type, cost, and execution method rather than primarily on cost. The new
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Ribbon Cutter metrics are an improvement over Dirt Kicker, but the government needs to
acknowledge that faster, proper, contractor execution can yield better results for all
parties involved.
Frequent Unforeseen Site Conditions
Description: MILCON projects on brown sites, or previously disturbed earth,
frequently encounter unforeseen site conditions, such as soil contamination, that require
remediation before construction can continue.
Analysis: It is common to find soil contamination on or near the airfield. Prior to
construction, this contamination must be remediated. The cost of remediation is not a
cost premium because the same requirement exists in the private sector; however, the fact
that it occurs after notice-to-proceed (NTP) causes the cost premium.

Contractors

mentioned that for large brown site construction projects an environmental survey is
executed prior to NTP or included in the DB contract.

Once NTP is issued, the

contractor, and by proxy the government, have begun expending money. If the project is
placed on hold, such as during the USACE weather shelter project, the contractor is still
paying for overhead and in some cases must pay his employees even though no
construction is occurring. This means during remediation the government is paying for
construction that is not occurring as well as remediation costs.
Mitigation: The USAF should fund companion projects to do geotechnical and
environmental surveys for MILCON brown sites. The up-front cost could easily reduce
the overall construction cost of finding contamination or soil issues after NTP issuance.
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Additionally, presenting the contractor with geotechnical information can allow for
different facility designs during the proposal phase.
Unique Attributes of MILCON Projects
Description: USAF and USACE personnel believe that unique attributes of USAF
MILCON projects are responsible for cost premiums.
Analysis: In the expert survey, this factor ranked as the 1st and 6th most influential
by USACE and USAF, respectively. However, contractors ranked this factor the 29th
most influential cost premium factor. This disparity means that government engineers
believe their projects have unique attributes compared to private industry, but these
beliefs may be unfounded. Additionally, this belief may cause government engineers to
not accept commercial solutions that would work for MILCON. For example, the use of
a pre-engineered building (PEB) to construct a weather shelter was a difficult proposition
for many government engineers. However, the CEG weather shelter demonstrated that a
design-build PEB can meet or exceed all military requirements while allowing the
contractor to use standard commercial practices. Although sometimes there are unique
requirements, it is more likely that many MILCON facility features are the same as in the
private sector.

For example, if an administrative facility contains a Sensitive

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), the entire facility is not a unique
administrative facility, only one portion. Engineers must ensure they do not expand a
single unique requirement to the entire facility.
Mitigation: To mitigate this cost premium, USAF engineers and stakeholders
must not over-specify their requirements. Engineers and stakeholders must be aware of
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the requirements for facility functions and not search for unique attributes of the military
unit occupying the space.
DoD Controllable Cost Premiums
This section contains cost premiums that can be controlled, mitigated, or affected
by the DoD. Each cost premium contains a description, limited analysis, and suggested
mitigation strategies.
Parameterization of Execution Method
Description: The USAF and its construction agents are not fully applying designbuild (DB) principles and thereby not gaining the performance and cost savings attained
in the private sector; in some cases, MILCON procurement costs are higher than the
classic DBB execution costs.
Analysis: Government application of DB does not match private sector DB in
terms of procedures or benefits; the government, as the owner and construction agent,
remains heavily involved in the process including, in some cases, not allowing
construction to commence until a design has been submitted and approved (Molenaar et
al. 1999; Gannon et al. 2012). In general, the government is adding additional parameters
such as specifications, requirements, or oversight that do not allow for optimal DB
performance. In traditional DB execution, construction is on-going as the design gets
finalized; for example, once the facility footprint has been specified and approved,
earthwork can begin while the vertical portions are still being designed. The requirement
for design and construction in series rather than in parallel forces the project to match a
DBB process with a single contractor and directly adds to costs by extending the
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schedule. The CEG weather shelter project allowed for an immediate start based on
designs completed to that point. On the other hand, USACE required a complete design
package prior to construction. The USACE policy demonstrates how construction agents
can operate a DB project in methods suited for DBB. Contractors and USAF personnel
surveyed ranked USACE’s implementation of DB as the 4th and 6th most influential cost
premium factor while USACE ranked it as the 12th. However, USACE ranked the
USAF’s implementation of DB as the 3rd most influential factor while contractors ranked
it 18th and the USAF ranked it 31st. These findings show disconnects between users,
construction agents, and contractors. Additionally, these results validate that MILCON
DB projects are not being executed using standard DB procedures. DB shifts the risk to
the contractor and allows them to proceed faster and cheaper when design and
construction occur in parallel and when contractors manage their own resources;
MILCON contract policies limit or eliminate these benefits.
Mitigation: Ensure all contract templates have been created using industry
standard DB contracting mechanisms rather than DBB. This includes making sure the
contracts are requirements based rather than methods based and allow the contractor to
manage their own design, schedule, and resources. The over-restriction of DB execution
converts the process into a DBB project executed by one contractor.
Sub-factor: Submittal Management and Requirements
Description: The submittal requirements and management system causes
MILCON cost premiums.
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Analysis: Based on interviews and survey data, the prescribed submittal system
utilized by MILCON construction agents adds significant time and, therefore, costs to a
MILCON project. For the weather shelter projects, the USACE RFP specified that
submittal approval would take at least 30 days once the contractor loaded the submittal
into USACE’s custom software solution; contractors were also told that construction
would be proceeding at risk if executed prior to submittal approval. On the other hand,
the CEG specified it would return submittals as soon as possible and only specified a
form to be used as a cover sheet. By working with the contractor, the CEG was able to
help the contractor execute rapid approval for many elements. Additionally, the USACE
specified many submittals as approval required, where work cannot commence without
approval, rather than for information. In a DB project, there should not be very many
“approval required” submittals since the contractor is responsible for a start-to-finish
project that meets all requirements set out in the contract.

This extra layer of

bureaucracy, with its very strict timelines, is another example of the parameterization of
the DB execution method.
Mitigation: Ensure all submittals required meet the expectations of those required
for industry standard DB execution. Remove the minimum amount of time to return a
submittal and exchange it for a maximum amount of time or a time based on the type of
submittal; for example, a full design will take longer to review than carpet swatches.
Adapting the submittal policy will directly affect the misapplication of the execution
process cost premium.
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Sub-factor: Quality Control Requirements
Description: Strict quality control (QC) requirements, beyond industry standards,
add additional costs to MILCON projects.
Analysis: The USACE and the CEG treated QC differently for their respective
weather shelter projects.

The USACE implemented their standard QC and quality

assurance process; the contract and RFP stated specific methods for ensuring quality.
Additionally, the USACE required the contractor to employ one or more full-time
personnel to solely act as QC. In interviews, contractors mentioned that the need for a
person solely tasked with QC is excessive. On the other hand, the CEG partnered with
the contractor to determine the best QC methods while still meeting USAF and industry
requirements. Based on contractor interviews, the CEG process more closely matches
QC implementation found in private sector DB construction. Construction agents must
remember that the contractor is at risk during a DB project and is responsible for both the
design and construction; this transfer of risk can allow deviations from USACE’s
standard QC policies.
Mitigation: Remove prescriptive QC requirements from DB RFPs and contracts.
Require the contractor to propose and coordinate a QC plan with the government.
Require the QC plan to meet industry standards and validate that key specifications have
been attained.
Selection of Construction Specifications
Description: Overly prescriptive construction specifications increase the cost of
MILCON dramatically over private sector construction.
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Analysis: Based on the JBER weather shelter project contracts, as well as
interview and survey data, most MILCON projects utilize method-based specifications
(MBS). The case study revealed 41 contract differences between USACE and CEG
execution that directly related to construction specifications. Additionally, three of the
four cost premium factors rated as having a large influence on cost premiums directly
relate to the selection of construction specifications. All of the contractors surveyed
mentioned that prescriptive methods and materials do not allow contractors to fully apply
DB practices, be aggressive, or provide more economical solutions. One respondent
bluntly stated that “’don’t confuse reason with requirements’ is rampant and costly.” For
DB execution, the use of MBS limits how contractors can design and construct facilities.
However, for DBB execution, where the construction agent is responsible for the design
and specifications, the use of MBS can be appropriate. Further research showed that
MBS, end-result specifications (ERS), and performance-related specifications (PRS) can
be used in combination to allow innovation in some areas while ensuring military
standards in other areas.

Construction agents can apply multiple specification

simultaneously to best meet the project’s needs. Additionally, while looking through a
thousand-page request for proposals (RFP), the use of templates which included MBS in
multiple locations resulted in erroneous, or conflicting, specifications.
Mitigation: DB MILCON projects should fully implement ERS and move toward
PRS. Additionally, they should incorporate requirements by standard reference rather
than including a link to the reference as well as a MBS. This allows industry standards to
be included with ERS evaluation rather than industry standards with prescribed methods
of execution that may vary from an updated industry standard. Since the construction
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agent sets some standards, the USAF must work with construction agents to impress the
need for ERS rather than MBS.
Construction Agent Fees
Description: Initial project estimates do not always include the construction agent
fee. The agent fee is taken out of the project, and this, in turn, limits the scope of the
project or requires additional funding to meet full project scope.
Analysis: All military construction agents charge a fee to manage a MILCON
project. This fee pays to cover litigation, inspection, administration, and engineer staff.
While the fee itself is known and has been shown by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be reasonable, construction agents have no desire to limit bidding or
change orders. Each cost increase or change order provides additional funding to the
construction agent. This means that problems during construction, design, or bidding can
increase an agency’s budget. The construction agent has agreed to perform the MILCON
project based on the programmed amount and thus that should be the fee regardless of the
bid. Additionally, the USAF does not always gain its full due from the construction
agent fee because base civil engineers may do their own inspection and oversight.
Mitigation: First, ensure all project estimates include the construction agent fee.
Second, work with USACE, NAVFAC, and AFCEC to set policy that the fee is based on
the programmed amount, and that any deviations from that programmed amount do not
increase or decrease the construction agent fee. Finally, set policy that allows USAF
engineers to work with construction agents to reduce the fee by providing construction
inspection and/or administrative support.
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Schedule Management
Description: Construction agents, specifically USACE, require the use of nonstandard software to maintain the construction schedule. This requirement results in the
contractor maintaining schedules in multiple software programs and adds to the
administrative costs.
Analysis: This research validated findings by Gannon et al. (2012) by quantifying
the schedule management cost premium as the 5th most influential cost premium from the
contractor perspective. However, USACE ranked it 36th out of 43 and USAF personnel
ranked it 25th. Additionally, contractors mentioned schedule management software in
every interview conducted. The software requirements for schedule management do not
appear to integrate with industry-standard software solutions such as Microsoft Project.
Therefore, the contractor ends up maintaining the schedule in a preferred software
solution and providing updates to USACE through a specified solution. For the JBER
weather shelter projects, the CEG allowed the contractor to use a preferred software
solution as long as it could meet certain requirements such as showing resource
allocations and a critical path. The CEG did not encounter any issues with this approach.
Mitigation: Work with construction agents to remove the requirement for
specified schedule management software. Develop and implement ERS for schedule
management while codifying how to show progress to the USAF and/or construction
agent oversight.
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Construction Agent Policies
Description: Construction agents such as USACE, NAVFAC, and AFCEC have
their own internal policies that can add to cost premiums. Based on interview data, many
of these non-standard policies come into effect at project closeout. A specific example is
the requirement for separate commissioning events for each major system.
Analysis: Each construction agent has their own internal policies that govern the
contractor’s responsibilities. While some of these requirements generate individual cost
premium factors, some of the more ambiguous elements fall into this cost premium
category.

Multiple interviews and the CEG weather shelter AAR mentioned

commissioning process policies. Some construction agents require commissioning events
for each major facility system.

This requires the contractor to pay for additional

personnel to show up to different events. The contractor passes these costs directly to the
government.

Contractors and USAF engineers mention that having a combined

commissioning event is sometimes appropriate and can save costs on all sides with the
same end-result. Other examples of internal policies include approval authorities for a
variety of requests and specified timelines for information requests regardless of request
scope. In some cases, these rules vary not only by construction agent but also by the base
or district.
Mitigation: Task outside personnel to look into these types of additional rules and
requirements and determine validity. This could be a perfect application of a Lean or
AFSO21 event where outside personnel can provide input on the policies. Additionally,
the USAF should request a funded lessons learned meeting, or “hot wash,” at project
closeout with the construction agent and contractor where everyone should feel free to
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bring up issues encountered or unproductive (non-value added) work accomplished
throughout the project. It can be difficult for personnel implementing the process to
notice that a process is not adding value to the MILCON project; these mitigation
strategies address the difficulty.
Perception Management and Design and Construction Agent Selection
Description: Negative perceptions about the processes and management style of
the USACE causes MILCON cost premiums. While negative perceptions also exist for
NAVFAC and AFCEC, the perceptions were more pronounced for the USACE.
Additionally, DoD directives specify the construction agent and in most cases it is not the
USAF (AFCEC). This specification directly affects the cost premiums associated with
perception issues.
Analysis of perception management: This cost premium is the most difficult to
quantify. Survey results showed that USAF personnel and contractors ranked the cost
premium factor “USAF project through USACE” as the most influential factor while
USACE ranked it 26th. Additionally, contractors ranked the cost premium factor “USAF
project through AFCEC (AFCEE)” as 6th most influential while USACE and USAF
ranked it 21st and 25th, respectively. This result shows that USACE and USAF have the
perception they are not responsible for causing cost premiums while contractors feel the
need to charge more than they would in the private sector since the project is for the
military. Additionally, during the technical evaluation for transferring construction agent
from USACE to the USAF for the CEG weather shelter, a contractor specifically brought
up, and codified, the “corps factor.” The contractor stated that the supervision and
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oversight brought to bear by USACE is significant compared to large corporate
customers and other government agency customers (Moser 2009). Additionally, multiple
contractors stated that although the USACE has expressed a desire to operate
construction projects similarly to the methods utilized off base, none of them had seen
USACE actually apply these desires. Furthermore, prime contractors have stated that
subcontractors do not provide their best prices due to the additional requirements levied
based on USACE involvement.

After speaking to USACE personnel, it is the

government’s belief that there are no valid reasons for this perception; however, in the
case of perception, the mere existence of it, regardless of reason, can add additional costs.
Whether these costs are billed as additional administrative requirements, additional time
for reviews, or additional costs to meet military standards does not matter if the basic
requirement is “a USACE project costs more.” The JBER weather shelter case study
helps validate the existence of this perception-based cost premium since only internal
factors could affect the price and schedule.

All published AARs stated that many

performance gains were attained through the application of “outside the gate”
construction techniques rather than a desire to apply those techniques.
Analysis of DA/CA selection: One of the fastest ways to validate or mitigate cost
premiums due to the use of the USACE is not to use them as the construction agent.
While AFCEC is allowed to execute projects, permission is rarely granted. Due to the
requirement for USACE to execute projects throughout the U.S. for many different
agencies, it has an extreme breadth of knowledge and is not necessarily vested in
adapting its MILCON policies for a single client. On the other hand, AFCEC can focus
its large scale construction management solely on USAF MILCON. This would allow

69

AFCEC to be more flexible with its contracts and work to mitigate MILCON cost
premiums. AFCEC could even be used to test different theories that could then be
implemented by NAVFAC and USACE.
Mitigation: The USACE needs to begin adopting policies previously mentioned in
this white paper and publicize its changes. Following that, the USACE needs to ensure
that all districts are following the new policy rather than just acting in the status quo.
Finally, USACE, NAVFAC, and the USAF need to partner with each other and
contractors rather than always trying to blame one another. Mitigating this perception
issue could take many years before dividends are noticeable. Additionally, advocate
AFCEC as the construction agent for more MILCON projects. Validate the request by
detailing how AFCEC would like to work to mitigate MILCON cost premiums by
experimenting with contract execution and acquisition changes. Ensure that all parties
understand the goal would be to share achievements with other construction agents
without them having to deal with the additional burden from trying innovative
techniques.
Outside DoD Control Cost Premiums
This section contains cost premiums that cannot be mitigated by the DoD or any
of its entities. These cost premiums require outside agencies to enact change; however,
the DoD can present options and request changes to mitigate these cost premiums. Each
cost premium contains a description, limited analysis, and suggested mitigation
strategies.
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Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Requirements
Description: DoD and government required anti-terrorism and force protection
(AT/FP) specifications add additional cost to MILCON facilities compared to the private
sector.
Analysis: UFC 4-010-01 and AFI 10-245 require that MILCON facilities meet
AT/FP requirements (Department of the Air Force 2003).

However, engineers can

include AT/FP costs as a line item during project programming. This helps mitigate the
effect of costs associated with AT/FP. Research found that although there is always an
AT/FP requirement, the decision of which standard to apply based on facility occupancy
varies. For the JBER weather shelters, differing levels of AT/FP requirements were
applied even though usage and location were similar.

This demonstrates the

inconsistencies that can exist through the application of AT/FP requirements.
Mitigation: This cost premium cannot be completely mitigated; however, the
inclusion of an AT/FP line item during programming limits the effects on project scope.
However, the AFI and DoD instructions should ensure that engineers can easily
determine the AT/FP requirements for each facility; the current interpretation allows for
gray areas that can change the facility cost.
Federal Acquisition Regulations
Description: The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) restricts and guides
government procurement, including the MILCON program.

These restrictions and

guidance add additional costs, administrative and otherwise, to MILCON execution.
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Analysis: Overall, the respondents rated the FAR as moderately influencing
MILCON cost premiums.

However, specific requirements, such as 8A and small-

business policies, as well as additional administrative requirements, were rated as more
influential towards MILCON cost premiums. Additionally, there are numerous FAR
clauses included in some MILCON projects but not in others. This disparity means that
contractors must thoroughly investigate a contract’s RFP to ensure there are no
additional, or abnormal, clauses. This directly increases the administrative requirements
in bidding and the maintenance of compliance documentation. Additionally, the JBER
case study demonstrated that FAR requirements can be inappropriately applied through
the use of boilerplate templates. Some FAR clauses, such as the use of Y2K compliant
material, are left in when they should be removed while other clauses are not
appropriately adapted, such as including the full text for cost plus acquisition on a firm
fixed price contract. While it is likely that the FAR, and many of its requirements, cannot
be removed, the USAF can still limit FAR-based cost premiums by not including extra,
unnecessary, FAR clauses.

Additionally, the JBER weather shelter case study

demonstrated that many cost premiums exist regardless of FAR requirements. Both
shelters met FAR requirements but the costs still varied dramatically, thus demonstrating
that internal requirements can heavily affect cost premiums.
Mitigation: USAF engineers need to be aware of all FAR clauses included in their
construction contracts. Additionally, Congress should be notified of clauses that no
longer serve a purpose so those can be removed from public law. Contracting officers
and specialists should select FAR clauses based on project requirements rather than a
template containing “what was used last time.”
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Socioeconomic Laws and Policies Including the Davis-Bacon Act
Description: Socioeconomic laws and policies such as the Buy American Act, the
Davis-Bacon Act (DBA), and small business policies directly add to the cost of MILCON
above private industry.

Additionally, DBA prevailing wage rates do not accurately

reflect the local area’s hourly wages and thereby directly increase MILCON costs.
Analysis of socioeconomic laws and policies: Policies and public law passed by
Congress directly add to the cost of MILCON procurement by requiring particular
materials, workers, or company usage.

This research did not focus heavily on the

socioeconomic policies affecting cost premium due to the inability of the USAF to
directly mitigate theses costs.

However, multiple surveys and interviews directly

mentioned that these types of policies increase the cost of MILCON procurement.
Additionally, small business policy requirements have a flow-down clause where the
prime and sub-contractors both have to meet usage requirements. Validating compliance
adds at best an administrative burden, and at worst adds costs by motivating small
businesses to raise prices since they are guaranteed work.
Analysis of DBA prevailing wage rates: Public law requires the use of DBA
prevailing wage rates for all federal construction in excess of $2,000 (Department of
Labor 2012).

A 1996 study demonstrated that these wage rates do not accurately

represent the local area’s wage rates (United States Government Accountability Office
2011). Additionally, a recent study of USAF bases found that the DBA wage rates are
114% and 118% of the local area’s hourly wage rate for carpenters and electricians,
respectively (Chapter IV). Since labor is generally 30% of a construction’s project costs,

73

these wage rates can directly affect the overall cost of MILCON projects (U.S. Census
Bureau 2011).
Mitigation: Sponsor additional research to quantify the cost premiums associated
with each socioeconomic policy. Following that, use the data to advocate that Congress
change or adapt socioeconomic policies. Specifically, advocate that Congress adapt
DBA wage rates to more accurately reflect the surrounding area’s wage rates.

If

required, sponsor additional research to exactly quantify the costs to the Air Force due to
DBA prevailing wage rates for use in proposing cost saving measures.
Factors Shown Not to Cause Cost Premiums
This section contains factors initially believed to cause MILCON cost premiums
but were determined not to cause cost premiums or only cause a very limited amount of
cost premium.

This section is included to help guide and scope future research.

Research found that safety requirements in EM 385-1-1, the USACE safety manual, do
not cause additional cost premiums. This is likely because these safety requirements
match OSHA requirements closely and are also heavily utilized outside of MILCON
procurement. Additionally, project signage requirements do not represent a MILCON
cost premium. Although the USACE prescribes exact signage specifications for the
construction site, this cost is negligible for a MILCON project since private industry
utilizes similar signs. Finally, the government requirement for warranty performance
bonds was shown not to cause noticeable MILCON cost premiums. Based on these
findings, USAF engineers should implement EM 385-1-1, in whole or part, on all

74

contractor construction projects rather than attempting to create and implement their own
non-standard safety specifications.
Summary of Cost Premium Cause Categories
The previous sections have discussed in detail the causes of MILCON cost
premiums.

Table 4 summarizes the findings and highlights the agencies that can

implement changes to address each cost premium. Categories that cannot be controlled
by any DoD entity have a level of control of “external.” Additionally, Table 4 lists
previous cost premium studies that have also faulted these cost premium causes. Based
on interview and survey data, mitigation efforts should focus first on the 10 items
highlighted with an asterisk (*) due to their larger influence on cost premiums.
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Table 4: Summary of Cost Premiums Cause Categories

Level of
Control

Cost Premium Cause Category
Development of overly restrictive
requirements*
Selection of acquisition method including a
failure to balance risk*
Stifling or not applying innovation*
Cost as a schedule metric
Frequent unforeseen sight conditions
Unique attributes of MILCON projects*
Parameterization of the execution method*
Selection of construction specifications*
Construction agent fees
Schedule management policies*
Construction agent policies
Perception management including
construction agent selection*
Anti-terrorism/force protection
Federal Acquisition Regulations*
Socioeconomic laws and policies including
the Davis-Bacon Act*

Previous Studies
112th
Pope
Congress Hartford
(1990)
(2011)
(2012)


USAF
USAF
USAF
USAF
USAF
USAF
DoD
DoD
DoD
DoD
DoD










DoD
External
External









External







Future Research
The AFCEC can help enable future research into MILCON cost premiums by
working to gather and provide data for researchers. To fully investigate MILCON cost
premiums, the AFCEC must begin gathering data immediately and expect results in 3 to
5 years due to the MILCON process. Some of the key data points that should be
collected include:
•

Initial programming estimate

•

Initial bid, even if it is unofficial

•

Initial project scope (less broad than the 1391 (programming document) but
more broad than a statement of work)
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•

Any scope changes implemented to meet cost restrictions (items such as the
removal of parking lots, work moved to other projects, removal of interior
walls)

•

Schedule information including initial estimated time to completion,
contractor’s schedule used for bidding, and final completion date

•

Estimated life-cycle cost at initial bid

While the current software solutions cannot track all of this information; the AFCEC can
track this information as part of the move to asset management based facility
maintenance and procurement. Tracking the information mentioned above, in addition to
the current MILCON data, would allow for quantitative MILCON research.
The AFCEC should also advocate to be the construction agent for MILCON
projects. Proper coordination with the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) would
allow AFCEC to select an engineer from a given base to be involved in the execution of a
MILCON project, including implementing adaptations to attempt to reduce cost
premiums, with a follow-on assignment to AFIT to execute cost premium research based
on the MILCON project just completed, and finally ending up at AFCEC to implement
changes.

This series of events would allow AFCEC to take an asset management

approach to MILCON costs and groom subject matter experts.

Additionally, this

approach would allow for experimentation rather than case study analysis. Finally, the
AFCEC can enable future MILCON cost premium research by continuing to sponsor
thesis-level research efforts. Engaging with AFIT would allow for low-cost research
streams while keeping MILCON cost premiums at the forefront of leader’s minds.
Future research exists in the form of analysis of public laws, such as quantifying the
effects Davis-Bacon Act wage rates, all the way to doing a large scale survey of involved
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stakeholders to quantify qualitative cost premiums. This research project provides a
starting point for many future research streams.

Conclusions
There are cost premiums associated with MILCON procurement. These cost
premiums reduce the overall performance of MILCON by frequently requiring the scope
of a project to be reduced to meet budgetary restrictions. Additionally, the removal of
elements of a project, such as parking and energy efficient products, due to budget
limitations decreases the life-cycle performance of a facility.

This white paper

documented 15 overarching, interconnected, factors shown to cause cost premiums.
Addressing any number or elements of these factors will start reducing cost premiums
and thereby increase MILCON performance. Engineers should understand that a request
to de-scope a project does not mean that the initial estimate was poorly executed, but
rather that cost premiums exist and should be addressed. The USAF needs to think about
MILCON projects from a final use, or end-result, perspective rather than a “what is
wanted right now” view. In a fiscally conservative environment, engineers will begin to
accept good enough rather than perfect; on the other hand, reducing MILCON cost
premiums could allow engineers to accept the right product with the correct quality.
MILCON cost premiums directly affect the ability for the USAF to procure new
facilities, remove dilapidated infrastructure, and ultimately execute its combat mission.
MILCON cost premiums take away from “tip-of-the-spear” activities without gaining any
benefits in terms of facility performance. Regardless of the fiscal environment, the
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USAF should begin reducing excess construction costs caused by policy rather than
requirement.
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III. Journal Article: Discovery of Internal and External Factors Causing Military
Construction Cost Premiums
The journal article presented in this chapter was submitted for publication in the
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. At the time of thesis completion,
the journal article was not yet accepted or rejected. This journal article presents the
results of the MILCON cost premium case study and survey from a more general
perspective.

While the content has not been changed, technical adaptations have

occurred for inclusion in this thesis. Further support and information regarding the
content contained in this article is available in Appendix A and Appendix B.
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Abstract
Each year the United States invests $30 billion in federal construction. Military
construction (MILCON) represents 40%, $12 billion, of that capital investment. This
study confirmed the existence of MILCON cost premiums compared to private sector
construction through an analysis of existing research. Then this study evaluated two
nearly identical projects and used expert interviews and surveys to determine which
factors influence the cost premiums. In addition to identifying 28 factors that moderately
or largely influence cost premiums, five overarching cost premium themes emerged:
failing to balance risk, additional public-sector requirements, stifling or not applying
innovation, selection of construction specifications, and parameterization of the execution
process. Additionally, once complete, two nearly identical projects differed by over a
year of construction time and $7 million in spite of the contract requirement similarities.
Research frequently cites federal laws and policies as the primary cost premium driver;
however, this research demonstrated that internal construction agent policies also cause
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increased cost premiums. Mitigating the causes of internal cost premiums could improve
public-sector construction cost performance.

Key Words (Subject Headings)
Assets; Contract management; Construction Costs; Construction management;
Design/build; Government; Military Engineering; Procurement

Introduction
In 2010 and 2011, the United States spent over $30 billion for federal construction
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012). For fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of Defense
(DoD) requested almost $12.5 billion for capitalized military construction (MILCON);
however, due to budgetary constraints, the DoD only received authorization for $6.5
billion of MILCON (112th Congress 2011; 112th Congress 2013).

The MILCON

program represents a large portion of federal construction; therefore, excess money
expended due to cost premiums represents money that is not available for other programs.
Additionally, as a result of the near 50% reduction in authorized MILCON, engineers
need to improve the cost performance of the MILCON program.
To improve construction performance in terms of life-cycle costs, schedule, and
final product received, military engineers implement industry best practices such as
design-build execution and asset management principles. One of the twelve facets of
asset management in facility execution is using innovative contracting procedures to form
partnerships rather than simply relying upon low-bid for contractor selection (Cotts et al.
2010). Innovative contracting requires selecting the proper procurement route for each
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project rather than using the same procurement method, the comfortable method, for
every project, and that can be difficult for both military and public sector engineers
(Lædre et al. 2006). The public sector followed private industry in embracing designbuild construction; now it must incorporate asset management thinking into the entire
process of facility procurement (Molenaar et al. 1999; Gannon et al. 2012).

Objectives
This paper presents the results of an investigation into USAF MILCON
procurement cost premiums. This investigation confirmed that MILCON costs exceed
private industry and then investigated possible mitigation strategies for reducing
excessive cost premiums.

Meeting this goal required a three-fold approach.

First,

MILCON and private industry costs were identified and analyzed through existing
literature.

Second, facility construction acquisition and execution methods were

explored. Finally, a case study was performed using two MILCON projects. The study
examined two construction projects with the same requirements, executed using different
procurement methods. Presented here are several factors that influence MILCON cost
premiums, which provides valuable insight to both DoD and private construction
engineers and contract administrators in all construction industries.

Background and Literature
Additional rules and regulations levied on public construction, including that done
by the military, make public construction unique. First, nearly all federal construction
must follow the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) codified as Chapter 1 of Title 48
of the Code of Federal Regulation (Federal Acquisition Regulation 2005). Public law
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defines military construction as “development, conversion, or extension of any kind
carried out with respect to a military installation. MILCON includes construction projects
… costing $750,000 or more” (Department of the Air Force 2010). In addition to the
explicit definition of MILCON projects, the U.S. government also limited which
construction agencies may execute MILCON; DoD Directive 4270.5 dictates that, with
few exceptions, the “Department of the Air Force shall use the services of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC)
for design and construction of the annual military construction program” (Department of
Defense 2005). With USACE and NAVFAC concurrence, the Air Force can execute a
limited number of projects through the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC)
(Department of the Air Force 2010). In October 2012, AFCEC was formed with the
merger of as the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) and the
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA); this paper uses the new title of
AFCEC. This study investigated if the policies of the selected design and construction
agent cause cost premiums for Air Force MILCON projects. Additionally, due to federal
restrictions and policies, many more stakeholders exist in USAF MILCON procurement
than in standard industry construction. The end-user of a project can be one or more onbase organizations; the owner, a civil engineer squadron; the design and construction
agent, USACE, NAVFAC, or AFCEC; the contractor; and Congressional leaders, who
dictate many social and economic policies. The number of stakeholders, with differing
interests, makes MILCON procurement a complicated endeavor with many facets that
can cause cost premiums.
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Military Construction Cost Premiums
Anecdotal evidence frequently supports the notion that costs associated with
MILCON procurement are higher than those in the private sector. Recent efforts to
confirm the existence of cost premiums associated with MILCON execution include a
qualitative study by Pope (1990) in which he compared MILCON to private
industry/commercial construction and showed that military construction costs more than
private sector construction. In 2011, faced with austere budget conditions, the House
Armed Services Committee (HASC) noted that an assessment of construction costs found
a 25% to 40% unit cost difference between MILCON costs and comparable facility
construction in the commercial sector (112th Congress 2011). Following a request from
the HASC, AFCEC codified Air Force cost premiums and found a 37% cost premium for
USAF MILCON based on a comparison of historical costs for similar building types
(Hartford 2012). Table 5 lists the factors responsible for MILCON cost premiums based
on the previous studies. Additionally, the table indicates whether the factor can be
controlled by the DoD (internal) or is based on requirements from another entity
(external), such as Congress.

While all three studies confirm the existence of cost

premiums, there are variations in the factors shown to influence the premiums.
Furthermore, many of the factors blamed for cost premiums are outside the control of the
DoD. These studies serve to confirm the existence of MILCON cost premiums when
compared to private industry construction procurement; however, many of the factors
addressed cannot be controlled or changed by the DoD.
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Table 5: Factors Shown to Influence Cost Premiums Based on Previous Research

Factor Influencing Cost Premiums
Additional administrative
requirements
Strict military standards
Contract and procurement restrictions
Davis-Bacon Act wage rates
Socioeconomic clauses/requirements
Construction type and restrictive
specifications
Energy and sustainability
requirements
Anti-terrorism/force protection
requirements
Base security requirements
Project planning and definition issues
Government quality-assurance
capacity

Type
(Internal/
External)

Previous studies
112th
Pope
Congress
Hartford
(1990)
(2011)
(2012)

Both



Internal
External
External
External














Internal
External





Both







Both
Internal
Both



Construction Execution and Acquisition
Extensive research has investigated construction execution and acquisition
methods for private industry, public industry, and MILCON procurement. These studies
focused on private industry best practices such as relational contracting, schedule
performance, and design-build procurement methods (Johnson et al. 2012; Rosner et al.
2009; Hale et al. 2009; Molenaar et al. 1999). While public construction strives to meet
the performance achieved by private industry, it has to do so in a methodical way to limit
risk and meet regulatory requirements.
In private industry, many execution and acquisition methods are available ranging
from design-bid-build and design-build to construction manager and private-publicpartnerships (Kelleher and Walters 2009). However, MILCON is restricted to limited
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methods of execution, which are typically, traditional design-bid-build (DBB) or designbuild (DB) (AFCEE 2008). Public-sector construction projects, including MILCON,
traditionally used the DBB method where an architect-engineer firm creates a design and
a separate contractor constructs the facility (AFCEE 2008). However, starting in 1996,
public-sector engineers began following private industry and implementing DB execution
where a single contractor takes the project from design through construction completion
(Molenaar et al. 1999; Rosner et al. 2009). A 2008 study of 835 USAF MILCON
projects determined that DB execution resulted in better performance for complicated
construction endeavors (Rosner et al. 2009). Additionally, results published in 2009 for
U.S. Navy MILCON living quarters showed a statistically significant improvement in
reduction of cost and schedule growth as well as overall construction time (Hale et al.
2009). However, to reduce the risk of inadequate facilities, the public-sector has heavily
restricted the use of DB. While research into public-sector DB projects has shown that
limiting the number of bidders based on their qualifications is most effective, portions of
the FAR limit the number of qualifications-based restrictions that can be used (Molenaar
et al. 1999; Federal Acquisition Regulation 2005). Finally, Gannon et al. (2012) found
that USACE DB policy forced contractors to commit to a schedule and cost within the
first 2 months of a project although it takes 8 to 11 months to reach the 100% design
milestone. Consequently, contractors charge more to limit their risk due to changes in the
final design. While public-sector construction strives to implement private-industry DB
procurement, some significant differences exist.
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Research Methods
Research into MILCON cost premiums is a qualitative and quantitative endeavor.
An evaluation of research literature confirmed the existence of MILCON cost premiums.
Following this confirmation, methodologies were selected based on their appropriateness
for analyzing the available data and producing results that limit threats to internal and
external validity. A unique case study, including its reports and contract documents,
identified internal causes of cost premiums. Following the case study, interviews and
surveys identified additional causes and validated and quantified the cost premiums. This
section details research methods related to the case study, interviews, and survey.
Weather Shelter Case Study
Two projects constructed during the same time frame at Joint Base ElmendorfRichardson (JBER) near Anchorage, Alaska, presented a unique opportunity to analyze
factors that influence MILCON cost premiums. This opportunity was unique for several
reasons. First, the two projects had the same initial requirement: construct a 7-bay
weather shelter. A weather shelter is a basic shelter for aircraft and personnel during
maintenance, fueling, and arming operations. Figure 5 presents a general single-line
diagram of the functional areas required in both weather shelters. Both weather shelters
contain seven hangar bays; a support area; ancillary support spaces for building
mechanical, communications, and fire protection systems; restrooms; and pass through
access (673d Civil Engineer Group 2009; U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska 2008).
Second, the construction agents executed the projects via different contract and oversight
methods. The construction agents varied methods based on internal policies, personnel
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experience, and expected costs. Finally, since both projects occurred at the same location
using MILCON authorized funds, they were subject to the same set of rules and
regulations. This limited the number of variables that could cause widely different cost,
schedule, and performance results. A single case study is appropriate because the ability
to analyze two public-sector projects with the same requirements, but different methods
of execution, is a unique and normally inaccessible phenomenon (Ellram 1996). This
case studied enabled research into internal cost premium factors rather than the same
external factors identified by previous research.

Figure 5: Layout of 7-bay Weather Shelter
Qualitative data, after action reports (AAR), interviews with engineers from the
673 Civil Engineer Group (CEG) and USACE Alaska District, and contract documents
were analyzed to determine the factors that affected each project’s cost performance.
Three different AARs were analyzed to isolate common factors.

Additionally,

quantitative data, including cost estimates and actual costs, were available for each of the
projects.
Interview & Survey
Semi-structured interviews with government and contractor experts in MILCON
construction added validity to the case study findings. A purposive sample was chosen
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due to the limited sample size and quantity of the experts with the requisite weather
shelter and general MILCON knowledge. The interviewers gained insight to develop
mitigation strategies and determine factors that could cause cost premiums.

The

interviewer asked government employees for their opinion on policies that cause cost
premiums as well as changes implemented to address cost premiums. Additionally, the
interviewer asked contractors about differences between MILCON and private sector
construction processes and policies. A survey was developed based on common factors
from the interviews as well as additional factors from the JBER MILCON case study.
The survey contained 33 Likert-style questions relating to factors that could cause
cost premiums on all MILCON projects and 10 questions related to the JBER weather
shelters specifically.

The survey asked respondents to rate each factor’s level of

influence on MILCON cost premiums as:
•

not at all

•

to a limited extent

•

to a moderate extent

•

to a large extent

•

to a very large extent

The survey respondents represented three demographic groups: USACE Alaska District
engineers and contract specialists, USAF civil engineers and contracting officers, and
contractors with both MILCON and private industry experience. The results of the
survey rated the level of influence different factors, including policy and construction
agent variations, have on MILCON cost premiums.

The low number of available

respondents, 18 in total, required the use of non-parametric descriptive statistics. The
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responses were ranked from most to least influential for each demographic group. If
multiple factors had the same average level of influence, each factor received the same
rank. Additionally, a weighted average for each factor was calculated by averaging each
factor’s level of influence within each demographic group; this weighted averaged
provided an overall level of influence rank for each factor.

The weighted average

mitigated the effects of having a varying number of respondents from each demographic.
Integration of the case study, interviews, and surveys limits threats to validity and permits
limited generalization of the results.

General Results
Weather Shelter Construction Comparison
Although engineers initially programmed both weather shelters to meet the same
requirements, the construction techniques, cost, and schedule performance all varied
widely. The USACE constructed shelter A represents a standard MILCON DB project.
Contractors bid on the project based on a statement of requirements and request for
proposal (RFP) developed by the USACE Alaska District. The CEG constructed shelter
B by developing a statement of work and using the U.S. General Services Administration
(GSA) Schedules Program and eBuy to procure a DB pre-engineered building (PEB) with
installation. Both solicitation processes allowed a “best value” based contract award
(GSA 2010). In the end, the contractor designed and constructed shelter A using standard
construction practices including concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls and a built-up roof
system. Shelter B utilized PEB construction practices including a very low slope metal
roof, insulated metal panels, and steel support structures. The more costly shelter took
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longer to construct and thus far did not result in better performance in terms end-user
needs, facility performance, or maintainability. Overall, both facilities perform their
mission satisfactorily, but the procurement method, cost, and schedule varied
considerably.
Construction Results Differences
Although the requirement for the two weather shelters was the same, shelter A
cost $25.8 million and took just over 27 months to complete while shelter B cost only
$18.9 million and was completed in 12 months.

However, shelter A encountered

contaminated soil that ended up costing 2 months of construction time. Table 6 contains
a description of the work performed, the costs for each shelter, and the percent difference
in costs. As shown, all elements of the PEB weather shelter (shelter B) cost less except
for the 480V alternating current (AC) power system. While the two projects began with
the same requirements, shelter B cost 27% less and took less than half the time to
construct when compared to shelter A. Additionally, for both projects the programmed
amounts, government estimates, were the same at $21.4 million. The next portion of this
study investigated the cause of these differences.
Table 6: Weather Shelter Cost Comparison
Shelter B
Cost
$16,088,586
$1,240,478
$461,267
$604,988
$144,665
$193,837
$142,730
$18,876,551

Work Description
Shelter Construction & Site Work
Design Services & Insurance
270V DC Power
480V AC Power
Compressed Air System
Hangar Floor Coating
Interior Painting
Total
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Shelter A
Cost
$21,932,667
$2,135,132
$683,668
$490,678
$225,879
$206,072
$143,440
$25,817,536

% Diff
73%
58%
67%
123%
64%
94%
100%
73%

Contract Analysis
While the AARs identified many process requirement differences between the
two projects, this study used the source contract documents to determine requirement
differences. Using the request for proposal (RFP) and statement of work (SOW) allowed
for an unbiased look into construction policy variations to determine if there were
differences that caused cost deviations. Both the RFPs reference additional documents
such as Unified Facility Codes (UFC); industry standards, such as National Electric
Code; and military requirements, such as Air Force Instructions (AFI) and Engineering
Technical Letters (ETL).

The differences between the contract requirements were

categorized in two ways. First, the difference was qualified as either a similar, but not
the exact same, requirement in both projects or a requirement that does not exist in one of
the two projects. An example of the former is requiring floor covering but specifying
different types. Following that, a determination of the level of difference was qualified
based on expert opinion as a minimal difference in requirement, a difference in
requirements, or an extreme difference in requirements. Items that existed only in one
project were automatically rated as an extreme difference.
The 1,009-page shelter A RFP is a consolidated RFP, SOW, and contract
administration document. On the other hand, shelter B released three documents, the
RFP, SOW, and contractor administrative requirements, totaling 161 pages via the GSA
system. Table 7 states the number of contract requirement differences between the two
shelters. In addition to quantifying the requirement differences in each contract, the
AARs highlight fundamental process differences. Each overarching cost premium theme
contains discussion of the process differences.
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Table 7: Summary of Contract Requirement Differences
Difference
Similar requirement, minimal difference
Similar requirement, difference
Similar requirement, extremely different
Requirement only in one contract, extremely
different
USACE more stringent
CEG more stringent

Quantity
31
35
5
46
81
3

Expert Survey
The expert survey was completed by nine personnel from USACE, Alaska
District, five USAF personnel representing the CEG and Contracting Squadron, and four
contractors representing experience with four different companies that have executed
MILCON. Table 8 summarizes the results for any factors rated as moderately or largely
influencing cost premiums. In addition to the factors presented in Table 8, another 15
factors only influence MILCON cost premiums “to a limited extent” and one factor has
no influence on cost premiums. The table also presents the response weighted average
and quantifies how many of the contract requirement differences relate to each factor.
Finally, the table provides the overall rank based on level of influence and the rank for
each demographic. Eighty-three percent of the 102 contract differences linked to the
survey fell into the moderately or largely influential categories. The factors that have
“specific” for their “applies to” can be applied only to the JBER weather shelter projects;
on the other hand, the “general” factors can be applied to the weather shelters and most
other MILCON projects. The factors listed in Table 8 were combined with the contract
requirement differences, interview data, and open-ended questions at the end of the
survey to generate overarching themes regarding cost premiums.
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Table 8: Moderately & Largely Influential MILCON Cost Premium Factors

USACE

USAF

Overall
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Applies
To
Factor
Specific CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar bay walls
General USAF project through USACE
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the hangar bays
Specific versus a de-energized system
Specific Built up low slope roof versus metal panels
Unique attributes of USAF project vs private industry with
General similar end-use requirements
General USACE implementation of design-build execution
General Quality control requirements set by the government
General Oversight on contractor by USACE/NAVFAC
General Prescriptive design requirements rather than code references
General Military design standards/specifications
General FAR: 8A/small-business policies
Specific Direct digital controls for all HVAC components
General USAF project through AFCEE
General Submittal process (administration/# of submittals)
General Restrictions placed on construction methods
General FAR: Administrative requirements
General USAF implementation of design-build execution
General Restrictions placed on designs
Additional capacity required in fire alarm system above and
Specific beyond current building scope

Contractor

Ranking

2
1

8
25

2
1

1
2

1

2

5

3

3

3.667

1

4

5

5

4

Moderate

3.467

2

29

1

6

5

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

3.43
3.411
3.389
3.306
3.259
3.175
3.139
3.139
3.115
3.096
3.058
3.05
3.046

7
9
1
23
4
1
1
0
14
0
4
0
1

4
8
8
16
18
18
4
8
8
18
8
18
16

12
7
19
4
2
9
19
19
27
12
16
3
12

6
6
3
15
15
6
25
12
6
6
21
31
15

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
12
14
15
16
17
18

Moderate

3

1

18

11

15

19

Influence
on
MILCON
Premiums
Large
Large

Weighted
Avg.
Value
4.056
4.052

# Contract
Rqmt
Differences
1
0

Large

4

Large

USACE

USAF

Overall
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Applies
To
Factor
General Submittal timeline (time for approval/rejection)
Schedule management requirements required by USACE
Specific versus CE squadron
General LEED for new construction requirements
Specific Internal roof drains versus gutters
Inhabited vs low-occupancy anti-terrorism/force protection
Specific standards requirements
General Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
General Design review process
Specific Requirement to develop test hangar concrete slabs
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed project cost) early in
General project development

Contractor

Ranking

8

30

14

20

2

4

34

25

21

2.896
2.861

2
1

18
18

12
17

21
25

22
23

Moderate

2.806

1

8

31

25

24

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

2.758
2.739
2.694

2
4
1

27
27
8

9
19
39

31
21
25

25
26
27

Moderate

2.528

0

40

19

12

28

Influence
on
MILCON
Premiums
Moderate

Weighted
Avg.
Value
2.974

# Contract
Rqmt
Differences
1

Moderate

2.917

Moderate
Moderate

Results: Overarching Cost Premium Themes
The analysis of survey results, interviews, and case study data revealed five major
overarching themes that influence cost premium which are shown in Table 9. Table 9
also shows the number of survey factors and contract requirement differences applying to
each theme. The survey factors and contract differences can fall into multiple themes.
These data were combined with the interview and open-ended survey responses to
provide the full analysis of each theme.
Table 9: Cost Premium Themes
# Survey
Factors

Theme
Failing to Balance Risk
Additional Public-sector Requirements
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation
Selection of Construction Specifications
Parameterization of the Execution
Process

14
10
9
11
10

# Contract
Rqmt
Differences
45
18
20
41
39

Failing to Balance Risk
The selection of acquisition and execution method, such as DB and FFP, directly
affects the balance of risk between the contractor and construction agent. Shifting from
DBB to DB shifts risk from the construction agent to the contractor (Lam et al. 2008).
However, in MILCON procurement, the risk is sometimes shifted so far toward the
contractor that it causes cost premiums. In private industry construction, the balancing of
risk minimizes cost and enables the contractor to operate in parallel. The interview and
open-ended survey question revealed that some construction agents are litigation adverse;
therefore, they specify everything possible in their contracts. Contractors price projects
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more costly due to the additional requirement to validate the design and construction
against the abundance of specifications and regulations. Forty-five contract differences
and 14 cost premium factors fall into the theme of imbalanced risk.
The most telling example of an imbalanced risk cannot be quantitatively
validated, but the perception appears to cause cost premiums. Contractors stated that the
most influential cost premium factor is the construction agent and, in this case, the
military construction agents drive cost increases. However, survey result shows that
construction agents perceive that they are not responsible for causing cost premiums
while contractors feel the need to charge higher prices for MILCON than private sector
projects. The ability to implement changes to mitigate this cost premium falls within the
realm of the DoD. In this case, even if there is no quantifiable reason for the cost
premium to exist, the military should address the perception issue and attempt to mitigate
this cost premium.
Research revealed two general schools of thought for the cause of the imbalanced
risk. First, military construction agents “partner” with contractors in name only. Johnson
et al.’s (2012) research revealed that, in many cases, the construction agent does not
partner with the contractor either due to an erroneous belief that the FAR forbids it or to
avoid accusations of showing preference for a given contractor. Additionally, the AARs
listed partnering as one of the primary drivers for success in the shelter B project (673d
Civil Engineer Group 2010; Moser 2009). Furthermore, Lam et al.’s (2008) general DB
research found that partnering can result in a higher level of success for DB projects.
Public-sector construction agents should look for ways to partner or ally with the
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contractor; alliancing can improve cost, schedule, and performance while benefiting both
the contractor and construction agent.
An adaptation of Gannon et al.’s (2012) cone of uncertainty (Figure 6) allows for
visualization of how the improper application of DB can cause an imbalance of risk. If
the construction agent and contractor balance risk, as it affects cost, the balanced cost
should appear near the center of the cone. However, as more risk shifts to the contractor,
the cost shifts towards the right side of the cone representing higher construction costs.
Additionally, the earlier in the design process the contractor is locked in to a fixed cost
and schedule, the higher the cost and longer the schedule tend to be. Construction agents
can balance risk by using an acquisition method with incentives or award fees that reward
the contractor for above standard work, costs, or schedule.

By balancing risk via

execution method and partnering with contractors, the government can lower
construction costs and increase construction performance.

Figure 6: Cost Cone of Uncertainty (Adapted from Gannon et al. 2012)
Additional Public-sector Requirements
The additional public-sector requirements theme encompasses a vast number of
rules, regulations, public laws, and policies that can increase public-sector construction
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costs compared to private industry. The JBER weather shelter case study presented an
opportunity to look into controllable, internal, cost factors since both projects had to meet
the same federal regulations and policies. This cost premium theme is represented by 10
surveyed cost premium factors and 18 contract requirement differences. Additionally,
the open-ended survey responses frequently brought up additional government
requirements such as the Buy American Act and Davis-Bacon Act wage rates. The 5th
and 11th most influential cost premium factors, based on the survey, include unique
attributes of military projects compared to private industry and FAR 8A and small
business policies. Although all military facilities must meet anti-terrorism and force
protection requirements, some facilities have more stringent requirements than other
facilities based on function and occupancy. Previous research and interview responses
have specifically cited military specifications as a cause of cost premiums; however, most
construction has moved away from military specifications towards industry standards and
UFCs (673d Civil Engineer Group 2009; U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska 2008). The
weather shelter projects demonstrated that construction agents should be aware of the
exact requirements for the facility requested and not always assume that the most
stringent standards need to be applied. The possible cost premiums can be mitigated by
the construction agent through analysis of the requirement itself.
In addition to unique military policies, the federal government has implemented
socioeconomic policies that increase the cost of public-sector construction. The survey
highlighted small-business policies, such as 8A source selection, and administrative
requirements from the FAR as moderately influencing costs.

Additionally, the

requirement to use Davis-Bacon wage rates increases the cost of public-sector

102

construction. While the original intent of the Davis-Bacon Act was to ensure a fair wage
and ensure wages paid by contractors doing federal work are appropriate for the area,
recent studies have shown these wage rates do not reflect the private sector construction
industry correctly and cause additional and unnecessary cost premiums (Hartford 2012;
Pope 1990).

Although many of the specific elements in this cost premium theme are

outside the control of the DoD, engineers, contracting specialists, and project managers
can limit the effect by treating each project as unique and applying only the necessary
specifications for the specific project.
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation
The AAR and interviews with contractors revealed a common theme: the standard
USAF MILCON DB process writes and regulates, sometimes unknowingly, innovation
out of many construction projects.

The innovation theme contains 20 contract

requirement differences which apply to 9 different cost premium factors. Two of the
factors rated as having a large influence on cost premiums are specific to the JBER
weather shelter designs. The remaining factors were all rated as moderately influencing
cost premiums. For the weather shelter projects, experts consider the shelter B approach
more innovative than the approach used in shelter A.
This study found that construction agents should not limit construction methods
or designs for DB projects, especially prior to a design charrette. The shelter A RFP
limited the construction to CMU and thereby limited designs and construction methods.
However, the shelter A construction agent stated that the end-user’s insistence on using
certain materials and methods limited the design. The shelter B RFP left the construction
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material open as long as it met all requirements; the end-result ended up meeting or
exceeding the requirements.

Construction agents should work to ensure they are

receiving requirements from the client rather than detailed direction.

After all

requirements have been identified, construction agents and contractors can work together
to use innovative or standard practices that best balance schedule, cost, and performance
while meeting all the requirements. This is not to say that innovative materials or ideas
are always the best option, but they should not be dismissed too quickly. Lam et al.
(2008) lends quantitative support to this concept based on their finding that allowing a
DB contractor room to provide knowledge and expertise improves DB project success
and allows the end-user to select previously unknown alternatives.
Construction agents should educate users on how innovative solutions will meet
their requirements. For example, leadership throughout JBER had to be educated on the
fact that a PEB is not always an “off-the-shelf” solution and can be designed and built for
their precise needs. One of the shelter B innovative ideas was to implement an electrical
disconnect rather than installing all “hazard-rated” electrical infrastructure. This single
change resulted in large cost savings and emphasizes why construction agents must work
with their contractors rather than simply dismissing ideas that do not align to “the way it
has always been done.” In another example, the shelter A RFP specified resilient vinyl
flooring in its non-aircraft areas while the shelter B RFP allowed the contractor to select
the floor covering, which ended up being a coating directly applied to the concrete slab.
The shelter A RFP specified vinyl flooring because that is the standard the user was used
to; on the other hand, the concrete sealant meets all requirements and ends up being more
durable for maintenance activities.

From the simple, such as flooring type, to the
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significant, such as insulated metal panels rather than CMU, construction agents should
allow DB contractors to propose and implement innovative solutions that allow the use of
different construction materials and methods without sacrificing quality.
Selection of Construction Specifications
Construction specifications define the requirements for a facility.

Generally,

construction contracts use three forms of specifications: method-based specifications
(MBS), end-result specifications (ERS), and performance-related specifications (PRS)
(Dhakal et al. 2009). The MBS is the classical form of specification where the design
and construction agent prescribe construction procedures for the contractor to follow. In
ERS, the contractor is fully responsible for the construction procedures and quality
control, but the construction agent accepts or rejects the final results based on a detailed
quality assurance plan. Finally, PRS grew from statistically-based quality assurance
specifications and relate quality characteristics and/or life-cycle costs to expected
performance of the work completed (Dhakal et al. 2009).

Based on the contracts

analyzed and the interview and survey data, most MILCON projects utilize MBS
regardless of execution method.
For the two weather shelters analyzed, 23 contract requirement differences
directly related to “prescriptive design requirements rather than code references.”
Additionally, this overarching theme contains three of the four largely influential specific
cost premium factors (Table 8). Furthermore, all of the contractors surveyed mentioned
that prescriptive methods and materials do not allow contractors to fully apply DB
practices such as being aggressive or providing more economical solutions by taking
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advantage of local purchase or economy of scale. This finding goes against one of the
key DB performance indicators: successful projects allow the contractor flexibility (Lam
et al. 2008).

However, the utilization of MBS can help the contractor select the

appropriate materials and methods that can meet the construction agent’s overall
requirements.
Based on this, and other research, construction executed using the DB
methodology should implement at least ERS and in some cases PRS (Dhakal et al. 2009;
Kelleher and Walters 2009). However, some public-sector construction, especially in
specialized areas such as the military, will always have unique requirements. Engineers
can implement ERS while still including explicit requirements; for example, in the case
of the weather shelters, these requirements included concrete floors rated for a specific
aircraft for a specific number of passes. The contract for shelter A included references to
industry standards, such as those published by ASCE, while also prescribing the floor
construction thickness, mixture, and procedures.

On the other hand, the shelter B

contract referenced the same industry standards and AFIs for the given aircraft but
allowed the contractor to design and specify the floor concrete. In the end, shelter A has
uniform thickness concrete throughout while shelter B has thicker concrete where the
aircraft rests and less thick concrete in non-aircraft loaded areas. By using an ERS rather
than an MRS, the contractor developed a method that saved time and money while
maintaining the performance requirements. ERS, and thusly PRS, can allow for more
innovative designs and potential cost savings without sacrificing performance during DB
execution (Dhakal et al. 2009).
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Parameterization of the Execution Process
Since the 1996 update to the FAR allowing the use of DB, many federal agencies
use it primarily to execute their construction projects. However, government application
of DB does not match private sector DB in terms of procedures or benefits; the
government, as the owner and construction agent, remains heavily involved in the process
including, in some cases, not allowing construction to commence until a design has been
submitted and approved (Molenaar et al. 1999; Gannon et al. 2012).

Additionally,

analysis of the weather shelter RFPs made apparent the over parameterization, or
specification, of requirements for a DB project. While all of the cost premium themes,
with the exception of additional public-sector requirements, can fall into the
parameterization of the execution process theme, this section will focus on additional
elements of inappropriate DB implementation.
In traditional DB execution, construction is on-going as the design is finalized; for
example, once the facility footprint has been specified and approved, earthwork can begin
while the vertical portions are still being designed. The requirement for design and
construction in series rather than in parallel forces the project to match a DBB process
with a single contractor and directly increases costs by extending the schedule.
Additionally, in climates with limited construction seasons, delays caused by these
policies are further compounded. For the weather shelter projects, there were 39 contract
differences related to the parameterization of DB theme; respondents rated 79% of them
as moderately influencing cost premiums.

Specifically, the shelter B RFP allowed

construction and design to occur in parallel while the shelter A RFP required a complete
design prior to construction. However, two of the factors in this theme were contentious
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topics during the survey and another two factors revealed widely varying responses
between demographics.
The contentious factors shown to influence MILCON cost premiums are the
military construction agents’ approaches to implementing DB processes.

Overall,

respondents ranked military construction agents’ standard implementation of DB as the
sixth most influential cost premium factor. However, the construction agents did not
rank the level of influence as highly as contractors or end-users. These findings are
significant because it demonstrates possible disconnects between end-users, construction
agents, and contractors. Without regard for blame, it is apparent that construction agent
requirements and policies are limiting DB execution, thereby adding to construction costs
and schedule. However, the execution of shelter B demonstrated that military engineers
are able to implement DB execution similarly to private industry.
The other factors that directly relate to the application of DB include schedule
management requirements. When asked to compare the shelter A and shelter B schedule
management requirements, contractors ranked the shelter A requirements as the fifth
most influential factor. Administrative burdens can cause additional costs for contractors
while construction agents incorrectly believe the same burdens exist in private industry.
The shelter A RFP prescribes schedule management software requirements; however, this
prescribed software is not commonly used throughout industry. Survey and interview
responses, as well as Gannon et al.’s (2012) previous research, state that the use of nonindustry standard software (i.e. Primavera) ends up forcing the contractor to maintain at
least two schedules, one in their normal software, such as Microsoft Project, and one in
the custom-built construction agent software. The shelter B RFP allowed the contractor
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to select the software to be utilized as long as it met standard requirements, such as
presenting resource distribution and a critical path.
In addition to the parameterization of schedule management, the two weather
shelter projects treated submittals differently. The shelter A RFP specified that submittal
approval would take at least 30 days, and construction would be proceeding at risk if
executed prior to submittal approval. This policy and the idea of construction proceeding
at risk are more appropriate for a DBB contract. The contractor has accepted that risk
already through the use of DB; their ability to utilize materials, methods, and procedures
of their choosing offsets this risk (Lam et al. 2008).

The shelter B RFP more

appropriately aligned to standard DB practices and specified that submittals would be
approved as soon as possible. By working with the shelter B contractor, the construction
agent was able to help the contractor execute rapid approval for many elements. Some
construction agents administer significantly more large construction projects than others;
therefore, requiring a standardized submittal process helps with the internal
administrative burden. However, to allow DB to perform as expected, construction
agents should be more flexible with approval timelines; the contractor is taking risk from
the construction agent by being responsible for both design and construction.

Summary and Conclusions
This paper presented five themes that influence cost premiums in public-sector,
specifically MILCON, construction based on a case study, expert surveys, and
interviews. The five cost premium themes are:
•

Failing to balance risk
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•

Additional public-sector requirements

•

Stifling or not applying innovation

•

Selection of construction specifications

•

Parameterization of the execution process

The unique case study allowed for the determination of cost premiums caused by internal
processes rather than those stipulated by Congressionally mandated laws and policies.
Previous studies have attributed cost premiums to items such as Davis-Bacon Act wage
rates and military requirements, but this study demonstrated that internal policies cause
some cost premiums. Specifically, the case study demonstrated that internal policies can
cause a $7 million, or 27%, project cost difference. Additionally, by combining expert
opinion and AARs with contract documentation, this study was able to show which
factors can, and to what degree, influence cost premiums. Although this one case study
provides evidence unique to these projects, it does validate the overall cost premium
findings. Furthermore, according to Patton (2001), the phenomenological findings based
on expert opinions have substantial weight in determining the true reality.
Overall, internal factors based on the parameterization of DB execution cause
many cost premiums.

Parameterization of DB can occur by selecting restrictive

specifications, stifling innovation, and failing to balance risk.

Based on previous

research, this parameterization directly affects the likelihood of DB success by limiting
contractor action and inputs while also expanding the construction timeline (Chan et al.
2004; Lam et al. 2008). Working to address internal causes of cost premiums can reduce
costs and likely improve DB performance.
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Relevance to Industry Practitioners and Researchers
Although the results of this study focused on MILCON procurement, the findings
can have significant implication for industry practitioners and researchers. The fact that
many of the factors influencing cost premiums were internal to the executing construction
agent suggests that practitioners should begin with an internal audit to reduce costs and
improve efficiency.

Additionally, studies could further investigate the effects of

parameterizing the execution process. This study showed that parameterization caused
cost premiums; further research could investigate the effects on schedule, overall
construction outcome, and likelihood of litigation.
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IV. Journal Article: A Geospatial Statistical Analysis of Non-Value Added Costs
Due to Davis-Bacon Act Prevailing Wage Rates
The journal article presented in this chapter was submitted for publication in the
Lean Construction Journal. At the time of thesis completion, the journal article was not
yet accepted or rejected. This journal article presents the results of the investigation into
cost premiums associated with the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) prevailing wage rates. While
the content has not been changed, technical adaptations have occurred for inclusion in
this thesis. Appendix C contains further supporting information including additional
background and methodology details. Appendix D contains a procedure log for all
geospatial and statistical operations carried out in support of this DBA research.
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Abstract
Question: Do prevailing wage rates add non-value added costs to federal
construction projects, specifically those executed by the United States Air Force?
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to understand how prevailing (DavisBacon Act) wage rates affect the cost of federal construction compared to private
industry. Additionally, this paper investigates concerns about the geospatial breakdown
of prevailing wage rates.
Research Method: Geospatial and statistical analysis of Davis-Bacon Act
prevailing wage rates compared to Bureau of Labor Statistics industry wage rates.
Findings: This paper also quantified a statistically significant difference (16%) in
prevailing hourly wage rates versus private-sector wage rates for carpenters and
electricians thereby codifying the non-value added prevailing wage based costs. This
paper documents how the geospatial breakdown for wage rate analysis for BLS has
enough fidelity for DBA wage rate use at United States Air Force installations.
Limitations: This research only invested prevailing wages at United States Air
Force installations for the carpenter and electrician trades.
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Implications: This research indicates a need to reexamine prevailing wage rates
in pursuit of federal lean construction.
Value for Practitioners: This paper quantifies cost differences, thereby
demonstrating opportunities for realizing cost efficiencies, based on prevailing wage rates
and promotes the removal of non-value added costs from federal construction projects.
Keywords: contract management, construction management, construction costs,
military construction, public sector construction, lean construction, federal facility
procurement, federal laws, waste
Paper type: Full paper

Introduction
In 2010 and 2011, the United States spent over $30 billion for federal construction
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The Department of Defense (DoD) military construction
program is responsible for 40%, or $12 billion, of the yearly construction expenditures
(112th Congress 2011b).

Recent research revealed that military construction costs

between 25% and 40% more than private industry; specific to the United States Air Force
(USAF), one study found the additional costs to be 37% greater (112th Congress 2011b;
Hartford 2012). Given this large cost discrepancy, private industry construction can be
used as a goal, or baseline, for an analysis of excessive costs in military construction. To
meet budgetary constraints and goals, investigating factors that cause military
construction to cost more than private industry construction would be of value to the
USAF. Therefore, examining military construction costs through lean analysis helps
identify areas of value added and non-value added, or waste, costs.
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In general, military construction involves constructing or modifying a facility to
meet a specific purpose. This one-of-a-kind product makes it difficult to analyze many
lean principles such as pull and striving for perfection (Koskela 2004). Many lean
construction analysis efforts focus on repetitive processes such as large scale residential
construction where lessons learned on one house can be applied to the next (Gustafsson,
Vessby, and Rask 2012). Although military construction does not typically involve
repetitive efforts, it can still be viewed from a lean construction perspective by focusing
on the process, which is repeated for every project, rather than a single one-of-a-kind
project.
This study focused on examining labor costs through a lean lens.

Labor

represents just over 30% of construction costs and is one of the few costs that can be
changed without affecting building design or effectiveness (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).
Specific regulations guide federal construction procurement; one of these requires the use
of the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) prevailing wage rates (Department of Labor 2012).
These wage rates are trade and region specific. Additionally, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) provides wage rate information for private industry construction through
its surveys. The BLS surveys workers throughout the United States (U.S.) and tabulates
the information, including hourly wages, based on their trade and locality. If there are
substantial differences between the prevailing wage rates and surveyed wage rates, the
extra costs can be considered type one, or necessary, waste (Womack and Jones 1996).
However, necessary wastes due to regulatory requirements and public law are still wastes
that can be addressed. Since wage rate data are geospatially related, an analysis via a
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geographic information system (GIS) can be used to compare the DBA wage rates to
BLS wage surveys at USAF active duty bases.

Objectives
The overall goal of the research was to confirm and quantify the findings of
numerous reports which found DBA prevailing wage rates to be a leading cause of
military construction cost premiums compared to private industry construction costs. To
achieve this goal, the approach used in the research was to determine, via geospatial
statistical analysis, if DBA prevailing wage rates vary greatly from the surrounding area
wage rates as determined by the BLS wage surveys at USAF active duty base locations.
Therefore, two hypotheses were developed to gain a better understanding of non-value
added federal construction costs based on labor wages. The first hypothesis addressed a
comparison of prevailing wage rates and private industry wage rates. The first alternate
hypothesis is that there is a difference between the DBA prevailing wage rates and the
wage rates paid in private industry. The second research hypothesis addressed agency
concerns about the geospatial breakdowns used for each type of wage rate. The second
alternative is that there is no difference between standardized DBA prevailing wage rates
and those surveyed by the BLS based on geographic location. The second hypothesis
focused on whether the high and low wage rates occur in the same location.

Background and Literature
Lean Thinking, Construction, and Waste
Originally, lean thinking focused on lean production. Womack and Jones (1996)
summarized five principles of lean thinking from a production perspective:
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•

Specify value

•

Identify and map the value stream

•

Make the process steps flow

•

Let the client, customer, or end-user pull value

•

Strive for perfection

However, further studies have demonstrated that some of these lean thinking elements do
not work as proposed for lean construction. Koskela (2004) analyzed each of the five
principles from a construction standpoint and determined that while Womack and Jones’
(1996) five principles are critical to implementing lean practices, many other principles
exist, especially in the complex construction environment. Despite these differences, the
concept of waste exists in lean thinking regardless of the implementation environment.
Womack and Jones (1996) define two types of waste. Type one waste is necessary
waste, which consists of activities or costs where value is not created but the waste
cannot be eliminated based on current technology or policies. Type two waste is pure
waste, which consists of activities that consume resources without adding value such as
wait time or rework. Significant amounts of lean construction research have focused on
costs and waste and found that showing savings is one of the best ways to motivate
companies to implement lean construction practices (Alves and Tsao 2007). This study
focuses on type one waste and quantifies the cost to the U.S. government, specifically the
USAF.
Prevailing Wage Rates
Prevailing wage rates are the wage rates paid to non-union employees working on
projects funded by the government (Cavanaugh 2010). There are multiple prevailing
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wage rate programs both in the U.S. and internationally. In the U.S., the McNamaraO’Hara Service Contract Act sets prevailing wage rates for service contracts. The DavisBacon Act (DBA) fixes prevailing wage rates for federally funded construction projects;
additionally, some states have prevailing wage rate acts for state-funded construction
(Cavanaugh 2010). This study focuses on the non-value added costs for construction as
USAF installations; therefore, the applicable prevailing wage act is the Davis-Bacon Act
(DBA).
In 1931, Congress enacted the DBA to enable fair construction procurement
practices (United States Government Accountability Office 2011). Congress designed
the act to “to protect communities and workers from the economic disruption caused by
contractors hiring lower-wage workers from outside their local area, thus obtaining
federal construction contracts by underbidding competitors who pay local wage rates”
(United States Government Accountability Office 2011).

The Department of Labor

(DOL) is responsible for administering the wage rates via its Wage and Hour Division
(WHD) (Department of Labor 2012). According to the WHD, “Davis-Bacon and Related
Acts apply to contractors and subcontractors performing on federally funded or assisted
contracts in excess of $2,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair (including painting
and decorating) of public buildings or public works” (Department of Labor 2012).
Currently, the DOL WHD uses voluntary surveys to determine the appropriate
prevailing wages for a region (112th Congress 2011a). Since 1996, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOL Inspector General have found and annotated
issues with the method of surveying used by DOL WHD. Inaccurate survey data, limited
scope of surveys, out-of-date union data, and a lack of result validation causes these
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issues (United States Government Accountability Office 2011). Although the WHD
implemented limited improvements, the process still results in the same type of errors.
The DBA prevailing wage rates are specific to geographical areas (Cavanaugh
2010). The WHD attempts to create wage rates by county but can use any contiguous
breakdown based on county areas, federally owned lands, wage data, and metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA) (United States Government Accountability Office 2011). While
the GAO has documented problems with the method of data collection, public law
requires that federal construction contractors use the results (Department of Labor 2012).
Bureau of Labor Statistics
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is “the principal Federal agency responsible
for measuring labor market activity, working conditions, and price changes in the
economy” (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). The BLS publishes average wage rates for
construction and non-construction trades broken down geographically into metropolitan
and non-metropolitan statistical areas (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).

Since the

primary responsibility of the BLS is labor statistics and analysis, it has an expert staff of
statisticians and data collectors. To that end, the House Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections found that the DOL WHD is an enforcement agency that lacks the expertise
provided by the BLS (112th Congress 2011a). However, the WHD stated that it could not
use BLS data due to its lack of geographic coverage (112th Congress 2011a).
Federal and Military Construction
This study of DBA prevailing wage rates focused on the effect of those wage rates
on USAF military construction. Military construction is “any construction, development,

121

conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military installation”
(Department of the Air Force 2010). There are two types of military construction;
MILCON, which is, in general, construction activities costing $750,000 or more, and
unspecified minor military construction, which is repair and maintenance of existing
facilities or construction costing less than $750,000 (Department of the Air Force 2010).
Public law codifies the rules and regulations governing military construction and requires
both types of military construction to use DBA prevailing wage rates (Department of
Labor 2012). Previous research has determined that military construction costs more
than private industry; many of these studies have found that DBA prevailing wage rates
add to the cost premiums, or waste (112th Congress 2011b; Hartford 2012; Pope 1990;
Carpenter 1992).

The many policies and laws regulating federal and military

construction limit the waste analyzed in this study to type one, or necessary waste, and
the scope to prevailing wage rates.

Research Methods
Two types of analysis were performed to determine the cost premiums associated
with DBA prevailing wage rates. The first was a geospatial analysis that combined the
data and allowed for initial analysis.

Geospatial analysis is a unique method of

quantitative analysis providing for both statistical analysis based on geography as well as
a visual representation of data and results.

The second analysis was a statistical

examination via multivariate analysis of the variance (MANOVA) and matched-pairs ttests to validate the statistical significance of the geospatial analysis results.
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The geospatial analysis involved combining and analyzing geospatial and nongeospatial data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the BLS, and the DOL WHD Wage
Determinations Online system. The BLS data were geospatially related to MSAs and
non-MSAs. The DBA data are not geospatially related and had to be manually extracted
and associated with each USAF base. Additionally, the DBA data are not the same
across each area; some regions contain data for many tradecrafts while other areas
contain a minimal amount. For this research, the electrician and carpenter trades were
analyzed because those trades existed in every DBA wage file and match exactly to a
BLS trade.
Geospatial analysis illustrated how the DBA prevailing wage rates and BLS wage
survey results vary across space independently from each other. Following the individual
analysis, comparative analysis of the two wage rates quantified differences in wage rates
and generated a graphic of the differences across space through the use of geographic
surface generation. The Kriging method generated the surface by interpolation between
data points (USAF bases). The Kriging surface generation method interpolates data
based on the weighted moving average and data variance (Hu 1995). The Kriging
surface generation method makes more accurate predictions than other models due to its
advanced modeling techniques. The BLS wage survey rates did not require interpolation
since geospatial data were available for the entire United States.
The statistical analysis used MANOVA and matched-pairs t-tests to determine if
the differences between BLS wage survey and DBA prevailing wage rates were
statistically significant. By comparing the differences in the wage rates, taking into
account the mean, standard deviation, and standard error, an F-test or t-test value is
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determined and used to generate a level of statistical significance (Neter and others
1996). A 95% confidence interval was applied to all statistical analyses. To test the
second hypothesis, both the BLS and DBA wage rates were standardized using Equation
1.
𝑍=

𝑋−𝜇
𝜎

(1)
Equation 1

In the equation Z represents the standardized wage rate, X represents the wage rate, µ
represents the average of all the wage rates, and σ represents the standard deviation of the
wage rates. The standardizing of the wage rates allowed for a direct comparison of the
high and low values by location.

Results and Analysis
Individual Wage Rate Analysis
The BLS and DBA wage rates were analyzed independently of each other both
quantitatively and spatially. Table 10 summarizes the quantitative results. The DBA
wages had more variability than the BLS rates; specifically, the DBA rates had a multimodal distribution while the distribution for the BLS rates was mound shaped. The large
standard deviation differences between BLS and DBA wage rates emphasize the wider
distribution of the DBA wage rates. Additionally, in some locations, the DBA prevailing
wage rate is less than the BLS surveyed wage rates. In these cases, the contractors could
either pay the lower wage rate, perhaps by bringing in labor from outside the local area,
or increase the wage rate to meet the local (BLS) labor rates. If the contractor brought in
out of state labor, it would defeat the intent and original purpose of the DBA. However,
if the contractor increases the hourly wages to meet BLS surveyed rates, the average
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carpenter hourly wage rate would jump by 4.3% to $25.20. Furthermore, the average
electrician hourly wage rate would increase by 2.9% to $30.18 on USAF construction
projects.
Table 10: Quantitative Wage Rate Analysis
Wage Rate
DBA
BLS

Carpenter
Electrician
Average Max
Min StdDev Average Max
Min StdDev
$24.16 $43.59 $7.25 $10.39 $29.33 $48.28 $7.25
$9.54
$20.61 $34.26 $8.81 $5.75
$24.69 $39.33 $10.02 $6.15

Wage Rate Differences Hypothesis
The primary hypothesis for this study involved determining whether a statistically
significant difference exists between DBA prevailing wage rates and BLS surveyed rates.
First, the differences were illustrated graphically. Figure 7 shows the carpenter wage
differences between the DBA and BLS wage rates as a geographic surface based on
USAF base location. The Kriging method generated the surface from the USAF point
data in order to make visualizing the difference easier. The maximum difference is just
over $20 per hour (red) and the minimum is around -$7 (blue). The Southeast, Texas,
and northern Midwest represent the areas with lower DBA wage rates than BLS while the
rest of the country has higher DBA prevailing wage rates. Figure 8 shows the wage rate
differences for electricians with a maximum difference of almost $21 per hour and a
minimum of -$17; however, since -$17 was considered an outlier, the next, non-outlier,
minimum wage difference was -$7 per hour. In the case of electrician wages, very few
areas have lower DBA wage rates while most of the U.S. has prevailing wage rates that
are higher than those paid by private industry. While both figures demonstrate that the
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difference distribution varies geographically, the Northeast, central Midwest, and West
have higher prevailing wage rates for both trades.

Figure 7: Carpenter Wage Rate Differences

Figure 8: Electrician Wage Rate Differences
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Quantitative analysis of the differences between the two wage rates quantified the
statistical significance of differences and presented a comprehensive “picture” of the
effects of DBA wages on USAF construction. A MANOVA analysis of carpenter DBA
and BLS wage rates returned an F-value of 60.97 resulting in a p-value of less than
0.0001 showing statistically significant differences. The matched-pairs t-test returned a
mean difference of $3.55 with a 95% confidence interval between $2.65 and $4.44. This
means that, on average, the U.S. government expends $3.55 more per hour as waste to
carpenters working on federally funded projects at USAF bases; this additional expense is
type one waste.
The MANOVA for the electrician wages also showed a statistically significant
difference with an F-value of 108.67 resulting in a p-value of less than 0.0001. In the
case of the electricians, the average difference was $4.64 with a 95% confidence interval
bounded by $3.76 and $5.51. The monetary value of the waste for electricians is higher
than the carpenter waste due to prevailing wage rates. This statistical analysis strongly
supports the theory that DBA wages differ from BLS wage rates and are normally higher.
Table 11 presents a summary of the differences between the BLS and DBA wages.
However, if contractors paid the higher wage rate at locations with lower DBA wages
than BLS wages, the average differences for carpenters and electricians would be 120%
and 122%, respectively. The results show that, at best, the USAF pays a carpenter 14%
more than the surrounding area and could be paying at least 20% more. These large
prevailing wage rate premiums emphasize how this “necessary” waste can significantly
increase federal construction costs.
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Table 11: Summary of Wage Rate Differences
Wages Being
Compared to BLS
DBA prevailing
wage

Carpenter Average Wage
Difference
$/hr
%
$3.55

114%

Electrician Average Wage
Difference
$/hr
%
$4.64

118%

Finally, Table 12 shows the number of USAF bases that have prevailing wage
rates above and below the BLS wage rate for the surrounding area. They key takeaway is
that most USAF bases have prevailing wage rates above wages paid in the surrounding
area.
Table 12: Summary of USAF Wage Rate Comparisons
Trade
Carpenter
Electrician
Carpenter &
Electrician

# of Bases w/
DBA Below
BLS
68
33

# of Bases w/
DBA Above
BLS
121
156

% of Bases
Below BLS
Rate
36%
17%

% of Bases
Above BLS
Rate
64%
83%

22

113

12%

60%

Wage Rate Geospatial Breakdown Hypothesis
Geospatial analysis was critical to addressing the hypothesis related to DOL
WHD’s concern that BLS geospatial divisions would be too inaccurate for prevailing
wage rate use. The BLS analyzes wage data based on metropolitan and non-metropolitan
statistical areas. The WHD sets DBA prevailing wage rates based on state, county, or
smaller areas inside each county. In some cases, the geographic breakdowns differ per
trade for the same region. Graphical comparisons of the BLS and DBA wage rates show
that the high and low wages, in general, occur in the same region of the country for both
trades. Figure 9 demonstrates this similarity for the carpenter trade while Figure 10
depicts the similarities for the electrician trade. The color of the stars represents the DBA
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wage rate while the color of the remainder of the map represents the BLS wage rate. As
shown, the lower rates occur in the Midwest and Southeast while the west coast,
Northeast, and non-continental U.S. have higher wage rates for both DBA and BLS. For
the electrical trade, the wage rates are higher in general across the entire country.

Figure 9: DBA & BLS Carpenter Wage Rate Combined Map
Quantitative analysis directly addressed the second hypothesis and showed the
similarities demonstrated graphically. MANOVA performed on the standardized wage
rates provided statistical validation of the similar trending. The p-values of 0.5636 and
0.8822 for carpenters and electricians respectively show differences between the
normalized wage rates were statistically insignificant. This finding supports the second
alternative hypothesis and the notion that the DOL WHD could use the BLS geospatial
divisions for setting DBA prevailing wage rates at USAF bases.
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Figure 10: DBA & BLS Electrician Wage Rate Combined Map
Limitations
Due to the availability of data and method of analysis there are limitations to the
conclusions drawn from this geospatial analysis. Conclusions drawn from this analysis
do not apply to specially funded realignment projects such as the Guam Realignment
Fund. Additionally, although both Davis-Bacon and BLS wage rates exist for trades
other than carpenters and electricians these were the only trades analyzed. This means
this research can be used to show that wage rates differ and contribute to cost premiums,
but cannot be used to specify an exact amount DBA prevailing wage rates add to
construction projects. Furthermore, the DBA analysis did not account for any fringe
benefit pay since these benefits may be included in private industry pay but the BLS does
not quantify them. In addition, any Davis-Bacon wage determinations with multiple
categories, such as over/under $1.5M, were averaged to represent USAF projects of both
MILCON and unspecified minor construction scope. Finally, this analysis treats all
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USAF locations the same.

This means radar sites and test ranges have the same

weighting as major installations with a greater volume of construction. This limitation
makes it impossible to quantify exactly how much extra money the USAF spends due to
Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rates. This analysis focuses on general additional costs
rather than an exact quantity.

Summary and Conclusions
This analysis showed that the Davis-Bacon wage rates are not accurately
representing industry wages for USAF bases. This misrepresentation results in easily
quantifiable type one waste for federal construction. Specifically, 64% of USAF bases
have higher DBA prevailing wage rates for carpenters, 83% of the bases have higher
rates for electricians, and 60% of the bases have higher prevailing wage rates for both
trades. However, at bases with prevailing wage rates below the surrounding area’s wage
rates, contractors may increase the wage rate paid or bring in labor from outside the local
area; either of these options hurt the government by violating the premise of the DBA and
increasing construction costs.

Additionally, this analysis confirms the House of

Representatives Subcommittee belief that any fidelity lost through the use of BLS wage
rates would be regained by not using statewide data for prevailing wage rates (112th
Congress 2011a). By demonstrating that the BLS and DBA wage rates agree with each
other for regions with higher or lower wage rates, this study lends additional validation
toward the subcommittee’s thought that fidelity would not be lost by changing to BLS
statistical regions.
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This research demonstrated graphically and statistically that the Davis-Bacon Act
method of prevailing wage determination does not accurately reflect market conditions
for carpenters and electricians, two major construction trades. Therefore, the use of DBA
results in type one waste and costs the taxpayers additional money for construction on
USAF installations.

Adapting DBA wage rates to match local prevailing wages in

geospatial breakdown as well as hourly rates would reduce USAF, and all federal,
construction costs while still supporting local contractors and crafts persons and not
removing any value from a construction project. The federal government could address
this inefficiency, i.e., type one waste, as the first step in implementing lean construction
practices to address budgetary concerns.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this article are those of the writers and do not reflect the
official policy of position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, the U.S.
Government, or the Air Force Institute of Technology.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter briefly summarizes the results presented in the white paper, two
scholarly articles, and their supporting appendices. While the scholarly articles each
contain their own, in-depth, conclusions and recommendations, this chapter combines
and simplifies the recommendations.

This chapter also addresses the overarching

research problem and each of the research objectives. Recommendations for future
research follow the synopsis of conclusions and recommendations for addressing
MILCON cost premiums.

Research Objectives Addressed
The overarching research objective was to determine if military construction
(MILCON) costs exceed private industry costs, thereby reducing the cost performance
and effectiveness of United States Air Force (USAF) construction, and if so, discover the
causes of the MILCON cost premiums. Four objectives, which directly relate to the four
phases of research, addressed the broad objective.

The first objective related to

confirming the existence of MILCON cost premiums. This research confirmed the belief
that MILCON cost premiums exist through an extensive literature review as well as
expert interviews and surveys. This confirmation of the existence of MILCON cost
premiums addressed the first half of the overall research problem and set the baseline
assumption for the remainder of the MILCON cost premium research.
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Factors Causing MILCON Cost Premiums
This section addresses the second secondary objective by summarizing the factors
shown to cause or influence MILCON cost premiums. While the expert survey identified
43 possible factors, and half of which at least moderately effect MILCON cost premiums
(Chapter III, Table 8), this section sticks to broad categories of cost premium causes.
Table 13 lists the major cost premium factors and where additional information can be
found relating to each factor. Additionally, Table 13 identifies whether the factors are
under the control of the Department of Defense (DoD) (internal), outside DoD control
(external), or a combination of both. The factors listed are general categories; some
factors, such as schedule and submittal development, have many additional factors within
them. The chapters listed contain details relating to the individual factors. Overall, this
research found that although factors outside of the USAF or DoD control cause cost
premiums, internal policies cause further cost premiums. This research expands the body
of knowledge related to these controllable cost premium factors rather than passing blame
onto factors outside the span of control of the USAF or DoD. While Table 13 lists many
factors shown to cause cost premiums, it should not be considered all-encompassing;
other factors, some of which are included in Chapter IV, can influence MILCON cost
premiums based on the specific project, location, or execution method.
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Table 13: Broad summary of factors causing MILCON cost premiums

Cost Premium Factor
Development of overly restrictive statements of work or
requirements
Failure to balance risk between all parties
Stifling or not applying innovation
Unique attributes/requirements for MILCON projects
Parameterization of the construction execution method
Selection of construction specifications
Schedule and submittal development and management
policies
Perception of MILCON construction agents
Anti-terrorism/force protection requirements
Federal Acquisition Regulations
Socioeconomic laws and policies including the Davis-Bacon
Act (DBA)

Internal/
External
Control

Supporting
Chapter(s)
II III IV

Internal





Both
Internal
Both
Internal
Internal










Internal





Internal
Both
External







External











Factor Analysis and Mitigation
The third and fourth research objectives related to analyzing the factors shown to
cause cost premiums and develop mitigation strategies where appropriate. Analysis of
cost premium factors under the span of control of the USAF or DoD found disconnects
between different entities and agencies involved. When contractors and government
agencies disagree on whether or not a given factor results in cost premiums, the
contractor is most likely adding to the cost while the government is not looking to
address the contractor’s concerns and thereby reduce costs. The overarching result of this
research is that the USAF needs to better partner with its construction agents such as
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) in order to begin addressing MILCON cost premiums.
Additionally, partnering or alliancing with contractors will allow cost premium causes to
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be mitigated through the synergy of new perspectives and experience. This research
found that 80% of the cost premium causing factors mentioned in Table 13 can be
directly mitigated by USAF or DoD entities. Mitigation of the remaining 20% will
require an act of Congress. This research also quantitatively demonstrated that DBA
wage rates are higher than the local area wage rates and addressed the DBA wage rate
administrator’s concern that the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) geospatial breakdown
did not offer enough fidelity. This information can allow the DoD to bring concerns
regarding prevailing wage rates to Congress to begin to address the remaining 20% of the
cost premium factors.

Overall Conclusions
This research confirmed the anecdotal belief that MILCON costs more than
similar private industry construction. Additionally, this research found that internal DoD
policies and actions cause many of these cost premiums. Previous MILCON research
focused on how public law and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) restrict the
ability to procure construction similarly to the private sector. However, this research
demonstrated that while those conclusions are true, there are many cost premium factors
that the USAF can address independently to lower MILCON costs without impacting, or
even improving, facility performance. All parties involved with MILCON procurement
and construction need to cooperate to help each other meet the user’s needs. An attitude
of cooperation, adaptation of contract templates to correctly reflect practices
implemented in name only, and a focus on the required end-result rather than methods
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applied will allow the USAF to reduce MILCON cost premiums and achieve more with
fewer construction dollars.

Opportunities for Future Research
This research can act as a baseline for many additional research endeavors into
MILCON cost premiums. This research has provided a list of factors shown to cause
increased MILCON costs above expected levels. Future academic inquiries can address
any number of these factors. The following list contains specifics topics that have
emerged where additional investigation can benefit USAF MILCON procurement.
1. Specific, all-encompassing, quantitative Davis-Bacon Act wage rate
analysis. The geospatial statistical study carried out for this research effort
focused on only carpenter and electrician trades. In order to quantify the
cost premiums associated with DBA wage rates, a researcher should
investigate all trades and associate the cost premiums for each based to the
amount of money expended on construction. This would allow an exact
dollar figure to be placed on the DBA wage rate cost premium.
2. Survey and interview regarding MILCON cost premiums with a larger
sample size. The requirement for knowledge regarding the JBER weather
shelter case study limited the number of survey participants for this
research. Additional insight could be gained by surveying a large sample
size and using inferential statistics to associate a specific “level of
influence” with each factor shown to cause cost premiums.
3. Quantitative MILCON cost premium research. This research would
require a long term investment from AFCEC which involves tracking
additional cost information. Additionally, contractors would have to be
willing to share quantitative cost data for projects similar in scope to
MILCON facilities. To do a full investigation, this future research would
have to investigate more than just historical square footage costs.
4. Undocumented scope changes that occur based on fixed programmed
amounts. It appears that when bids are too far above the programmed
amount, engineers reduce scope by removing components of MILCON
facilities. Research into what changes to reduce the bids, and any
performance losses, could help quantify the need to reduce cost premiums
due to the loss of performance. This investigation would require AFCEC
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to track additional information regarding changes to scope from project
inception to bid acceptance.
5. A comparison between private and government execution process,
specifically design-build. James Rosner (2008) also proposed this topic
for additional research in his thesis related to MILCON DB execution.
This research endeavor demonstrated the need to remedy DoD
implementation of DB in order to gain the benefits seen in private
industry.
Further investigation should compare each design and
construction agent’s policies and management guides against private
sector implementation of DB. This future research could help MILCON
execution align more properly to industry standard execution methods.
6. Look into innovative construction materials and methods not currently
used in MILCON. Design and construction agencies restrict the use of
certain methods and materials for MILCON execution. An investigation
into the reasons why certain materials, such as flexible plastic water pipes
rather than copper, are not allowed and what risk the government would
be accepting by allowing new industry standards in MILCON could help
validate the need to allow innovation. This investigation could also focus
on whether or not the end result requirements or user preferences drive
restrictions and limitations.
7. Experiment during MILCON execution. AFCEC should coordinate with
researchers to implement suggested cost mitigation strategies from this
research or private industry practices and then analyze the results. By
partnering with a researcher, changes could be thoroughly documented
and analyzed in an academically rigorous way without taxing AFCEC’s
limited resources.
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Appendix A. MILCON Case Study Supporting Information
Chapters II and III contain most of the results and analysis as it relates to the
JBER weather shelter case study. This appendix contains further methodology details
including information about the database used. Additionally, the final section of this
appendix contains raw content exported from the case study contract requirement
differences database. All conclusions based on the data in this appendix are documented
in Chapters II and III.

Analysis Process Details
Four broad data sources were available for this case study. Both the USACE and
CEG provided the RFPs (contract documents), including the SOW and specifications,
which contractors used to bid on the weather shelter projects. Additionally, CEG and
USACE personnel were available for interviews whenever questions arose about the
projects.

Also, the construction agents provided quantitative data such as the

programming estimate, actual cost of construction, and schedule information. Finally,
AARs written by personnel from the CEG, USACE, and Air Force Audit Agency were
obtained. The synthesis of all the information provided results in a database of contract
requirement differences.
The programming documentation sets the initial, macro, project requirements.
The first step of the case study was to ensure the two weather shelters had the same
macro requirements. Once it was demonstrated that the same requirements existed for
both facilities the analysis of contract requirement differences could begin. For this
study, the contract documents provided an unbiased baseline of requirement differences.
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The USACE RFP was considered the standard since it represents the majority of USAF
MILCON. For each requirement listed or defined in the USACE RFP, a search was
made for an equivalent requirement in the CEG RFP. Any differences in requirements,
or lack of a requirement, was codified and entered in the database. After the analysis of
the contract documents, the AARs were used to ensure no requirement differences were
missed. Finally, any discrepancies or oddities were validated by asking project managers
what was meant by the statement and how each contractor interpreted the statement.
There were very few discrepancies noted during the case study research. Once the
database was populated with all the contract requirement differences, they were
associated with existing, interview developed, survey questions or turned into new survey
questions. Finally, all the contract requirement differences were associated with contract
line item numbers (CLIN). By utilizing a variety of biased and unbiased sources, the
single case study was able to ensure a thorough analysis of contract requirement
differences and thereby discover any factor that could cause cost premiums.
Case Study Database
The development of a database that organizes all the data collected during the
case study is critical to successful analysis (Yin 2009). The use of a database with set
parameters on what was documented for each contract difference helped establish a chain
of evidence and thereby mitigate some threats to construct validity (Yin 2009). Construct
validity is validity that relies on both subjective judgments and empirical data, in this
case the subjective judgment is that of the researcher (Patten 2009). The use of a
database, rather than a single data sheet, ensured data from different sources could be
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linked together for analysis. A Microsoft Access data stored all the survey and case study
data. Table 14 documents the case study database structure.
Table 14: Case Study Database Structure
Database
Name
ID
ShortName

Name

Type

Description

ID
Requirement
Short Name
USACE
Containing
Document
USACE
Section/Page
CEG
Containing
Document
CEG
Section/Page
Difference

Integer
Text

Auto populated by Access
Simple identifier of the requirement

Text

Which USACE provided document
contains the requirement

Text

Which section or page of the USACE
document contain the requirement
Which CEG provided document
contains the requirement

DiffMag

Level of
Difference

Text

DiffSide

More
Text
Stringent
Agency’s
Requirement
Notes
Rich Text

USACE-doc

USACE-sec
USAF-doc

USAF-sec
Diff

Notes
Survey

USACE-CLIN

USAF-CLIN

Text

Text
Number

Survey
Number
Question
Number
Link to
Text
USACE
CLIN
Link to CEG Text
CLIN
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Which section of page of the CEG
document contains the requirement
1 = Similar requirement exists but not
the exact same
2 = The requirement does not exist in
one of the contracts
L = little difference in requirement
M = difference in requirement
H = extreme difference in requirement
(required for Diff=2)
A = CEG specified a more stringent
requirement
C = USACE specified a more stringent
requirement
Notes describing the difference between
CEG and USACE projects
Populated with the survey question
number if directly linked to a survey
question.
USACE CLIN (cost id) containing this
requirement. Comma delimit if more
than one.
CEG CLIN (cost id) containing this
requirement. Comma delimit if more
than one.

Case Study Raw Data
This section contains the raw case study information. The first part lists the CLIN
cost information. The remaining parts present the raw contract requirement differences.
The data has been sorted into five sections, four representing the level of influence, and
the remaining section containing contract difference requirements not associated with a
survey question.
CLIN Costs
The CEG and USACE projects used different CLINs. Additionally, the USACE
project included costs for work not completed on the CEG project; these costs are
included in the CLIN list by construction agent but are not included in the pair analysis or
the case study results. Table 15 contains the USACE CLIN identifiers, descriptions, and
costs. Table 16 contains the CEG CLIN identifiers, descriptions, and costs. Finally,
Table 17 contains the linked cost data including broad descriptions.
Table 15: USACE Shelter Costs by CLIN
CLIN
0001
0002
0003
0012AA
0013
0015
0016
0017
0018
0019
0020

Description
Design/Construct Site Work (outside 5')
Design Wx Shelter (within 5')
Construct 5-bay Weather Shelter
Mod Option Item 0012AA
Offsite treatment contaminated soil
Construct Bay 6 & 7
Provide/install 270V DC Power (7-bay)
Provide/install 480VAC, 3 Phase, 4 Pole (7-bay)
Provide/install compressed air system (7-bay)
Hangar Floor Coating
Interior Painting
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Cost
$3,637,966
$2,135,132
$16,941,440
$50,000
$5,000
$4,991,227
$683,668
$490,678
$225,879
$206,072
$143,440

Table 16: CEG Shelter Costs by CLIN
CLIN
0001AA
0001AB
0001AC
0001AD
0001AF
0001AG
0001AH
0001AJ
0001AK
0001AL

Description
Purchase Pre-fabricated 7-Bay Weather Shelter Hangar
Freight for 7-Bay Weather Shelter Hangar
Provide Ancillary Services
Provide Installation & Site Preparation
270 V DC Power System
480 V AC Power System
Compressed Air System
Hangar Floor Treatment
Hangar Bay Interior Painting
Builder's Risk Insurance Deductible

Cost
$1,232,685
$397,990
$890,478
$14,457,911
$461,267
$604,988
$144,665
$193,837
$142,730
$350,000

Table 17: Matched CLINs and Shelter Costs
CEG
CLIN(s)
1AA,
1AB, 1AD
1AC, 1AL
1AF
1AG
1AH
1AJ
1AK

USACE
CLIN(s)
0003,
0015
0002
0016
0017
0018
0019
0020

Description

CEG Cost

USACE
Cost

Shelter Construction & Site Work
Design Services & Insurance
270V DC Power
480V AC Power
Compressed Air System
Hangar Floor Coating
Interior Painting

$16,088,586
$1,240,478
$461,267
$604,988
$144,665
$193,837
$142,730

$21,932,667
$2,135,132
$683,668
$490,678
$225,879
$206,072
$143,440

Largely Influential Contract Requirement Differences
•

•

Name: Exterior Wall Systems
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 46
- 2.3.13)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USAF
o Linked Survey Question: 36
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USAF specified the use of insulated metal panels for the exterior.
USACE just specified the use of metal panels.
Name: Hangar Bay Electrical
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
110- 2.6.6)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D5.1)
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Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different
More Stringent Agency: USACE
Linked Survey Question: 39
USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001, 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017
CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AF, 0001AG
Notes: USACE required electrical in the hangar be hazard rated per NEC
requirements. USAF allowed for hazard rated or a de-energized circuit
IAW AFOSH 91-100. USACE was very prescriptive with the type of
receptacles and controls required; USAF required meeting NEC and
applicable ETLs.

Both USAF and USACE specified the type of equipment that would be
connected to the 270V and 480V power systems.
Name: Roof System
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 43
2.3.10)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.3)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 35
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies a low-slope BUR, 2-ply modified hot-mopped in
place. USACE specifies exact roofing material requirements. USACE
required interior roof drains. USACE required 20-year warranty. USACE
required 2 roof access hatches.
USAF required a low-slope metal panel assembly that does not shed snow.
USAF allowed a gutter system. USAF required 25-year warranty. USAF
required 1 roof access hatch.

Moderately Influential Contract Requirement Differences
•

Name: 100% Design submittal
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 27
Part 6)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 44
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA
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o Notes: USACE prescribed exact requirements and comments for the 100%
design submittal. USAF specified broad requirements not necessarily for
a 100% design.
Name: 65% Design Submittal
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page
10-18 Part 4)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 44
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA
o Notes: USACE prescribed the expectations of a 65% design to include
what each discipline has to have complete.
USAF did not specify 65% design submittal or requirements.
Name: 95% Design Submittal
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page
18-27)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 44
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA
o Notes: COE prescribed exact requirements for the 95% design submittal
summed up as “complete and buildable”. USAF did not specify. Includes
requirements for each discipline. USAF only mentioned drawings and
analysis requirements in broad terms.
Name: Acceptable Building System Types
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
64)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B50)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifically allowed: cast in place concrete foundations,
concrete slabs on grade, structural steel columns, braces and beams,
engineered metal trusses, roof assemblies with tributary dead loads.
USAF did not specify building systems.

147

•

•

•

•

Name: Additional References
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 2)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (2.4)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 16
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies many additional ETLS, TOs, AFIs, AFMs than
USAF. However, USAF says the list may not be all inclusive of all
requirements that must be met for DoD projects. Differences include ETL
03-1 Storm water construction standards, ETL 03-3 - Air Force Carpet
Standard
Name: Antiterrorism Requirements
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 5)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (2.3.5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 31
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USAF weather shelter was planned to be low occupancy and
therefore exempted from many AT/FP requirements. USACE required the
building to be considered inhabited but not a primary facility.
Name: Ceiling Finish
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 52
2.3.24)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C3.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE prescribed a suspended ceiling. USAF allowed suspended
ceiling or a hard lid.
Name: Civil Scope
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
15)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G30)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA
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o Notes: USACE is extremely prescriptive required a licensed civil engineer
whereas USAF specifies civil objectives.
Name: Communication Room Criteria Sheet
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 682-683)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specified areas and heights, USAF said “as required”.
Rest the same
Name: Compaction Tests
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
32-33)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.4)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive with compaction tests. USAF required
appropriate compaction but did not specify testing. In the general
specifications USAF required the contractor to have an approved quality
control plan.
Name: Contractor Quality Control
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 45 04.00 10)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 45 04.00 29)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USAF requires the control to develop and implement a quality
control plan in coordination with the government.
USACE specifies exact requires the contractor's quality control plan must
meet including:- Exactly what content must be included in the quality
control plan including formatting- A design quality control plan- How
many personnel it takes to manage a quality control plan- Exact
requirements for QC personnel (mainly graduate school or many years of
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experience)- Phases of the quality control plan (including development)A list of all tests and inspections
Name: Corridor Room Criteria Sheet
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 686-687)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE very prescriptive specifying corridor height, area, and
width. USAF specified what must be able to transit and fit in corridor.
USAF specified exterior access; USACE did not. USACE required walk
off mats at entries.
Name: Design Reviews
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 34 1.2)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 44
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to print all comments and responses
in Dr. Checks system and bring 35 copies. USAF has no similar
requirement. Additionally, contractor must furnish a hard copy and
annotated in Dr. Checks action taken against each comment.
Name: Design Submittal Requirement
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 57)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.11)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires 41 hard copies of the 65%, 95%, and 100%
designs. USAF appears to only specify 3 copies of any submittal.
Name: Design Submittal Review
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 3
1.2)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req ()
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
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o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to use Dr. Checks Review System
and respond to comments on the design. Following those comment a
review meeting will be held. The Government has 30 days to review and
comment on the 65% and 95% design submittals.
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•

•

•

USAF requires submittals via an AF Form 3000 (submittal attached) and
does not specify a time required to review and return.
Name: Door Roof Covers
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
45)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 15
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE specified sloped standing seam metal roof for canopies
over each exterior door.
Name: Dust Control
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
14)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G1.1.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE is prescriptive on how dust will be controlled (water mist,
temp enclosures, or other suitable methodology). USAF says contractor
shall provide dust controls.
Name: Electrical Room Criteria Sheet
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 680-681)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specified heights and areas; USAF said as required.
USAF required rubber base at the walls, USACE did not specify. Rest the
same.
Name: Environmental Protection Execution
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o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 57 20.00 10 Page 9
Part 3)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 57 20.00 10)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies the exact way that the environment shall be
protected including fencing off areas not to be disturbed and physically
limiting the work area. USACE sets specific requirements for how the
environment shall be protected (required to be built in to the
environmental protection plans).

•

USAF left the execution of environmental protection to the contractor.
Name: Evaluation Rating System
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Basis for
Award Part IV. (pg 43))
o CEG Source (Section): Tech Eval R1 (Volume II)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC, 0001AD
o Notes: COE and USAF evaluated the RFP using different ratings.
However, the differences should not affect the outcome.
Name: FAR Clauses
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (pg 47-61)
o CEG Source (Section): GSA Schedules (N/A)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 18
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: The COE RFP is required to include all FAR clauses referenced.
The GSA Schedules process takes care of some of the clauses so 3 CES
personnel did not have to include those in the SOW.

•

Any cost differences based on this are more on the government
administration side rather than the contractor side.
Name: FAR Clauses Differences
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00700)

•
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CEG Source (Section): Atch 2 (RFP Section I, pg 170)
Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Different
More Stringent Agency: USACE
Linked Survey Question: 21
USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: The following 38 FAR clauses are included in the USACE project
but not the USAF project
52.211-10 - Commencement, Prosecution and completion of work
52.211-12 - Liquidated Damages
52.211-15 - Defense priority and allocation requirements
52.211-18 - Variation in Estimated Quantity
52.215-11 - Price reduction for defective cost or pricing data
modifications
52.215-13 - subcontractor cost or pricing date-modifications
52.215-21 - requirements for cost or pricing data or information other than
cost or pricing data- modifications
52.217-7 - Option for increase quantity-separately priced line item
52.219-4 - Notice of price evaluation preferences for Hubzone small
business concerns
52.219-16 - Liquidated Damages--subcontracting plan
52.219-25 - Small disadvantaged business participation program disadvantaged status and reporting
52.222-1 - Notice to the government of labor disputes
52.222-23 - Notice of requirement for affirmative action to ensure equal
employment opportunity for construction (covered by 52.222-27)
52.222-39 – Notifications of employee rights concerning payment of
union dues or fees
52.223-3 - Hazardous Material Identification and Material Safety Data
(included in OSHA and EM 385-1-1)
52.223-13 - Certification of Toxic Chemical Release Reporting
52.225-11 - Buy American Act - Construction Materials Under Trade
Agreement
52.231-5000 - Equipment ownership and operating expense schedule
52.232-5000 - Payment for materials delivered off-site
52.236-1 - Performance of work by the contractor
52.236-4 – Physical data
52.236-25 - Requirements for registration of designers
52.244-6 - Subcontracts for commercial items
52.246-12 - Inspection of construction (covered in -1 and -13)
52.247-64 - Preference for privately owned US-flagged commercial
vessels
52.249-5000 - Basis for settlement of proposals
o
o
o
o
o
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52.201-7000 – Contracting officer’s representative
252.204-7000 - Disclosure of information
252.215-7000 - Pricing adjustments
252.219-7003 - Small business subcontracting plan
252.222-7000 - Restrictions on employment of personnel
252.223-7001 – Hazard warning labels
252.223-7004 - Drug free work force
252.227-7023 - Drawings and other data to become property of
government
252.227-7024 - Notice and approval of restricted designs
252.236-7001 - Contract drawings, maps and specifications
252.236-7008 - Contract prices-bidding schedules
525.247-7023 – Transportation of supplies by sea
The following clauses are included in the USAF project but not USACE:
52.216-7 - Allowable cost and payment
52.222-50 – Combating trafficking in persons
252.225-7012 – Preference for certain domestic commodities
252.225-7014 – Preference for domestic specialty metals
252.225-7016 – Restriction on acquisition of ball and roller bearings
252.232-7003 – Electronic submissions of payment requests and receiving
reports
252.244-7000 – Subcontracts for commercial items and commercial
components (DoD contracts)
•

Name: FAR Clauses Full Text
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Section 00700 pg 62192)
o CEG Source (Section): GSA Schedule, Specification - General Req ()
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 21
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: Both GSA and COE contracting are required to meet FAR and
DFAR requirements. COE lists all of the FAR contract clauses while the
USAF was not required to list all of the clauses since some are covered by
the GSA process. Additionally, when listed the USAF removed elements
of the clauses that did not apply.
Overall there are likely additional contractor administrative costs due to
the inclusion of the full-text of all FAR clauses including the portions that
do not apply to this contract. For example clause 52.203-10 included all
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the different type of awards (cost-plus-fixed, cost-plus-incentive, etc.)
even thought this contract is a fixed price contract.
Name: Field Testing
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page
32-40)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (All)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE specified the exact testing to occur for each piece of
equipment while also specifying that equipment shall be tested IAW
industry codes and standards. USAF solely specified testing IAW
industry codes and standards.
Name: Fire Alarm System
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
135-138 2.7.8)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (D4.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 42
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE required the fire alarm system to include a 50% expansion
capability and a minimum of 2 additional releasing zones. USACE also
specified an outside strobe facing the tower. USACE also prescribed the
features of the fire alarm whereas USAF specified a Monaco or equivalent
system.
USAF specified the system required and required a NFPA Class A
addressable fire alarm system (but not including expansion).
Name: Fire Protection Design Coordination
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
128 2.7.4)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D40)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 10
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires the fire protection engineer (FPE) to meet with
Elmendorf fire protection authorities to review all fire protection aspects
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prior to the 65% submittal. USAF required an FPE to be integral to the
design team and only prescribes coordination with Elmendorf fire
protection for the location of a Knox-Box.
Name: Fire Protection Manufacture's Rep
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
129 2.7.4)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE required the manufacture's representative for major fire
protection components to lead testing at the project site. USAF did not set
this requirement.
Name: Fire Protection Quality Control Inspections
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
129 2.7.4)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 45 04.00 29 3.2
(Page 37))
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE prescribed that the FPE shall conduct and document QC
inspections at least monthly. Additionally the FPE must be present for
final acceptance, inspection and testing. The USAF required the
contractor to develop their own QC plan.
Name: Fire Protection System Prohibited Items
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
130)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 26
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE provided a list of prohibited items that would impact
proposal evaluation.
Name: Fire provisions for masonry
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
41)
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o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 16
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies the use of ETL 02-15 A1.1.1.2.1 a minimum of
1-hour fire-rated masonry wall. Both USACE and USAF require the use
of the same ETLs and NFPA requirements but USACE specified masonry
requirements whereas USAF left it open to the D-B contractor to decide
material type.
Name: Fire Sprinkler Piping Requirements
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
132)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D4.3)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USAF required a sprinkler system IAW NFPA, UFC, and ELT
requirements. USACE required the same but then prescribed the exact
piping, fittings, valves, and gaskets to be utilized in the system.
Name: Firms Who May Submit
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part II)
o CEG Source (Section): Atch 2 - Technical Analysis (Section 2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 19
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE specifies an unrestricted and open competition for both
large and small business. USAF specified the use of the GSA Schedules
Program.
This difference meant the USACE RFP is significantly longer to specify
all the contracting requirements. These are not required for the USAF
project since the contractor is already in the GSA Schedules Program.
Name: Hangar Floor
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
19)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
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Linked Survey Question: 32
USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
Notes: USAF gives the requirements based on loading (F22) which
matches USACE. USAF then references the appropriate AFIs, UFCs, and
ETLS. USACE goes further to reference all references but then prescribe
mixtures for concrete.
Name: Hangar Heating
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
84-85)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D3.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE was very prescriptive on how the hangar shall be heated.
USAF required hangar heating based on natural gas and forbid flames or
glowing elements open to the atmosphere in the hangar areas. USACE
specified a 3 hour timeframe to return to design temperatures; USAF did
not specify.
Name: Hangar Transition and Floor Slabs
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
21)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.4 (page 38))
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USAF allowed the hangar floor to be constructed with varying
thicknesses (NLT 6”) based on where the aircraft would actually be
located whereas USACE required the entire floor to be at least 12” thick.
Name: Hangar Ventilation (including APU)
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
83)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D30)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USAF required mechanical ventilation at a rate of at least 1000cfm
to maintain indoor air quality IAW ASHRAE standard 62.1 - ventilation
for acceptable indoor air quality. USACE prescribed exactly how the air
o
o
o
o
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shall be ventilated as at least 3000cfm. USACE then requires a separate
ventilation system for the APU. USAF required APU and hangar area to
be ventilated in order to maintain air quality but did not specify a method.
Both agencies required tempered make up air when the APU exhaust
system is operating.
Name: HVAC Building Controls
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
99-103)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D3.4)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 38
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE prescribes extensive direct digital control (DDC) units that
integrate to the energy monitoring and control system (EMCS). USACE
specifies that the DDC must serve the entire facility. USAF determined
that requirement impractical and only required DDC for monitoring
boilers and collecting utility metering data due to mission requirements
(hangar doors opening and closing).
COE specified a laptop containing a modem and floppy disk drive.
Name: Interior Floor Finish
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 51
2.3.22)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C3.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE required the use of linoleum flooring. USAF required
resilient flooring that can resist tool cart traffic. USAF is willing to accept
finished concrete.
Name: Interior Wall Finishes
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 51
2.3.23)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C3.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD, 0001AK
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o Notes: USACE specified exactly what the walls should be covered with in
different rooms. USAF requested contractor give consideration to room
requirements and specified a finish level.
Name: Interior wall partitions
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
47)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE is much more prescriptive on walls compared to USAF.
However the end result is the same. USACE specifies the steel runner size
whereas USAF requires gypsum board walls on metal studs.
Name: Interior Wall Systems
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 47
2.3.14)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USAF
o Linked Survey Question: 16
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specified walls would be masonry or concrete with 1-hour
fire rating for walls and 45 minutes for openings. USAF specified CMU
or fire-rated insulated metal panels. Required fire rating is 3 hours for
walls and openings.
Name: Janitor's Closet Room Criteria
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 692-693)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE prescribed size, resilient flooring, and ceramic tile
wainscoting. USAF set “as required”, sealed concrete, and some sort of
wainscoting.
Name: LEED Documentation
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 29)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (2.3.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 46
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o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AA
o Notes: The USAF requires the contractor to show calculations used for
LEED credits. The USACE dedicates a section of specifications to how
LEED will be documented. The end results are similar but the path to get
there varies.
Name: Lighting Equipment
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
109)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D5.3)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD, 0001AF, 0001AG
o Notes: USAF specified interior lighting intensities and ASHREA 90.1
requirements as well as giving consideration to LEED-NC requirements.
USACE specified exact fixtures and lamps to be utilized as well as
lighting intensities.
USAF specified that exterior lights should face away from areas that
interfere with flying operations.
Name: Mechanical Room Criteria Sheet
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 678-679)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specified area as 1200ft; USAF specified as “as required”.
Rest same between agencies.
Name: Mechanical Specifics
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
92-99)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D30)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE has prescribed exact requirements for each and every type
of heating system. USAF references industry standards. Cost differences
are likely due to administrative requirements vs. actual HVAC equipment
and installation.
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USACE specified use of DOE Buying Energy Efficient Products
Recommendations or Energy Star. USAF specified energy efficient.
Name: Men's and Women's Restroom Criteria
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 688-689)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 15
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE required: ceramic tile wainscot; USAF did not specify
type. USACE required countertop mounted sinks, USAF required a wall
mounted. USACE required occupancy switched lights; USAF prescribed
locally switched. USACE required resilient flooring, USAF desired
sealed concrete. USAF required 2 women's water closets vs. USACE
single.
Name: Non-government borrow sources
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 30.00 29 Page 6)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (Page 8 1.15)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE has specific requirements for the testing of nongovernment borrow sources including an engineer with 3 years of
experience performing the tests. USAF specifies testing of nongovernment borrow sources.
Name: Non-Hangar Bay Concrete
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 62
2.4.8)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.3)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015, 0001
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD, 0001AE
o Notes: USACE is extremely prescriptive on concrete design and specs.
USAF references ACI 302.1R and UFC requirements.
Name: Plumbing Installations
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
71)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D20)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
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More Stringent Agency: USACE
Linked Survey Question: 32
USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
Notes: USACE is very prescriptive on how all plumbing will be installed
(9 pages). USAF states the plumbing must meet industry standards such
as the International Plumbing Code. USACE goes into specifics such as
“reduction of pipe sizes shall be made with reducing tees or reducing
fittings”. Likely cost differences due administrative requirements vs.
plumbing material and labor.
Name: Preconstruction Submittals
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 2)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC
o Notes: USACE specifies additional submittals above and beyond USAF
requirements. Additionally, USACE specifies them as “preconstruction”
whereas USAF specifies them as submittal requirements.- Certificates of
insurance- Surety bonds- Construction progress schedule- Schedule of
prices
Name: Quality Control System Software Requirement
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 45 02.00 10)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE specifies exactly what will exist in a quality control
system (QCS). USAF has no such requirements beyond using a quality
control system as part of the quality control plan.
o
o
o
o
o

•

•

•

The USACE QCS system must be able to transfer data to the government
include administration data, finances, QC, submittal monitoring, and
scheduling. USACE has developed QCS software that the contractor must
utilize.
Name: Quality Objectives
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 7)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
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o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 16
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE specifies that the facility shall be constructed with an
anticipated life of 50 years with refurbishment at 20 years. USAF does
not specify.
Name: RFP Evaluation Process
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part III)
o CEG Source (Section): Tech Eval R1 (All)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 18
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE evaluates: experience, past performance, schedule, design
solution &amp; drawings, and organization and management. USAF
evaluates: compliance with SOW and specs, management capabilities and
approach, schedule, past performance, and price.
Name: Roof Drainage
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 23
2.2.11)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G3.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 34
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE extremely prescriptive. USAF: “Roof drainage shall be
collected and discharged into the manhole. USACE specifies rainfall
intensity, size of infiltration basins, monitoring tubes.
Name: Schedule Activity Coding
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 8)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
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o Notes: USACE requires scheduling use the activity coding structured
defined in the Standard Data Exchange Format in ER1-1-11 Appendix A.
The structure must be used even if some fields are not used.
Name: Schedule Critical Activities
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page4-5
3.3.2.4)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 32 01.00 10
3.3.2.4)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE requires the following additional critical activities be
scheduled:- Submission of the testing and air balance review reportSubmission and approval of testing and balancing of HVAC plus
commissioning plans and data- Air and water balance dates- HVAC
commissioning dates- Controls testing plan- Controls testing- Performance
verification testing- Other systems testing, if required
Name: Schedule Requirements
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: The following elements of the schedule are required by USACE
and not the USAF:- Government activities (approvals, submittals, design
reviews, etc.)- Responsibility (which party is responsible for performing
the work)- Work areas (identify work area where activity occurs)Modification or claim number (include mod/claim in in schedule)- Bid
item (identify each activity's bid item number)- Phase of work- Category
of work- Feature of work- Project start date- Constraint of last activity
(calculated by critical path)- Early Project Completion (which activities
were accelerated to complete the project early)- Interim completion datesStart Phase X- End Phase X- Phase X (identify which phase activity is in)Default progress data disallowed- Out-of-sequence progress (disallowed
unless contracting officer specifically approves)- Negative lags disallowed
Name: Schedule Submission Requirements
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o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 89 3.5)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 Submittal
Procedures)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USAF requires the schedule be submitted and the use of an
industry standard program. USACE has specific submittal requirements
including:- 3 copies- 2 disks (floppy unless otherwise approved) with
labels- specific file naming conventions- narrative reports- approved
changes verification- schedule reports (activity numbers, description, etc.)activity reports (list of all activities)- Logic report (preceding and
succeeding activities)- Total float report- Earnings report (by bid item)Network diagram- Continuous flow diagrams- Project milestone datesBanding (grouping of activities)- S-curves of earnings
Name: Schedule: Critical Path Method
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 4
3.3.1)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 32 01.00 10 3.3.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires the critical path method project schedule be in the
precedence diagram method. USAF only requires the use of the critical
path method.
Name: Schedule: Directed changes
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 13
3.8)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 21
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE specifies procedures for directed changes. USAF only
references FAR requirements.
Name: Schedule: Ownership of float
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o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 13
3.9)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 23
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE specifies that schedule float is not for the exclusive use of
the contractor or government. USAF does not specify.
Name: Schedule: Requests for time extensions
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page
12-13 3.7)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE specifies procedures and submittals required for requests
for time extensions. USAF only references FAR requirements.
Name: Schedule: Standard Data Exchange Format
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10
Appendix A)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 23
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires the use of the specific non-proprietary protocol
called standard data exchange format for its schedule. USAF does not
specify.
Name: Site Drainage
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Pages
22-23)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G3.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
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Linked Survey Question: 32
USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015, 0001
CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD, 0001AE
Notes: USACE is very prescriptive on storm drainage including specifics
on culverts, infiltration basins, and drain rock. USAF references the
international plumbing code and UFC-3-260-02.
Name: Specification: Airfields and heavy-duty concrete pavement
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (32 13 13.03)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE included additional specifications for airfields and heavyduty concrete pavement including specific mixtures, how to tie-in, weather
limitations. USAF solely required the following of the UFC and IBC.
o
o
o
o

•

•

•

USACE required government approval of concrete design (mix, ratio,
etc.).
Name: Sprinkler System Design
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
132-133)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D4.2 & D4.3)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USAF required a sprinkler system that meets all NFPA and UFC
requirements. USACE prescribed exact elements of the sprinkler system
to include color, deconfliction, and signage. Additionally USACE
specifies that the location of sprinklers and routing of pipes is subject to
approval of the USACE Contracting Officer.
Name: Standard Hangar Bay Room Criteria
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 675)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD, 0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USAF specified a height of 27 ft. USACE specified height as
required for clearance. USAF required additional equipment.
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USACE required an exterior personnel door and cable portal in the hangar
aircraft door; USAF did not. USACE required the walls to be painted
CMU, USAF required painted CMU or metal panels.
Name: Storm Water Protection Plan Inspection
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 57 34.00 29)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 57 34.00 29)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 11
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE specifies the qualifications that a storm water protection
plan inspector as meeting federal standard requirements. USAF does not
specify beyond requiring the contractor to meet federal standard
requirements.
Name: Structural Steel
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
63)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive to include specifying types of
indicators to be used and primer color. USAF references industry
standards.
Name: Submittal Classification
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 4 1.3)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE specifies that submittals are classified as government
approved or information only. USAF requires the contractor coordinate
with the government to determine submittal requirements.
Name: Submittal Packages
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 8-)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.1.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
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o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive in the formatting of specifications,
designs, and color prints received. USAF required similar drawings,
designs, and catalog cuts but did not specify a hard copy format.

•

•

•

Note: Both USAF and USACE have the same electronic drawing
requirements.
Name: Submittal procedures
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 6 1.11)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.11)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE requires 6 copies of submittals for government approval
and 3 for information only. USAF only requires 3 copies of submittals.
Name: Submittal Stamps
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 6-8 1.15)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE requires the use of a stamp by the contractor on submittal
data to certify the submittal meets contract requirements. USAF has no
such requirement.
Name: Submittal Transmittal form
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 5-6 1.10)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.10)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
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o Notes: USACE requires the use of an ENG Form 4025. USAF requires
the use of an AF Form 3000.
Name: Submittal: Scheduling
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 5 1.9)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.9)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 13
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USAF did not have a scheduling requirement for submittals.
USACE specifies that submittals forming a system or interrelated items
shall be submitted concurrently with adequate time allowed (14+ days)
allowed for approval.
Name: Submittal: Withhold of payment
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 5 1.6)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 12
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE specifies that payment will be withheld for materials used
without approval. USAF does not specify beyond FAR requirements.
Name: Sustainable Design
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 7)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (2.3.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 46
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies the shelter should be able to be LEED “certified”
while USAF specifies the project must meet as many prerequisites and
credits as practical for LEED-NC.
Name: Telecommunications Requirements
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
115-117 2.6.11)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D5.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 32
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015
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o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE prescribed communications configurations meeting and
exceeding Elmendorf standards. USAF required contractor meet
Elmendorf Communication Installation Standards. USACE also set
minimum contractor qualifications including years of experience (3 years).
Name: Test Hangar Floor Area
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
21)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 33
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE required the construction of a 3m by 12m test slab with 4
different surface textures. Then a decision would be made regarding the
final selected texture. USAF did not have this requirement.
Name: Work Prior to 100% design
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 28
6.4)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 2
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE did not allow any field or construction work without 100%
design approval. This could be waived if a contractor identifies fast-track
portions of the project at the start of design work. Review of the 100%
design can take 14 days.
Name: Year 2000 Compliance
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00800-159 SCR-38)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 21
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE uses an additional contract requirement to reference FAR
39.106 requiring Y2K compliance. The USAF does not include a special
clause for this.
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Limited Influence Contract Requirement Differences
•

•

•

•

Name: Bathroom Accessories
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
53)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.4.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 37
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive on bathroom accessories with exact
specifications for each item (including toilet tissue dispenser, tampon
receptacle, waste receptacle, etc.). USAF just required the item itself.
Name: Closeout Submittals - Warranty Management
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 78 02.00 10 1.3)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 78 02.00 10 1.3)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 49
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0018
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE specifies a requirement for performance bond, prewarranty conference, and a contractor's response to construction warranty
service requirements. Both USAF and USACE require a warranty
management plan and warranty tags.
Name: Conference Meeting Records
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 3
Part 1.1)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (Page 8 1.16)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to prepare meeting minutes and
provide within 10 working days. USAF does not set a time table for
meeting minutes.
Name: Environmental Protection Plans
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 57 20.00 10 Part 1)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 57 20.00 10 Part
1)

173

•

•

•

o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE requires the following environmental protection plans that
USAF does not:- Non-hazardous solid waste disposal plan- air pollution
control plan- contaminant presentation plan- waste water management
plan- A historical, archaeological, cultural resources, biological resources
and wetlands plan- pesticide treatment plan
Name: Fire Protection System Training
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
130 2.7.4.F)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D40)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 40
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE required an 8-hour training session for fire protection
operations and another 8-hour session for fire protection system
maintenance. USAF required a single 8-hour session on all elements of
the fire protection system.
Name: Fire Protection System Warranty Maintenance
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
130 2.7.4.G)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 41
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE required that one month prior to fire protection system's
warranty expiration the equipment distributer perform all recommended
annual maintenance. Additionally the equipment distributer must replace
any defective or damaged parts, modify software as required, and recertify the system.
Name: Government Field Office
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 30.00 29 Page 5
1.10)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
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More Stringent Agency: USACE
Linked Survey Question: 45
USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
CEG CLIN(s):
Notes: USACE required a government field office be furnished with office
furniture and four laptop computers with base stations. USAF did not
have requirement.
Name: Independent design review
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 45 1.6)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 43
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to have an independent (not
associated with the design) engineer/architect in each discipline review
and certify the design and calculations as being correct and meeting the
RFP requirements. This must be done for 65%, 95%, and 100% designs.
Name: Progress Meeting Contents
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page
11-12 3.6.3)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies what content is required at progress meetings
including: start and finish dates, time completion, cost completion, logic
changes, and other changes.
Name: Red Zone Meeting
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 30.00 29 Page 8
1.20)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (Page 8 1.16)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o
o
o
o
o

•

•

•
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•

•

o Notes: USACE requires a specific red zone meeting at 75% completion.
USAF does not specify a specific red zone meeting but does discuss punch
lists and weekly meetings.
Name: RFP: Technical Solution, Organization and Management
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part V 2, Tab
B and C (pg 21-23))
o CEG Source (Section): Tech Eval R1 (All)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: USACE prescribes exactly how technical solutions will be given as
part of the RFP as well as exactly what information and what format it
shall be in for evaluating organization and management. USAF does not
prescribe the format.
Name: Safety and Occupational Health Requirements
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 35 29 Part 1)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 35 29)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 47
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: Both projects require the use of EM 385-1-1 however USACE also
has additional specifications goes further into specifying exact submittals
required. The difference ends up being that the USACE requires
government approval of accident prevention plans, activity hazard
analysis, crane critical lift plans, and proof of qualifications for crane
operators whereas USAF requires those items exist per OSHA and EM but
not government approval.
Additionally, USACE includes definitions in their specifications whereas
those definitions also exist in OSHA and EM 385-1-1. Overall, USACE
just includes requirements out of EM 385-1-1 in their RFP.
Name: Submittal Procedures
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00800-156 (SCR-8))
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001
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o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD
o Notes: USAF specifies the use of an AF From 3000; USACE requires the
use of a ENG Form 4288. Both require the form in triplicate. USACE
specifies they need at least 30 days to review any submittal; USAF does
not specify.

•

•

•

Based on interviews the long process can increase construction time and
thereby increase construction cost.
Name: Update submission following progress meeting requirement
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 11
3.6.2)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 32 01.00 10 Page
14 3.6.2)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specifies that an updated schedule is submitted 4 days
after the meeting. USAF requires an updated schedule be submitted
before the next meeting.
Name: Videotaping of Tests & O&M Training
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 78 02.00 10 1.6)
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 22
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0018
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE required that all training and tests be videotapes and
provided to the government. USAF did not have this requirement.
Name: Windows
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
50-51 2.3.21C)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G5.4.4)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 41
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE required 5 year warranty; USAF did not specify. Cost
differences negligible with this project due to lack of windows.
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Not Influential Contract Requirement Differences
•

Name: Air Force Project Sign
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 58 23.00 29)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o Linked Survey Question: 48
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE requires a specifically formatted project sign for the
construction site. The cost of the sign is incidental to the project.

Contract Requirement Differences Not Linked to the Survey
•

•

•

Name: Demolition Work
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
13)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G10)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AE
o Notes: The demolition of existing taxiway was not included or required
for the USAF project. Both projects did require similar earthwork for
building construction. For cost comparisons the demolition performed on
the USACE project should be removed.
Name: Emergency Eye Wash/Showers
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
86)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D2.1.6)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE specified that water tempering system cannot be one per
emergency fixture; USAF did not specify. Otherwise requirements the
same.
Name: Excavation and Handling of Contaminated Material
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (02 61 13)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
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More Stringent Agency: USACE
USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015, 0013
CEG CLIN(s):
Notes: USACE included a specification on the excavation and handling of
contaminated material. USAF did not include specifications.
Name: Field Screen Testing of Soils for POL Contamination
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (31 09 20.00 29)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015, 0013
o CEG CLIN(s):
o Notes: USACE included specifications for field screen testing of soils for
POL contamination. USAF did not include such specification.
Requirements specified in code.
o
o
o
o

•

•

•

•

USACE contractor is required to field screen all excavated soils.
Name: Foam Alert System
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
140 2.7.8)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (D40)
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: COE specified blue beacon alarms for foam system; USAF did not
specify.
Name: Hangar Doors
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
47-48 2.3.16)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.4.3)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: Both USAF and USACE specified vertical doors. USACE allow
steel panels or fabric. USAF required fabric.
Note: USAF could use GSA Selection door without markup.
Name: HVAC Heating/Cooling Set Points
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
77-78)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D30)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
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More Stringent Agency: USACE
USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
Notes: USACE required a winter set point of 68oF, USAF required a set
point of 65oF for the hangar bay. All other areas were the same.
Name: Low Level High Expansion Foam Systems
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
134 2.7.7)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (D40)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE is more prescriptive in the foam requirements by calling
out specific ETL criteria as well as specifying the exact pipes and valves
to be utilized. USAF just required foam system to meet requirements.
End result is the very similar.
Name: Proposed Schedule
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part V 2, Tab
A (pg 20))
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC
o Notes: The USAF did not specify a schedule time. USACE specified a
max duration of 540 days unless an alternate schedule optimizes costs in
which case 750 days Is allowed. However, both USACE and USAF must
follow FAR 52.211-10 which specifies a maximum time.
Name: Restroom Hardware
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 52
2.3.26)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.4.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD
o Notes: USACE required chrome plated hardware. USAF specified heavyduty stainless steel hardware.
o
o
o
o

•

•

•

180

•

•

•

•

Name: Site Electrical
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
118-120 2.6.14,15)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G40)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001, 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AF, 0001AG
o Notes: USACE is more prescriptive than USAF but not by much for
transformers and connections. Both require metering and connection to
existing base power.
USACE is very prescriptive on conduit and raceway while still requiring
meeting NEC.
Name: Sources for Reference Publication
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 42 00)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017,
0018, 0019, 0020
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH,
0001AJ, 0001AK
o Notes: USACE includes a list of sources for reference materials. USAF
does not.
Name: Temporary Construction Facilities Specifications
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 50 02.00 10)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD
o Notes: USACE included specific requirements for temporary construction
facilities. USAF did not include any requirements.
Name: Utility Stairs
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 54
2.3.28)
o CEG Source (Section): ()
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely
Different
o More Stringent Agency: USACE
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s):
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•

o Notes: USACE specified exact requirements for utility stairs. USAF did
not specify.
Name: Water Line Upgrade
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page
26)
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G3.1)
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference
o More Stringent Agency:
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD, 0001AE
o Notes: USACE project required upgrading an 8” water line to 10”. USAF
project did not require upgrade but did require a 10” water line.

182

Appendix B. Survey and Interview Supporting Information
This appendix contains supporting information for interviews and surveys carried
out in support of research documented in Chapter II and Chapter III. The first section
contains further information on the development of the survey. The second and third
sections contain the sample characteristics and further detail on survey interpretation.
The fourth and fifth sections contain the actual survey and interview questions. The final
section contains statistical analysis of all survey responses. In order to maintain the
anonymity of the respondents, the raw open-ended survey question and interview
responses have not been documented in this thesis. The author may be contacted for
further information.

Survey Development
The survey consisted of two overarching questions.

Both questions ask the

respondents to rate the level of influence factors have on the cost of MILCON projects;
however, the first question asks for a comparison between MILCON and private industry
construction while the second question requires a comparison between the CEG and
USACE weather shelters. Each of these two overarching questions had a series of cost
premium factors listed underneath that required a Likert-style response.
The cost premiums factors were developed by synthesizing contract requirement
differences from the weather shelter case study with literature review and interview
results. In total 102, or 87%, of the contract requirement differences linked to factors in
the survey.

All ten of the block two questions were developed based on contract

requirement differences that could not be answered with a general comparison between
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MILCON and private industry. Additionally, 22 of the 33 block one questions directly
linked to contract requirement differences. In order to limit the survey length, factors
quantitatively known to cause cost premiums, such as Davis-Bacon Act wage rates, were
left out of the survey. However, the FAR drives many of these quantitative factors, so
they were included in a general form.

Although these factors were purposely not

included many respondents mentioned the additional requirements in the open-ended
response at the end of the survey.
Follow on research, with the goal of using inferential statistics, will need a much
larger sample size. There are multiple barriers to success that could not be overcome for
this study. First, the requirement for knowledge related to the JBER case study greatly
reduced the population of available experts. A more broadly distributed survey would
not be able to ask questions about specific MILCON projects. Second, contractors and
government employees are hesitant to answer questions or provide additional data
because it can directly affect their organization’s performance. For example, a contractor
who provides information about why MILCON costs more could end up losing money if
the Government improved its MILCON process and reduced costs. However, many
contractors pointed out that improving the process could increase their profits since many
additional burdens could be removed. Additionally, some government employees are
hesitant to blame their own organization. Finally, a larger survey would require full
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and an Air Force survey control number.
Both of these elements take additional time to obtain, and the Air Force is hesitant to
inundate personnel with surveys; thus, it is difficult to obtain a control number. The
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survey implemented supported the goals of this study; however, the lessons learned and
understood can help future research.
Institutional Review Board
The AFIT Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed the interview and survey.
The IRB granted the survey and interview an exemption from human experimentation
requirements (32 CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2, and AFI 40-402) on 15 October 2012. This
study qualified for an exemption because no sensitive data was collected and respondent
anonymity was maintained through the use of broad demographic information.

Sample Characteristics
A purposeful sample was utilized for both the surveys and interviews.

The

purposive sample ensured all respondents were experts in the engineering, construction,
and contracting fields with knowledge of private industry and MILCON or direct
knowledge of the case study projects (Patten 2009). Additionally, snowball sampling
occurred with the survey when contractors and USACE provided additional points of
contact. Although snowball and purposive sampling bring can add additional bias to the
study, the use of unbiased source documents mitigated this bias. The sample involved
three demographics.

The USAF personnel demographic contains engineers and

contracting officers currently or previously assigned to the 3rd Civil Engineer Squadron,
673d Civil Engineer Group, or 673d Contracting Squadron. The USACE demographic
contains engineers and contracting personnel assigned to USACE Alaska District.
Finally, the contractor demographic contains engineers and contract specialists with
private industry and MILCON experience. In each demographic certain respondents did
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not answer all of the survey questions. This outcome was expected since all respondents
were asked not to answer questions where they did not have experience or knowledge.
The sample used for the survey and interviews provided knowledge, both broad and
specific, that helped validate MILCON cost premiums and provide external validity to
the case study findings.

Survey Interpretation
The limited population, and therefore limited sample size, resulted in the use of
descriptive statistics rather than inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics include using
histograms, the mean median or mode, as well as qualitative descriptions of data (Neter et
al. 1996). The small sample size required the use of these statistics were utilized because
the responses did reflect a standard distribution.

However, the use of descriptive

statistics does not invalidate the results and even helps avoid issues with the Likert scale
using ordinal data in a continuous manner (Carifio and Perla 2007). Non-parametric
statistics were used to rank each factors level of influence relative to one another for each
demographic. Additionally the responses were average for each demographic for each
factor. Finally, an overall weighted average was determined based on the response
averages from each demographic. All of these values were utilized to compare cost
premium factors individually as well as in between demographics.

Survey Given
The survey given to USAF civil engineers and contracting personnel, USACE
Alaska District, and contractors is shown in Table 18.
electronically to all respondents.
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The survey was distributed

Table 18: Electronically Distributed Survey
Directions: Please place an x in the appropriate box rating the influence of each factor.
Research has shown that MILCON projects cost more than equivalent private industry
construction. For the factors below it is given that MILCON projects costs more than private
industry construction. If you have no experience with one of the factors please leave it blank.
The second block of questions relate specifically to the Army Corp of Engineers (standard)
MILCON 7-bay weather shelters compared to the USAF GSA procured weather shelters.
While this survey focuses on cost, the research team understands that in some instances the
additional cost is merited.
Demographic Information
Please select (by bolding) the entity you
USAF
USA
associate with:
Engineering
Engineering
USAF
Contracting
Contractor
Questions Block 1
Please rate the level of influence each factor
Factor influence on MILCON cost premiums
below has on the cost of MILCON projects
To a
To a
To a
To a
above private industry construction costs.
Not at
very
limited moderate large
all
large
extent
extent
extent
extent
USAF implementation of design-build
execution
USACE implementation of design-build
execution
Design-build rather than design-bid-build
Contracting method: Firm fixed price
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed project
cost) early in project development
Oversight on contractor by local CE squadron
Oversight on contractor by AFCEE
Oversight on contractor by USACE/NAVFAC
Quality control requirements set by the
government
Submittal process (administration/# of
submittals)
Submittal timeline (time for
approval/rejection)
Unique attributes of USAF project vs private
industry with similar end-use requirements
Military design standards/specifications
Contract requirements for PEs (professional
engineers)
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
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FAR: 8A/small-business policies
FAR: Restrictions on government-contractor
alliancing/partnering
FAR: Administrative requirements
Non-FAR related administrative requirements
Restrictions placed on designs
Restrictions placed on construction methods
USAF project through USACE
USAF project through AFCEE
Prescriptive design requirements rather than
code references
O&M training for government personnel
Warranty requirements
Requirement for a non-government
independent design review
Design review process
Contractor provided government field office
LEED for new construction requirements
Safety requirements (OSHA & EM 385-1-1)
Project signage requirements
Requirement for warranty performance
bonds
Questions Block 2
Please rate the level of influence each factor
Factor influence on MILCON cost premiums
below has on the cost of the USACE weather
To a
To a
To a
To a
shelter (standard) above USAF GSA-procured Not at
very
limited moderate large
weather shelter costs.
all
large
extent
extent
extent
extent
Schedule management requirements
required by USACE versus CE squadron
Inhabited vs low-occupancy antiterrorism/force protection standards
requirements
Requirement to develop test hangar concrete
slabs
Internal roof drains versus gutters
Built up low slope roof versus metal panels
CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar
bay walls
Acquisition of specified bathroom accessories
versus requirement for non-specific
bathroom accessories
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Direct digital controls for all HVAC
components
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the
hangar bays versus a de-energized system
Additional capacity required in fire alarm
system above and beyond current building
scope
Additional Comments
Please feel free to provide comments for any of the factors, especially factors which you rated
as having no influence or a strong influence on MILCON cost premiums.

In addition to the survey the following text was included in the email to ensure all
respondents understood their rights as they relate to the survey, the purpose of the
research, and to comply with the guidelines of the IRB exemption:
Purpose:
The United States Air Force continually searches for methods to reduce
construction costs and improve performance. This research attempts to determine
what factors cause military construction to cost more than private industry. In
order to validate and determine the influence of factors shown to cause increased
costs, experts such as you are being surveyed. The open ended and/or Likert style
questions provide a deeper understanding of factors affecting the costs of military
construction above standard private industry costs. All answers are anonymous
and cannot be traced back to you.
Participation:
Your participation in this data collection effort is greatly appreciated and desired.
Though your participation is beneficial to this research, please remember that it is
COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY. Whether you decide to participate or withdraw
from the survey or interview process will have no impact up your relationship
with the researcher, the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense.
Confidentiality:
Demographic data regarding the status of the interviewee is collected solely to
allow the data to be interpreted more specifically. All answers are
ANONYMOUS and do not include name or organization.
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Instructions:
•

Base all of your responses on your own personal experiences, thoughts, or
desires

•

For open ended questions please ensure your answers are as clear as
possible. If more background information is required feel free to provide
that information to the researched.

•

There is no “right” answer to the survey or open ended questions. Please
select the option you feel is most correct.

•

If you believe you do not have the experience to truthfully answer a
question please leave it blank.

Contact Information:
If you have any questions, comments, or concerns about this survey or interview,
please contact Capt Daniel Blomberg using the information below.
AFIT/ENV BLDG 640/Room 104A
2950 Hobson Way
Wright Patterson AFB OH 45433‐7765
Email: daniel.blomberg@afit.edu
Advisor: paul.cotellesso@afit.edu
Advisor: alfred.thal@afit.edu
Phone: DSN 785‐3636 x7401, commercial (937) 255‐6565 x7401
Interview Questions
The following open-ended interview questions were asked to the government
employees and contractors surveyed.

Questions two and three were only asked of

contractors and question five was only asked of government employees.
1. In your expert opinion, do you believe MILCON costs more than private
industry construction? If so, what are the causes of MILCON cost
premiums compared to private industry construction?
2. (Contractor Only) What is your overall experience working on MILCON
projects compared to private industry construction?
3. (Contractor Only) What, if any, additional factors are included for
MILCON projects that are not included for private industry construction?
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Additionally, do these factors vary by executing agent such as USACE,
AFCEE, or the local civil engineer squadron?
4. What is your opinion on the implementation of Air Force MILCON
design-build processes compared to private industry implementation and
the traditional Air Force MILCON design-bid-build execution?
5. (Government Only) Have you seen any policies that either cause
additional cost premiums or have worked to remove cost premiums? If so,
what are the policies and can they be controlled or influenced by the
USAF?
Survey Response Data
This section contains the survey response data for all questions.

Table 20

contains the general MILCON cost premium factors (Block 1 in Table 18) while Table 21
contains cost premium factors directly related to the JBER weather shelter projects
(Block 2 in Table 18). Figure 11 shows the color key for the demographic data as
depicted in each distribution. Table 19 contains the cost premium identification numbers
that link the survey question to a cost premium theme in the survey results table.

Figure 11: Distribution Key for Survey Demographics
Table 19: Cost Premium Theme IDs
#
1
2
3
4
5

Cost Premium Theme
Selection of Construction Specifications
Misapplication of Execution Process
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation
Failing to Balance Risk
Additional Public-sector Requirements
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Table 20: Survey Response Data - General MILCON Cost Premium Factors
Question & Statistical Information
USAF implementation of design-build
execution
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 3.05
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSACE:3.75
AvgUSAF:2.4
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor:3
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 3, 4
• Overall influence: Moderate

Distribution

USACE implementation of design-build
execution
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.43
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.89
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.40
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 4.00
• # of kt differences linked: 7
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 2, 3, 4
• Overall influence: Moderate
Design-build rather than design-bid-build
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 2.32
AvgUSACE: 2.56
• NUSACE: 9
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.40
AvgContractor: 2.00
• NContractor: 4
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Limited

Contracting method: Firm fixed price
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 2.30
• NUSACE: 7
AvgUSACE: 2.00
AvgUSAF: 2.40
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 2.50
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Limited
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Question & Statistical Information
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed
project cost) early in project development
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 2.53
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.67
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 3.25
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 1.67
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Moderate

Distribution

Oversight on contractor by local CE
squadron
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 2.06
AvgUSACE: 2.38
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSAF: 1.80
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 2.00
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Limited
Oversight on contractor by AFCEE
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 2.43
• NUSACE:8
AvgUSACE: 2.75
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.20
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 2.33
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Limited

Oversight on contractor by
USACE/NAVFAC
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.39
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.67
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 4.00
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
Quality control requirements set by the
government
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.41
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 3.33
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.40
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 9
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Moderate

Distribution

Submittal process (administration/# of
submittals)
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.11
AvgUSACE: 2.44
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSAF: 3.40
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 14
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 4
• Overall influence: Moderate
Submittal timeline (time for
approval/rejection)
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 2.97
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.22
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.20
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 4
• Overall influence: Moderate
Unique attributes of USAF project vs
private industry with similar end-use
requirements
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 3.47
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 4.33
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.40
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 2.67
• # of kt differences linked: 2
• Cost Premium Themes: 3, 5
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
Military design standards/specifications
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.26
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 3.78
AvgUSAF: 3.00
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 4
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3, 5
• Overall influence: Moderate

Distribution

Contract requirements for PEs
(professional engineers)
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 2.14
AvgUSACE: 1.67
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSAF: 3.00
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 1.75
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Limited
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 2.76
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSACE: 3.13
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.40
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 2.75
• # of kt differences linked: 2
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5
• Overall influence: Moderate

FAR: 8A/small-business policies
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 3.18
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSACE: 3.13
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.40
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
FAR: Restrictions on governmentcontractor alliancing/partnering
• N: 15
AvgWeighted: 2.49
• NUSACE: 7
AvgUSACE: 2.00
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.80
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 2.67
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5
• Overall influence: Limited

Distribution

FAR: Administrative requirements
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 3.06
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSACE: 2.88
AvgUSAF: 2.80
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 4
• Cost Premium Themes: 4, 5
• Overall influence: Moderate

Non-FAR related administrative
requirements
• N: 15
AvgWeighted: 2.41
• NUSACE: 7
AvgUSACE: 2.57
• NUSAF:5
AvgUSAF: 3.00
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 1.67
• # of kt differences linked: 8
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 4
• Overall influence: Limited
Restrictions placed on designs
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.05
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.89
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.00
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.25
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
Restrictions placed on construction
methods
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.10
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.89
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.40
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3
• Overall influence: Moderate

Distribution

USAF project through USACE
• N: 16
AvgWeighted: 4.05
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.56
AvgUSAF: 4.60
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 5.00
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Large

USAF project through AFCEE
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 3.14
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 2.67
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 2.75
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 4.00
• # of kt differences linked: 0
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Moderate

Prescriptive design requirements rather
than code references
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 3.31
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 3.67
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 3.00
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 3.25
• # of kt differences linked: 23
• Cost Premium Themes: 1
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
O&M training for government personnel
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 2.15
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 1.78
AvgUSAF: 2.00
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 2.67
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 5
• Overall influence: Limited

Distribution

Warranty requirements
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 2.23
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 1.89
AvgUSAF: 1.80
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 2
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Limited

Requirement for a non-government
independent design review
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 2.41
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSACE: 2.13
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.60
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 2.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Limited
Design review process
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 2.74
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.67
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.80
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 2.75
• # of kt differences linked: 4
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 3
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
Contractor provided government field
office
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 1.99
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.11
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 2.20
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 1.67
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Limited

Distribution

LEED for new construction requirements
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 2.90
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.89
AvgUSAF: 2.80
• NUSAF: 5
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 2
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Moderate

Safety requirements (OSHA & EM 385-11)
• N: 18
AvgWeighted: 1.96
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 2.33
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 1.80
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 1.75
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 5
• Overall influence: Limited
Project signage requirements
• N: 17
AvgWeighted: 1.29
• NUSACE: 9
AvgUSACE: 1.33
• NUSAF: 5
AvgUSAF: 1.20
• NContractor: 4
AvgContractor: 1.33
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Not at all
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Question & Statistical Information
Requirement for warranty performance
bonds
• N: 14
AvgWeighted: 1.83
• NUSACE: 8
AvgUSACE: 1.50
• NUSAF: 3
AvgUSAF: 1.67
• NContractor: 3
AvgContractor: 2.33
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 4
• Overall influence: Limited

Distribution
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Table 21: Survey Response Data - Specific to Weather Shelters MILCON Cost
Premium Factors
Question & Statistical Information
Schedule management requirements
required by USACE versus CE squadron
• N: 13
AvgWeighted: 2.92
• NUSACE: 7
AvgUSACE: 2.00
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 2.75
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 4.00
• # of kt differences linked: 2
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5
• Overall influence: Moderate

Distribution

Inhabited vs low-occupancy antiterrorism/force protection standards
requirements
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 2.81
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 2.17
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 2.75
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 5
• Overall influence: Moderate
Requirement to develop test hangar
concrete slabs
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 2.69
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 1.83
AvgUSAF: 2.75
• NUSAF: 4
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Moderate
Internal roof drains versus gutters
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 2.86
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 2.83
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 2.75
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Question & Statistical Information
Built up low slope roof versus metal panels
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 3.67
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 3.50
AvgUSAF: 3.50
• NUSAF: 4
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 4.00
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3
• Overall influence: Large

CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar
bay walls
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 4.06
AvgUSACE: 3.17
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSAF: 4.50
• NUSAF: 4
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 4.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1
• Overall influence: Large
Acquisition of specified bathroom
accessories versus requirement for nonspecific bathroom accessories
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 2.33
AvgUSACE: 2.00
• NUSACE: 6
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 2.00
AvgContractor: 3.00
• NContractor: 2
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1
• Overall influence: Limited
Direct digital controls for all HVAC
components
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 3.14
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 2.67
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 3.25
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 3.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1
• Overall influence: Moderate
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Distribution

Question & Statistical Information
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the
hangar bays versus a de-energized system
• N: 12
AvgWeighted: 4.00
• NUSACE: 6
AvgUSACE: 3.50
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 4.00
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 4.50
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3
• Overall influence: Large

Distribution

Additional capacity required in fire alarm
system above and beyond current building
scope
• N: 11
AvgWeighted: 3.00
• NUSACE: 5
AvgUSACE: 3.00
• NUSAF: 4
AvgUSAF: 3.00
• NContractor: 2
AvgContractor: 3.00
• # of kt differences linked: 1
• Cost Premium Themes:
• Overall influence: Moderate
Survey Response Results
This section contains a synopsis of the survey response data. This data is used
and referenced throughout the thesis. Table 22 (next page) contains each factor, its
weighted average, qualitative level of influence on cost premiums, rank based on each
demographic, and overall rank based on the weighted average. The table is sorted based
on factor cost premium influence from most to least influential factors, and highlights
difference ranks between demographics.
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Table 22: Survey Results Including Ranked Level of Influence
Applies
To
Specific
General
Specific
Specific
General
General
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General
General
General
General
General
General
Specific
General
General
General
General
General

Factor
CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar bay
walls
USAF project through USACE
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the
hangar bays versus a de-energized system
Built up low slope roof versus metal panels
Unique attributes of USAF project vs private
industry with similar end-use requirements
USACE implementation of design-build
execution
Quality control requirements set by the
government
Oversight on contractor by USACE/NAVFAC
Prescriptive design requirements rather than
code references
Military design standards/specifications
FAR: 8A/small-business policies
USAF project through AFCEE
Direct digital controls for all HVAC components
Submittal process (administration/# of
submittals)
Restrictions placed on construction methods
FAR: Administrative requirements
USAF implementation of design-build execution
Restrictions placed on designs

Influence
on Cost
Premiums

Weighted
Avg.
Value

Rank by Demographic

Large

4.06

8

2

2

1

Large

4.05

25

1

1

2

Large

4.00

5

3

2

3

Large

3.67

5

5

4

4

Moderate

3.47

1

6

29

5

Moderate

3.43

12

6

4

6

Moderate

3.41

7

6

8

7

Moderate

3.39

19

3

8

8

Moderate

3.31

4

15

16

9

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

3.26
3.18
3.14
3.14

2
9
19
19

15
6
25
12

18
18
4
8

10
11
12
12

Moderate

3.12

27

6

8

14

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

3.10
3.06
3.05
3.05

12
16
3
12

6
21
31
15

18
8
18
16

15
16
17
18

USACE USAF Contractor

Overall
Rank

Applies
To
Specific
General
Specific
General
Specific
Specific
General
General
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Specific
General
General
General
General
General
Specific
General
General
General

Factor
Additional capacity required in fire alarm system
above and beyond current building scope
Submittal timeline (time for approval/rejection)
Schedule management requirements required by
USACE versus CE squadron
LEED for new construction requirements
Internal roof drains versus gutters
Inhabited vs low-occupancy anti-terrorism/force
protection standards requirements
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
Design review process
Requirement to develop test hangar concrete
slabs
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed project
cost) early in project development
FAR: Restrictions on government-contractor
alliancing/partnering
Oversight on contractor by AFCEE
Non-FAR related administrative requirements
Requirement for a non-government independent
design review
Acquisition of specified bathroom accessories
versus requirement for non-specific bathroom
accessories
Design-build rather than design-bid-build
Contracting method: Firm fixed price
Warranty requirements

Influence
on Cost
Premiums

Weighted
Avg.
Value

Rank by Demographic

Moderate

3.00

11

15

18

19

Moderate

2.97

30

14

8

20

Moderate

2.92

34

25

4

21

Moderate
Moderate

2.90
2.86

12
17

21
25

18
18

22
23

Moderate

2.81

31

25

8

24

Moderate
Moderate

2.76
2.74

9
19

31
21

27
27

25
26

Moderate

2.69

39

25

8

27

Moderate

2.53

19

12

40

28

Limited

2.49

34

21

29

29

Limited
Limited

2.43
2.41

18
24

35
15

34
40

30
31

Limited

2.41

32

30

32

32

Limited

2.33

34

37

18

33

Limited
Limited
Limited

2.32
2.30
2.23

25
34
38

31
31
39

36
32
18

34
35
36

Overall
USACE USAF Contractor Rank

Applies
To
Factor
General O&M training for government personnel
Contract requirements for PEs (professional
General
engineers)
General Oversight on contractor by local CE squadron
General Contractor provided government field office
General Safety requirements (OSHA & EM 385-1-1)
General Requirement for warranty performance bonds
General Project signage requirements

Influence
on Cost
Premiums
Limited

Weighted
Avg.
Value
2.15

Rank by Demographic

Limited

2.14

41

15

38

38

Limited
Limited
Limited
Limited
Not at all

2.06
1.99
1.96
1.83
1.29

28
33
29
42
43

39
35
39
42
43

36
40
38
34
43

39
40
41
42
43

Overall
USACE USAF Contractor Rank
40
37
29
37
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Appendix C. Davis-Bacon Wage Rate Analysis Supporting Information
This appendix includes additional information that supports Chapter IV. Journal
Article: A Geospatial Statistical Analysis of .

This appendix provides additional

background information, more detailed methodology, and more exhaustive results than
could be included in the journal article.

Additional Literature Review
Quantitative Spatial Analysis
Spatial analysis requires all data to be attributed to a location in space. However,
it is possible to take non-spatial raw data and relate it to known spatial points. Raw data
can either be imported into a geographic information system (GIS) as data with arbitrary
X-Y points or with unique identifiers that can be related to other data containing
geographic attributes (Old 2000).

The arbitrary X-Y points can either relate to

geographic points on earth or be relative to each other without regard for the true location
on earth. These two methods allow for visualization and statistical analysis of data points
relative to each other or relative to true geographic locations (Old 2000). The analysis of
wage rates relates attributes of the raw non-spatial data to data containing geographic
locations.
When spatial data is available for singular points, but analysis requires a
congruent surface, GIS applications allow for the generation of a surface. Software
performs interpolation on the voids between data points to generate a surface. In ESRI
ArcInfo four surface interpolation methods exist: trend surface, inverse distance weighted
(IDW), triangulation, and Kriging (Hu 1995).
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Triangulation generates surfaces

represented by irregularly spaced points (TIN) while the other methods’ surfaces are
represented by equally spaced data points, or grids. The trend surface interpolation
method uses least-squares polynomial regression with observed data points to generate
the surface. While this method is easy to understand, it is highly affected by uneven data
point distribution and extreme values. The IDW method weights observed points so “the
influence of one point relative to another declines with distance from the new point” (Hu
1995). The advantages of this method include the speed and reasonable results. The
disadvantages include the possibility of ambiguity when the characteristics of the
underlying surface are unknown and inaccuracies caused by uneven data point
distribution. Triangulation generates data from existing surfaces and data points. Due to
this ability, triangulation can offer more accurate surfaces when the attributes of existing
surfaces are known. Also, triangulation is more accurate than any grid method because
known data points are located exactly on the surface rather than only being honored
occasionally. However, surfaces generated by triangulation are generally not smooth and
may have discontinuous slopes around edges and data points. Also, triangulation is
usually unable to extrapolate beyond the observed data points’ domain. Finally, surfaces
generated by Kriging are based on the weighted moving averaging method. The main
assumption of the Kriging method is a statistically homogenous dataset. The Kriging
method uses semivariograms, based on the data variance, to weight data and generate a
smooth surface. Additionally, this method utilizes clustering by weighting a series of
nearby points with a singular value located at the centroid of the cluster. While the
Kriging method provides a smooth interpolated surface, its weaknesses include the fact
that original data points are seldom honored, and the estimation of the semivariogram
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may not correctly relate to the spatial correlation of the existing, known, data. In order
to validate the correct method was utilized, the distribution of the interpolated data can be
validated against the distribution of the existing data (Hu 1995). ArcInfo allows for the
utilization of a variety of surface generation methods which can be used to generate data
where observations do not exist.

Detailed Methodology
This section provides additional details regarding the methodology used to
analyze the effects of the Davis-Bacon Act on USAF construction.
Data Utilized
Analyzing the impacts of the DBA prevailing wage rate involved acquiring,
merging, and analyzing spatial and quantitative data from a variety of government
agencies. The following agencies provided data used for the DBA wage rate analysis:
•

U.S. Census Bureau – The Census Bureau provides spatial data including state
and county boundaries as well as metropolitan and micropolitan statistical
areas. Additionally, the Census Bureau provides place names that can be used
for spatial analysis. The 2011 Tiger data were used. (U.S. Census Bureau
2011)

•

Wage Determinations OnLine Program – The MHD provides DBA wage
determinations via its WDOL.gov site. The data are raw and non-spatial.
WDOL.gov is the official repository for DBA prevailing wage acts. The May
2012 data were used.(Wage Determinations OnLine 2012)

•

Bureau of Labor Statistics – The BLS provides tables of employment and
wage data that are matched to statistical areas provided by the Census Bureau.
The BLS also provides area definitions of nonmetropolitan areas. The May
2011 data were used. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011; Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2011)
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Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) – The OSD provides GIS data for all base
locations via data.gov.

The January 2010 data were used. (Department of Defense

Installations & the Environment 2010)
Geospatial Analysis
This section provides an overview of the steps taken to perform spatial analysis
comparing DBA prevailing wage rates to BLS survey wage rates. A spatial analysis is
the most appropriate methodology because both the BLS survey wage rates and the DBA
prevailing wages vary by geographic location. Additionally, the spatial analysis allows a
quantitative analysis of data across geographic boundaries. The analysis required four
main steps with a multitude of sub-operations. Appendix D contains a detailed procedure
log of all manipulations. All procedures listed were carried out in Microsoft Excel or
ESRI ArcMap.
1. First, all shapefiles, excel worksheets, and DBA text files were downloaded from
sources listed previously. The dates of files downloaded provide a static look, a
snapshot in time, at DBA wage rates compared to BLS wage surveys since both
the DBA and BLS data are updated frequently.
2. Next, spatial data were created based on the non-spatial data provided.
Specifically, the DBA wage data are not spatial data that can be directly loaded
into ArcMap.
a. Create the boundary data for the BLS data based on metropolitan and nonmetropolitan statistical areas. This is accomplished by focusing on
metropolitan statistical areas and matching the nonmetropolitan statistical
areas to county data. However, due to inconsistencies between the Census
Bureau and BLS MSAs some IDs must be changed. Table 27 in Appendix
D summarizes the changes that must be made to the BLS data to ensure
data integrity, continuity, and accuracy.
b. For the BLS information, the data were limited to the electrician and
carpenter trade codes, 47-2111 and 47-2031 respectively. The data were
joined to the boundary information thereby creating one set of spatial data
for BLS survey wage rates.
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c. The applicable USAF bases were extracted from the DoD installations
spatial file. This analysis focused on active duty Air Force bases as well
as joint bases under Air Force command. The joint bases analyzed
include: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Joint Base Charleston, Joint
Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, Joint Base McGuire-DixLakehurst, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, and Joint Base San Antonio.
d. For the DBA data, the zone(s) each USAF base resides in was determined
and the extracted information was merged with the USAF base
information. Table 23 lists the applicable DBA wage rate files based on
USAF installation location. Only these wage rates were used for this
analysis.
e. For the DBA data only the electrician and carpenter wages for each
required zone were extracted. If two hourly wage rates were listed, the
average was utilized to encompass the entire range of USAF construction.
3. The BLS data were analyzed as a standalone entity. A quantitative analysis of the
carpenter and electrician BLS data was performed to determine statistically
significant metrics such as mean, median, mode, and type of distribution.
Additionally, the data were spatially visualized to determine how the wage rates
vary across the country.
4. The DBA data were also analyzed as a standalone entity. A quantitative analysis
of the carpenter and electrician DBA data was performed to determine statistically
significant metrics such as mean, median, mode, and the type of distribution at
USAF bases. Additionally, the data were spatially visualized to determine how
the wage rates vary across USAF bases throughout the country.
5. Finally, the DBA data were compared to the BLS data.
a. The two spatial datasets were visually compared to determine if there were
similar trends. This comparison was done by comparing the standardized
wages rates to each other.
b. The quantitative percentage and dollar wage rate difference were
computed. These differences were compared statistically and visually.
c. Geostatistical analyst was used to map the wage rate difference across the
entire United States. The use of Kriging surface generation is appropriate
due to the geographic nature of the data provided as well as the limited
DBA availability. DBA data were limited since it was only processed for
each USAF base whereas the BLS data provided coverage of the entire
United States.
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Table 23: DBA Wage rate files analyzed
AL58
AK1
AZ1
AR132
CA31
CA33
CA5
CA9
CA36
CA9
CA37

CA29
CA23
CA29
CA9
CO2
CO6
DE4
DC2
FL7
FL1
FL56

FL18
FL29
FL64
FL35
FL36
FL70
GA173
GA203
GA204
GA208
GU1

HI1
ID10
IL7
IN2
KS7
LA9
MD77
MD82
MA1
MI135
MS119

MS90
MO12
MO51
MT63
NE64
NE66
NV1
NV4
NV10
NV1
NH12

NH13
NJ27
NJ39
NM40
NM23
NM32
NM34
NY76
NY31
NY13
NC25

NC65
NC62
NC47
NC41
ND3
ND7
ND5
OH12
OH29
OK14
OK32

PA1
PR1
SC29
SC30
SC33
SC23
SC37
SD4
SD3
TN37
TN41

TX2
TX61
TX266
TX267
TX218
TX268
UT18
UT7
UT10
UT16
VA112

VA115
VA118
VA134
WA38
WA42
WY23

The spatial analysis of the DBA and BLS data provided quantitative and visual
results. Although the use of only two craftsman trades limited the analysis, the results
can be utilized to validate existing literature and reports related to the cost of DavisBacon prevailing wages.
Statistical Analysis
The software solution JMP v10.0 was used for all MANOVA and t-test analysis.
The data were provided to JMP by exporting the tables of carpenter and electrician wage
rate data from ArcGIS. JMP was used to determine the following additional information:
the wage rate if DBA wages could not be lower than BLS wages, the difference and
percent difference if the wage rate could not be lower than BLS wages, and the
normalized DBA and BLS wage rates. Equation 2 shows the formula used to determine a
base’s wage rate if the wage rate could not be below the BLS wage rates.
𝑖𝑓 �

𝐷𝐵𝐴 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 < 𝐵𝐿𝑆 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 → 𝐵𝐿𝑆 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 → 𝐷𝐵𝐴 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
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�

(2)
Equation 2

Additionally, Equation 3 presents the formula used to standardize the wage rates (Neter et
al. 1996). Data for the entire population of USAF bases are available; therefore, the
population statistical variables are used rather than sample variables. Both the DBA and
BLS wage rates were standardized to allow for comparison of the high and low value by
location.
𝑋−𝜇
𝜎
Where:
X = the wage rate
µ = the average of all the wage rates
σ = the standard deviation of all wage rates

(3)
Equation 3

𝑍=

MANOVA and matched-pairs t-tests were used to determine if the differences in
wage rates were statistically significant. For all tests, a 95% confidence interval (α=0.05)
was applied. A MANOVA was performed on the standardized wage rates in order to test
whether the DBA and BLS wage rates track similarly to each other, high and low values
in the same geographic locations. A MANOVA was performed on the wage rates in
order to test the hypothesis that the DBA wage rates vary from the BLS wage rates.
Additionally, in order to get expected dollar differences a matched-pairs t-test was used
to determine the 95% confidence interval. These statistical tests help validate the visual
data presented by ArcGIS.

Detailed Results
This section contains additional results information not contained in Chapter IV.
The additional results include statistical details for each test performed as well figures for
data mentioned but not provided in Chapter IV.
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Statistical Results
This section contains figures illustrating the wage distributions as well as the
detailed results of the MANOVA and t-tests. Figure 12 shows the distribution for BLS
carpenter wage rates. As shown, the skewed right distribution shows that few regions are
paying the highest wage rates. The wage rates vary between $8.81 and $34.26 with an
average of $20.61. Figure 13 shows the BLS electrician wage rate distribution. The
wage rates vary between $10.02 and $39.33 with an average rate of $24.69. Figure 14
shows the multi-modal DBA wage rate distribution for carpenters. The wage rates vary
between $7.25 and $43.59 with an average of $24.16. Finally, Figure 15 illustrates the
distribution of electrician DBA wage rates. The wage rates vary between $7.25 and
$48.28 with an average of $29.33. The BLS wage rates distributions are shaped similarly
for Air Force bases and wage rates across the entire United States.

Figure 12: Frequency Distribution of
BLS Carpenter Wage Rates

Figure 13: Frequency Distribution of
BLS Electrician Wage Rates
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Figure 14: Frequency Distribution of
DBA Carpenter Wage Rates

Figure 15: Frequency Distribution of
DBA Electrician Wage Rates

The following tables contain the detailed results of all statistical analysis
performed on the wage rate data.

Table 24 provides the MANOVA data for the

standardized wage rates. The following two tables (Table 25, Table 26) provide matched
pairs and MANOVA data for the carpenter and electrician trades.
Table 24: MANOVA Analysis of Standardized Wage Rates
Carpenter:
F Test Value: 0.0017804
Exact F: 0.3347
NumDF: 1
DenDF: 188
Prob>F (p-value): 0.5636

Electrician:
F Test Value: 0.0001171
Exact F: 0.0220
NumDF: 1
DenDF: 188
Prob>F (p-value): 0.8822
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Table 25: Carpenter Wage Rate Detailed Statistical Results
Matched Pairs: DBA-BLS

MANOVA
F Test Value: 0.3242846
Exact F: 60.9655
NumDF: 1
DenDF: 188
Prob>F (p-value): <0.0001*

Note: * means statistically significant at
α=0.05.
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Table 26: Electrician Wage Rate Detailed Statistical Results
Matched Pairs: DBA-BLS

MANOVA
F Test Value: 0.5780305
Exact F: 108.6697
NumDF: 1
DenDF: 188
Prob>F (p-value): <0.0001*

Note: * means statistically significant at
α=0.05.
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Appendix D. Davis-Bacon Wage Rate Analysis Procedure Log
This appendix contains a detailed procedure log for analysis presented in Chapter
IV and Appendix C.

This appendix details the data preparation and creation,

visualization of the data, and statistical procedures used. Microsoft Excel, JMP, and
ESRI ArcMap were used for data creation, manipulation, and analysis. Any names of
files presented can change based on the year of data download but the methodological
processes remain the same.

Data Preparation/Creation
This section contains procedural instructions for preparing and creating the
required data. Specific data sources are detailed in Appendix C.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Preparation (Spatial)
In this section the data is prepared for use with BLS data by creating the
nonmetropolitan statistical areas from county data and separating the metropolitan
statistical areas. These areas are used for BLS’ wage rate surveys.
Non-Metropolitan and Metropolitan Statistical Areas
This section contains the procedures used to create geospatial non-metropolitan
statistical areas.
1. Using ArcMap load the U.S. states (tl_2011_us_state) and counties
(tl_2011_us_county) and symbolize to show the borders only.
2. Add the Metropolitan/micropolitan statistical areas to the map
(tl_2011_us_cbsa).
3. Start Editor on the MSAs.
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4. Use select by attributes to select all areas where MEMI equals 2. This
will select all micropolitan areas.
5. Delete these areas. This should leave 374 MSAs.
6. Stop editing and save the edits.
7. Now use the clip tool to clip the counties by MSA.
8. Create a copy of the counties file; call this file counties_no_msa
9. Now select by location all counties in counties_no_msa that are within the
source layer of MSAs
10. Start editor and delete these counties.
11. Stop editing and save the edits. The counties_no_msa will be used to
create the nonmetropolitan statistical areas.
12. Open area_definitions_m2011.xls in Excel.
13. Create a new column called Non-MSA and use the following formula in it:
=IF(LEN(TRIM(C2))=7,"Y","")
This will use the MSA code to determine if it’s a MSA/non-MSA based
on its code length.
14. Delete all rows that do not have a Y for Non-MSA
15. Change the heading names to no longer have spaces, dashes, or
parentheses
16. Create a new column called StateCountyCode
17. Use this formula and repeat it all the way down: =CONCATENATE(A2,"",H2)
This will join the state code and county code so there is a unique value for
joining.
18. Save and close Excel.
19. In ArcMap add the area_definitions excel file
20. Open the attribute table for counties_no_msa and add a new text column
called state_county
21. Use the field calculator to set state_county to [STATEFP] &"-" &
[COUNTYFP]
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22. Join the excel file to counties_no_msa linked by state_county and
StateCountyCode
23. Dissolve county_no_msa into a file called Non_MSAs with MSACode
with division code as the dissolve field.
24. Join Non_MSAs with the excel file by the MSA code with divisions
25. Use editor and delete the 1 <Null> value in Non_MSA. This is an area
not tracked by the BLS.
26. Export the joined Non_MSA as NonMSA and delete the old Non_MSA.
This is done to ensure all the data is in one location and doesn’t require the
join to function.
BLS Geospatial Areas
This section details how to combine the MSA and non-MSAs together to create
one file containing the BLS geospatial breakdown.
1. Use the merge function to combine MSA and nonMSA.
2. The output file should be BLSAreas
3. Remove all outputs in the field map except Non_MSA
4. Add a new output called AreaCode and the inputs should be
MSAs.CBSAFP and NonMSA.MSAcode_with_divisions; remove the
inputs from the field map.
5. Add a new output called FullName (len of 150) and the inputs should be
MSAs.NAMELSAD and NonMSA.MSAname_with_MSA_divisions.
6. Add a new output called ShortName (len of 150) and the input should be
MSAs.NAME and NonMSA.MSAname_with_MSA_divisions.
Military Bases (Spatial)
The procedures in this section limit the bases to just USAF active duty
installations.
1. Add
MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS_RANGES_TRAINING_AREAS_BND
to the map.
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2. Do the transformation to ensure proper analysis however it is unlikely to
change anything since NAD83 and WGS84 are extremely similar.
3. Select by attributes from the base area with this query: "COMPONENT" =
'AF Active' OR "JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Charleston' OR
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Elmendorf - Richardson' OR
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Andrews - Naval Air Facility Washington'
OR "JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base McGuire - Dix - Lakehurst' OR
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst' OR
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Langley - Eustis' OR "JOINT_BASE" =
'Joint
Base
San
Antonio'
This will select all active duty USAF bases and joint bases where the
USAF is the lead agency.
4. Export this selection to a new file called USAF_bases.
5. To make it easier to visualize the bases on future maps, convert the
polygons to points using the Feature to Point tool.
6. Save the point file as USAF_bases_points
Davis-Bacon Wage Data Preparation (Spatial)
This section details the procedures used to prepare a spatial file for linking with
the Davis-Bacon Act wage determination information. The result of this series of steps is
a file containing each Air Force base and its correct Davis-Bacon Act wage data file
lookup.
1. Load states, counties, and USAF bases in ArcMap
2. Now select by location the counties that intersect USAF bases
3. Export the selection to a new shapefile
4. Use Excel to open the DBF file and extract the following columns to a
new sheet: STATEFP, COUNTYFP, COUNTYNS, GEOID, NAME,
NAMELSAD
5. Create new columns for the DVB FileCode and LookUp
6. For each county on pull the FileCode and download the DVB file from
Wage Determinations Online
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7. For counties with multiple DVB files open the file and see which is
applicable to the Air Force Base in the county. For example FL1 applies
to Brevard County Air Force Bases while FL8 applies to the rest of the
county. Also, NV1 is for Nellis AFB while NV4 is for the ranges.
8. For the LookUp column run this formula for all rows of data:
=CONCATENATE(A2,"-",B2)
9. With the shapefile of counties intersecting USAF bases clip the files to
just the bases (if this was done with all counties ArcMap may have been
overloaded).
10. Since some bases span multiple counties it is best to know which base in
in the county. Use spatial join to join the USAF bases to the clipped
county file into a file called USAF_base_with_county.
11. In USAF_base_with_county add a new field called StateCounty.
12. Use the field calculator to set StateCounty to [STATEFP] &"-" &
[COUNTYFP]
13. Add the excel sheet with Davis-Bacon Wage file information to ArcMap
14. Join the excel information to USAF_base_with_county by StateCounty to
LookUp
15. Export the joined file as USAF_base_DBA_file.
16. To handle Nellis AFB and its ranges select the Nellis area bases in Clark
County and extract them from the USAF base file.
17. Join the Nellis bases in Clark County to the Davis-Bacon wage spatial
data. This will give four unique bases rather than the one “base” joined.
This is required because not all the Clark County bases have the same
Davis-Bacon wage determination.
18. Use editor to delete the existing Nellis area bases in Clark County in the
DBA file.
19. Use append to combine the new Nellis base information with the rest of
the DBA file.
20. Edit Nellis Air Force Range to have a file code of NV4.
21. Stop editing and save the edits.
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Davis-Bacon Wage Data Preparation (Non-Spatial)
This section summarizes the process used to create excel files with the proper
Davis-Bacon Act wage information and identifiers.
1. Copy the applicable FileCodes from the excel file used to create the spatial
Davis-Bacon data for each USAF base to a new file called DBA-data.
2. Remove all non-unique FileCodes
3. Create other columns called “WageType”,
“OccupationTitle”, “WageRate”, and “FringeRate”

“OccupactionCode”,

4. For each FileCode there will be two rows, one for OccupationTitle =
“Electrician” with OccupationCode = “47-2111” and another for
OccupationTitle = “Carpenter” with OccupationCode = “47-2031”.
WageType will be “DBA”
5. Fill in the required data from the .dvb files. The dvb files can be opened
in Notepad or any text editor. For any dual wage rates average the
categories. For Davis-Bacon wage determinations set by county, check
which county the USAF base(s) is/are in and average or choose
accordingly.
6. Now split the carpenter data into a separate sheet and electrician data into
another separate sheet.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Preparation (Non-Spatial)
This section summarizes the process used to create a singular excel file containing
all the BLS data.
1. Open oes_data_2011.xlsx.
2. Due to some inconsistencies between the Census Bureau MSAs and BLS,
Table 27 lists the AREA ids that must be changed
3. Create a new excel sheet called BLS_data
4. Create two sheets in the excel file, one called electrical and one called
carpenter.
5. Copy the field descriptions sheet from oes_data_2011 to the new sheet.
6. Copy row 1 from oes_data_2011 to the electrical and carpenter sheets.
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7. Rename GROUP to GRP in the carpenter and electrical sheets
8. Filter oes_data_2011 to code area_type 4 and 6
9. Filter oes_data_2011 to OCC_CODE equals 47-2111
10. Copy the data to electrical
11. Filter oes_data_2011 to OCC_CODE equals 47-2031
12. Copy the data to carpenter
13. Save the BLS_data file
Table 27: BLS MSA ID corrections
Old ID
79600
78100
71650
76600
71950
75700
70750

New ID
49340
44140
14460
38340
14860
35300
12620

Old ID
76450
74650
76750
73450
74950
72400
66

70900

12700

78

77200

39300

New ID
35980
30340
38860
25540
31700
15540
6600001 (also
change area type to
6)
7800001 (also
change area type to
6)

Combine the Spatial and Non-Spatial BLS Data (Spatial)
This section details the procedures used to combine the spatial and non-spatial
BLS data. The final output is two GIS files, one for each trades’ BLS wage rates.
1. Start ArcMap and add the BLSAreas file.
2. Add the BLS_data excel file.
3. Join BLSAreas to BLS_data’s carpenter sheet by AREA to AreaCode
4. Export the data as BLS_Carpenter_Wages
5. Join BLSAreas to BLS_data’s electrical sheet by AREA to AreaCode
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6. Export the data as BLS_Electrician_Wages
Combine the Spatial and Non-Spatial DBA Wage Data (Spatial)
This section details the procedures used to combine the spatial and non-spatial
DBA data. The final output is two GIS files, one for each trades’ DBA wage rates.
1. Start ArcMap and add the USAF_base_DBA_file, counties, and states.
2. Add the DBA-data excel sheet.
3. Join USAF_base_DBA_file to DBA-data’s carpenter sheet by FileCode to
FileCode
4. Export the data as DBA_Carpenter_Wages
5. Join USAF_base_DBA_file to DBA-data’s electrician sheet by FileCode
to FileCode
6. Export the data as DBA_Electrician_Wages
Carpenter and Electrician Wage Rate Data (Spatial)
This section explains the procedures used to create a single GIS file for each trade
which contains the DBA and BLS wage rates.
1. In ArcMap add BLS_Carpenter_Wages, BLS_Electrician_Wages,
DBA_Carpenter_Wages, and DBA_Electrician_Wages
2. Run intersect with BLS_electrician_wages and DBA_electrician_wages.
Call the output Electrician_Wages_Intersect.
3. Run intersect with BLS_carpenter_wages and DBA_carpenter_wages.
Call the output Carpenter_Wages_Intersect.
4. Add a new column to both intersect files called WageDiff with the type as
float.
5. Use the field calculator on the WageDiff column with this formula:
[WageRate] - [H_MEAN]
6. Add a new column to both intersect files called WageDiffPercent
7. Use the field calculator on the WageDiffPercent column with this
formula: ([WageRate] / [H_MEAN]) *100
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8. Convert both intersect files to points for visualization and surface
generation using Feature to Point.
Call the carpenter file
Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt.
Call
the
electrician
file
Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt.
Visualization/Analysis
This section of the procedure log details steps taken to visualize and analyze the
data.
Compare Wage Rate Differences
This section describes the procedures used to test the hypothesis that BLS and
DBA wage rates are different.
Graphical Representation
This section details how to visualize the wage rate differences. The key to
visualization is the generation of a surface based on wage rate difference point data.
1. Load Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt,
and States in a map in ArcMap

Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt,

2. Open the Geostatistical Wizard in the Geostatistical Analyst toolbar.
3. Under geostatistical methods select Kriging / CoKriging
4. For the source dataset select Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt
5. For the data field select WageDiff
6. For overlapping data points select “use mean”
7. In step 4, select covariance as the variable because it results in less
predicted error.
8. In step 4, click the button to have ArcMap automatically optimize the
model
9. In step 5 move the searching neighborhood into the center of the United
States since that is where the data points are
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10. Click finish. This has generated a surface representing the wage rate
differences for the carpenter trade.
11. Repeat steps 2 through 10 for the Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt file
12. Clip the two surfaces to the United States using either the clip command
or the clip function in the data frame properties
Statistical Tests
This section details how statistical tests were performed on the GIS data in JMP.
1. In ArcMap open the attribute table for Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt and
Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt
2. Export each attribute table as a text file
3. Import each attribute table’s text file into an Excel worksheet; the text file
is comma delimited and has headings
4. Open the excel file for each wage rate in JMP
5. Perform a MANOVA between H_MEAN and WageRate by selecting Fit
Model in the analyze menu.
6. Add H_MEAN and WageRate to the Y box
7. Change the personality to MANOVA
8. Run the model
9. Run a matched pairs test on the wage rates to determine the average
difference and its confidence interval
10. Select Matched Pairs from the analyze menu.
11. Add H_MEAN and WageRate to each axes box
12. Run the test, the resulting p-value and confidence interval address the
wage rate difference hypothesis
Compare Geographic Breakdown Fidelity
This section describes the procedures used to test the hypothesis that BLS and
DBA wage rates had high and low values in the same areas.
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Graphical Comparison
This section details how to use ArcMap to visualize the high and low values for
each wage type of a single map.
1. Add
States,
Counties,
BLS_Carpenter_Wages, to ArcMap

DBA_Carpenter_Wages,

and

2. Symbolize the DBA wages as relatively large stars for easy visualization
3. Symbolize the BLS_Carpenter_Wages with graduated colors with the
value as H_MEAN with classification as quantile with 6 classes
4. Symbolize the DBA points as starts with the same graduated colors
according to the wagerate with classification as natural breaks (jenks) with
6 classes. Jenks is used in this case because quantiles did not make sense
based on the histogram.
5. The colors of the stars and the BLS polygons should be the same in the
same areas if they hypothesis that the high and low values of the wage
rates are in the same location is true
6. Repeat the above steps
BLS_Electrician_Wages

with

DBA_Electrician_Wages

and

Statistical Comparison
This section details how statistical tests based on GIS data were performed in
JMP to support the comparison of the geographic breakdown of the wage rates.
1. Use the same excel files used for the statistical analysis
2. Start with the carpenter wage rate information
3. Create a new column with the type of float for each wage type. Call the
column DBAStandardized and BLSStandardized
4. Use the formula Col Standardize(DBA WageRate) to get the standardized
DBA wage rates
5. Use the formula Col Standardize(BLS WageRate) to get the standardized
BLS wage rates
6. Perform a MANOVA between the two standardized wage rates by
selecting Fit Model in the analyze menu.
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7. Add the two standardized columns to the Y box
8. Change the personality to MANOVA
9. Run the model
10. The F-test p-value will describe the statistical significance of the
difference between the standardized wage rates
11. Repeat these steps for the electrician wage rate information
Additional Analysis Options
JMP can be used to perform additional mathematical operations that can then be
imported back into Excel.

For example, this research investigated how the cost

premiums would change if the DBA prevailing wage rate could not be lower than the
BLS wage rate for the area. By using an if then statement in JMP (Equation 2, Appendix
C) these new wage rates can be determined. The following steps state how to export the
data from JMP and import it into ArcMap for analysis.
1. Perform any additional mathematical operations in JMP
2. Export the table from JMP as an Excel file
3. Open the excel file and delete all the existing columns except OBJECTID.
This should leave you with an OBJECTID column and any of the new
columns created in JMP.
4. Add the excel file to ArcMap
5. Join the excel table to the electrician or carpenter intersect file by
connecting the two OBJECTID columns.
6. Geospatial analysis can now be carried out based on the new outputs from
JMP
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